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I. Introduction 
In 1896, Mr. Justice Harlan remarked that our Constitution 
1 
was "color blind . " Unfortunately, this was only a dissenting 
opinion. The Court required a half century before it perceived 
the true light and refused to sanction discrimination based up-
on race, creed or color. 
In 1896, minority groups had mere token political represen-
tation in this country . Today, minority groups are no longer in 
Egypt . Rather they are on Mt . Nebo, the promised land of com-
plete equality is within their reach and they are advancing for-
ward to reach it . Hence, the pendulum is now swinging in the 
opposite direction . Minority groups are now advocating the adop-
tion of legislation barring discrimination . In 1896, the govern-
ment was the usilent ally" of the forces of bigotry. Today, the 
states are being asked to join {as an active partner) private 
groups fighting discrimination . 
Nevertheless, this forward advance has been an uneven one . 
This is especially true in the field of housing. The key weapon 
in the battle for equality in housing has been the Fourteenth 
Amendment . Before this amendment can be app lied, "state actionu 
must be found to exist . Since much of the discrimination 
present in housing has evolved from private agreements and 
private legal devices, the Courts have encountered difficulty 
in finding the requisite "state action . " In addition, the 
Courts have failed to completely illumine the scope and outer 
limits of their decisions . Therefore, we are left with doubts 
as to how much inequality, if any, the law will tolerate . It 
-~ 
is the purpose of the author to trace the development of con-
stitutional restrictions on discrimination in the field of 
housing and to analyze the weaknesses of the adjudicated cases 
in this area. 
We shall be concerned with discrimination in both private 
and public housing. In addition, we shall discuss recent legis-
lative activity in the field of "fair housing legislation." 
Equality implies the attainment of brotherhood. The 
word "brothers" contains another word - "others" -within it. 
I am suggesting, in a sort of symbolic way, that the problems 
in this area are not purely legal. The legal problems have to 
be interpreted within the broader framework of human relations. 
Hence, we begin our study by viewing the sociological and 
psychological effects of discrimination in housing. 
II. The Sociological and Psychological Effects of Discrimina-
tion in Housing 
A. The General Characteristics of Minority Housing 
To fully appreciate the sociological and psychological 
effects of discrimination in housing, one needs to merely ob-
serve the general characteristics of one area of discrimination-
nonwhite housing. These general characteristics have been 
1 described by one commentator as follows: 
"Nothing is so obvious about the Negroes' level of 
living as the fact that most of them suffer from poor 
housing conditions." 
More specifically, such housing suffers from the following 
defects: 2 
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1. Most such homes are in older sections having long histories 
of deterioration. 
2 . In 1950, more than 27% of the homes were delapidated, about 
five times the proportion of those of white families . 
3. Many such homes lack the basic amenities (toilets) . 
4. Repairs to the homes are either not made or are not feasible. 
5. Banks refuse to finance the repair of such homes . 
6 . There is little investment in new buildings in nonwhite 
sections . What public housing there is destroys as many 
homes as it builds . 
7. Tax arrears are higher in these sections than others . 
8 . Nonwhites receive less housing value per dollar than do whites. 
9 . Public services, such as garbage collection, building in-
spections, street maintenance, are less satisfactory than 
in other areas . 
10 . Building values are lower in relation to rents than in 
other areas. 
11 . Overcrowding of land and buildings exists in 18% of the homes . 
Only 5% of white families were extremely overcrowded in 1950 . 
12 . Schools, hospitals and recreational facilities are inferior . 
13 . Single family dwellings have been subdivided into multiple 
dwellings even though they were not suited for that purpose . 
These conditions have had an adverse effect, not only upon the 
minority groups involved, but also upon the dominant majority . 
B. The Effect on the Minority Group 
Let us begin with the more obvious situation - the effect 
-4-
of these conditions upon the minority. Such areas are synonymous 
with areas of disease and illhealth, crime and juvenile delin-
quency, and general social disorganization.3 A study by a 
federal government agency has concluded that slum areas com-
prising about 20% of metropolitan residential areas throughout 
the United States, contained 33% of the population but produced 
50% of the arrests, 55% of the juvenile delinquency, 60% of the 
tuberculosis victims, and 50% of the diseased.4 
Studies with respect to respiratory diseases are revealing. 
Woofter has found a Pearsonian correlation of + . 809 between Negro 
death rates from tuberculosis and congestion in New York City . 5 
In the Black Belt of Chicago where Negroes were living 90,000 per 
square mile as compared with 20,000 whites per square mile in an 
adjacent area, the Negro death rate for tuberculosis was more 
than five times the rate for whites in 1940- 41 . 6 Although the 
high tuberculosis rate was caused partially by other factors 
such as malnutrition resulting from poverty and ignorance, 
overcrowding was a substantial contributing cause . ? 
The non- physical effects on the minority are even more 
shocking . 
Overcrowding and the lack of proper facilities contributes 
to family dis organization . Thus, Frazier writes: 8 
"Because of the i r poverty it is often necessary for 
the two or even more families to occupy a single house 
or the same apartment . Thus individual families are 
denied the privacy which is necessary to family exclusive-
ness . Even where the family is isolated from other 
families, very often the Negro family in the city is 
forced to take in lodgers ••• Often where Negro families 
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occupy a single dwelling unit without lodgers, the space 
at their disposal provides no privacy for the individual 
members of the family . tt 
Furthermore, Woofter reports a Pearsonian correlation of +.243 
between the density of the Negro population and the rate of 
illegitimacy. 9 Frazier concludes his survey with this observa-
tion: 10 
" ••• the house is not a home, f:,ut a place to cook and 
eat as individuals and sleep at night . When the weather 
permits it is generally a place from which one escapes . 
This is true of adults as well as children . This fact 
probably explains why so many Negroes concentrate on the 
streets of Negro neighborhoods . So far as the children 
are concerned, the house becomes a veritable prison for 
them. There is no way of knowing how many of the con-
flicts in Negro families are set off by the irritations 
caused by overcrowding people who come home after a day of 
frustration and fatigue, to dingy and unhealthy living 
quarters . n 
The findings of psychologists and sociologists presented 
to the Court in the Brown case reveal other aspects of the prob-
lem. 11 This report demonstrates that minority group children 
who were subjected to segregation, prejudice, and discriminations 
"learn the inferior status to which they are assigned as they 
observe the fact that they are almost always segregated and kept 
apart from others who are treated with more respectn and that 
"they often react with feelings of inferiority and a sense of 
personal humiliation.n This "leads to self-hatred and rejection 
of his own group . n Some children nmay react by overt aggression 
and hostility;" others "by withdrawal and submissive behaviorni 
most children "react with a general defeatist attitude and a 
lowering of personal ambitions . " "Many minority group children 
of all classes also tend to be hypersensitive and anxious about 
- 6-
their relations with the larger society . They tend to see 
hostility and rejection even in those areas where these might 
not actually exist . " Although these findings were presented 
to the Court in a case involving segregation in educatioh, they 
are clearly relevant to housing segregation as well . Further-
more, segregated housing tends to perpetuate segregation in 
education . A Commission of the North American Council of the 
World Presbyterian Alliance has recently published a report which 
recognized that it is the "preva i 1 ing pat tern of segregated 
housing" from which "stem other forms of discrimination . " It 
reported that so long as segregated housing continues "any 
integration of churches or schools tends to be no more than a 
token . '' 12 
The adverse effects of segregated housing are not limited 
to the children of the minority group. It extends to the adults 
in the minority group as well . 13 "Whenever discrimination pre-
vails it is always accompanied by tension, challenge, aggression, 
difficulties and flex . 1114 
C. The Effect on the Majority Group 
However, in a more subtle way , segregated housing has a 
harmful effect upon the members of the dominant majority . Thus 
Myrdal concludes that the low economic, political, legal, and 
moral standards of southern whites is kept low because of dis -
crimination against Negroes . 15 Linder · pinpoints the problem 
even more cogently by observing that : 
-7-
"People preoccupied with hate are peop 1 e subject to 
emotional turmoil . Since the entire visceral system is 
affected by emotional states, hatred and the tensions 
accompanying hatred seriously effect mental balance and 
physical health . In truth, people who are preoccupied 
with hate are sick people who become more sick the more 
they hate . "l6 
The Social Science Statement attached to the Appellants ' 
brief in Brown,l? indicates that more than 80% of the social 
scientists polled stated it as their opinion tha t the effects 
of such segregation are psychologically de trimental t o the majority 
group members . This statement indicates that: 
" ••• confusion, conflict, moral cynicism, and disrespect 
for authority may arise in majority group children as a 
consequence of being taught the moral, religious and 
democratic principles of the brotherhood of man and the 
importance of justice and fair play by the same persons 
and institutions, who, in their support of racial segre-
gation and related practices, seem to be acting in a 
prejudiced and discriminatory manner . Some individuals 
may attempt to resolve this conflict by intensifying their 
hostility toward the minority group . Others may react by 
guilt feelings which are not necessarily reflected in more 
humane attitudes toward the minority group . Still others 
react by developing an unwholesome, rigid, and uncritical 
idealization of all authority figures -- their parents, 
strong political and economic leaders . As described in 
"The Authoritarian Personality," they despise the weak, 
while they obsequiously and unquestioningly conform to 
the demands of the strong whom they also, paradoxically, 
subconsciously hate . " 
D. The Harmful Effects on Society as a Whole 
Furthermore, there is a definite correlation between 
segregated housing and the occurrence of race riots . Where 
Negroes are integrated with Whites into self- contained communities 
without segregation, reach daily contact with their co-tenants, 
- 8-
are given the same privileges and share the same responsi-
bilities, initial latent tensions tend to subside, distinctions 
become reconciled, cooperation ensues and an environment is 
i 1 h · h . d 18 Th L created in which interrac a armony 1S ac 1eve • us, _ ee, 
in analyzing the race riot concludes that: 
11 No Negroes and whites who lived close together as 
neighbors showed any tendency to fight each other . ul9 
In tracing the real causes of race riots Lee emphasizes 
the two opposing processes of: (1) a tremendous accumulation 
of pressures within the hemmed in Negro district and, (2) sharp 
defensive movements to keep the Negro community from expanding . 20 
Segregation in housing has other harmful effects . 21 
Segregated housing involves a loss of the social values of cul -
tural interchange of mixed groups . It is a factor leading to 
the decay of American cities . In addition, segregated housing 
in the United States adversely affects our world political posi-
tion and our relations with other nations . 
E. Discrimination as a Prime Cause of Segregated Housing 
On the assumption that each man gets the full housing 
value he can pay for, it is frequently argued that Negroes can-
not obtain better housing because of inability to pay rather 
than because of discrimination . This contention is based on 
the fact that non-white income is less than one- half of white 
income, with government data establishing that the median in-
come of white families in 1950 was $4,135, whereas for non-
whites it was only $1,569 . 22 . Nevertheless, the potency of 
discrimination is proven by the fact that Negro families get 
-9-
less for their housing dollar than white families on the same 
income !eve 1. 23 
"Negro residents of the Chicago 'Black Belt' pay as much 
per cubic foot per room as that paid by wealthy residents for 
equivalent space of the Lakeside Drive . n24 
Indeed, the relative inferiority actually increases as 
the rental va 1 ue increases . 25 
PERCENTAGE OF SUB- STANDARD UNITS 
Ratio 
Monthl;:t: Renta 1 Value White Non- White (Non- White to White) 
Under $5 90 . 2 97 . 6 1. 1 
$5 - $9 87 . 7 94 . 7 1.1 
$10 
- $14 69 . 4 79 . 4 1.1 
$15 - $19 42 . 1 55 .3 1. 3 
$20 - $24 25 .0 43 . 8 1.8 
$25 - $29 14 . 4 31 .o 2 . 2 
$30 - $39 7 . 7 20 . 9 2 . 7 
$40 - $49 4 . 0 13 . 5 3 . 4 
$50 
- $59 3 . 2 10 . 9 3 -4 
$60 
- $74 2 . 8 9 . 1 3 . 3 
$75 - $99 2 . 7 10 . 7 3 . 9 
$100 and over 2 . 8 13 .4 4 . 8 
Hence, d i scr imina t ion is a prime cause of this injurious 
situation which still plagues our society. 
III . Discrimination, Propert;:t: Values, and Other Myths 
One of the major justifications for discrimination in 
housing has been an economic one . Up to about 20 years ago, 
- 10-
even unbiased students of the subject assumed that the presence 
of minorities in a neighborhood was a serious value destroying 
influence . 1 Thus, in listing the factors to observe in apprais-
ing, one expert stressed the necessity to inquire as to whether 
there are "undesirable racial elements in the neighborhood, and, 
if so, are they likely to expand in a way that may injure the 
property . n2 Mcmichael pointed out that values almost always 
decline when a white district is colonized by Negroes . 3 The 
desirability of enforcing racial restrictions was strongly 
recommended by appraises . 4 Louis M. Platt wrote:5 
"Badly neglected properties are salable in a settled 
district; but let one Negro move into a white district and 
a chain of events that will halt the sales of nearby 
properties is set in motion . " 
Appraisers soon set up a hierarchy showing how land values 
are affected by races and nationalities . From most favorable to 
least favorable, the list was : 6 
1 . English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, Scandinavians 
2 . North Ita 1 ia ns 
J . Bohemians or Czechs 
4 . Poles 
5. Lithuanians 
6 . Greeks 
7 . Russian Jews 
8 . South Ita 1 ia ns 
9 . Negroes 
10 . Mexicans 
- 11-
However, scientific examinations in recent years have 
reversed this line of thought . These studies indicate that 
under present day conditions the infiltration of minority 
groups tend to stabilize or even raise property values . 7 Al -
though panic selling sometimes follows early sales to the 
minority group and prices drop, prices soon become stabilized 
~fter the first hysterical selling phase has passed . After 
this period has passed, prices gradually increase under the 
pressure of Negro bidding . 8 
"It usually will be found that sales activity is greater 
in racially mixed areas, especially in low and moderate price 
ranges, and that the high effective demand among Negro buyers 
not only sustains price levels but often increases them . n9 
However, majority groups still entertain the misconception 
that minority groups do not properly maintain their homes, and 
over-occup_a'y them . 10 These groups fail to realize that these 
minority persons are the victims and not the cause . 11 The 
recently published Report of the Commission on Race and Housing 
summarizes some of the salient aspects of the evidence concern-
12 ing property values and race as follows: 
"More often than not , residential areas in which non-
whites are permitted to enter are older neighborhoods 
where the housing is already obsolescent or deteriorating . 
Declining values in those districts, coinciding with 
nonwhite entry, have furnished much of the evidence for 
the thesis that nonwhites injure property values . 11 
Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, modern 
proponents of discrimination in housing still cling to the notion 
that property values will be depressed by integration . In fact, 
-12-
this has been (as shall be indicated later) the rallying cry in 
opposition to Fair Housing Legislation. 
In addition to the valuation argument, the following other 
arguments have been made in opposition to integration: 
1. Negroes and Whites do not mix. 
2 . Nonwhites are dirty and spoil the neighborhood . 
3 . Nonwhites hurt the social status of white neighbors . 
4. The minority always goes where it is not wanted . 
Reasoned and scientific analysis has clearly demonstrated the 
falsity of these positions . 12 
IV . The Common Law and Public Poli£Y 
Aside from constitutional considerations, discriminatory 
devices in housing may be violative of the public policy of a 
state as expressed in its common law . 
The power of alienation is so commonly one of the constituent 
elements of property that it is now regarded as a characteristic 
attribute of ownership. Restraints which make it impossible foc 
the owner of property to transfer his interest have grave social 
and economic consequences . 1 Such restraints take the property 
out of commerce . They also have the tendency to concentrate 
wealth . Another evil growingout of a restraint is its effect 
to discourage improvements when it is imposed upon an interest 
in land . Some, if not all , of these consequences flow from a 
discriminatory restraint. Hence, it might be contended that a 
restraint on alienation based upon race is contrary to common 
law public policy and is void . 
-13-
Clearly at the early common law a restraint on alienation 
that closed "the market afforded by a whole race of the human 
family"2 was void . The older authorities conclusively indicate 
that a restraint barring sale to all of a race would have not 
been tolerated . 3 Unfortunately, the American courts and authori-
ties have not uniformly followed the earlier approach . 
In 1915 and 1918, the courts of Louisiana and Missouri 
held discriminatory restraints to be valid . 4 The next court to 
consider the question was the Supreme Court of California . 5 The 
California court held that a covenant prohibiting sale to a non-
caucasian was forbidden by the common law rule against restraints 
on alienation, but that a covenant prohibiting occupanrry by a 
non-caucasian was valid . This left the Negro buyer in the odd 
position of having title, but being unable to occupy the land. 
Such inconsistent thinking created a serious split of authority 
among the American common law jurisdictions. Thus Tiffany re-
ports:6 
"Prohibitions against alienation to persons of a par-
ticular race or color have been regarded as invalid, on 
the ground that they violate the general policy against 
restraints upon alienation, but there is a considerable 
body of authority which supports the opposite view . A 
restraint on the use of property, as where it is provided 
that the property shall not be used or occupied by a per-
son not in a particular race, has generally been con-
sidered as not invalid as a restraint on alienation . 11 
The distinction suggested appears to be a victory of form 
over substance.? Tiffany concedes that a restriction on use am 
occupancy is as a practical matter a restraint on alienation . 8 
- 14-
Furthermore, even from a technical point of view, a restraint 
on use does prevent a seller from conveying a full fee simple -
use and occupancy being one of the attributes of ownership . 
However, although some courts were perhaps prepared to concede 
that such covenants were restraints on alienations, they consid~r-
ed them reasonable restraints . One of the justifications for the 
reasonableness of such restraints and their compliance with pub-
lic policy has been that it was "good business practice . n9 Thus, 
economic and business considerations were considered more impor-
tant than human va 1 ues . 
The lack of reasoned analysis in the area misled even such 
a dignified body as the American Law Institute to sustain the 
validity of a discriminatory restraint . 10 In the opinion of the 
Institute, the avoidance of unpleasant racial and social rela-
tions and the stabilization of land values which supposedly 
result from the enforcement of an exclusion policy outweig~ed 
the evils which normally result from a curtailment of the powers 
of alienation . 
Sporadically, courts found other means and theories for 
invalidating such covenants . One of these was the "changed 
conditions" doctrine . Thus, where Negroes infiltrated into a 
restricted area in large numbers so that the party seeking 
enforcement of the covenant was already living under the very 
conditions it was designed to prevent, a court of equity would 
refuse to enforce the discriminatory covenant . 11 Other courts 
have inquired as to whether the restriction was sufficiently 
- 15-
definite in terms . In a Canadian case 12 the Court held that a 
restriction against transfer to ''Jews" was void for indefinite-
ness . This latter problem has, however, not been considered 
difficult in the American cases . Thus, a restraint against uper-
sons of the negro race or blood" was enforced against an "octor-
oon . ttl3 
In discussing the relevant policies, the Courts rarely 
discussed the aspect of human values . Thus, Judge Traynor of 
the California Supreme Court was an early prophet of change 
when he wrote that these covenants : 
" ••• must yield to the public inter4est in the sound development of the whole community . "! 
V. Segregated Housing and the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 
Despite the reluctance of the Courts to strike down 
segregated housing as an illegal restraint on alienation, there 
was historical precedent to indicate that such segregation was 
violative of our basic notions of justice . In fact, it appears 
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment (had they been 
asked the specific question,) would have answered that segregated 
housing constitutes an abridgement of equal protection and due 
process . 
The general objectives of the framers were stated as 
follows: 1 
"Slavery by building up a ruling and dominant class 
had produced a spirit of oligarchy adverse to republican 
institutions which inaugurated civil war . The tendency 
of continuing the domination of such a class, by leaving 
it in the exclusive possession of political power would 
be to encourage the same spirit and lead to a similar re- -
sult . u 
-16-
More specifically, Thaddeus Stevens, the Joint Reconstruc-
tion Committee member in charge of the Amendment in the House 
declared: 2 
" ••• Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall 
punish the black man precisely in the same way and to the 
same degree . Whatever law protects the white man shall 
afford equal protection to the black man . Whatever means 
of redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all . 
Whatever law allows a white man to testify in court shall 
allow the man of color to do the same . These are great 
advantages over their present codes • ••• Some answer: 
' Your Civil Rights Bill secures the same things .' That 
is partly true, but a law is repealable by a majority . " 
It is evident that the framers meant that all persons 
should have equal opportunity to buy property . 3 That was one 
of the primary objectives of the Civil Rights Bill . 4 According 
to Stevens ' statement, the amendment also had to make this 
guarantee since it was equal in scope to the Civil Rights Bill . 
In the Senate, Senator Howard quoted at length from 
Corfield v . Coryell,5 in which Washington, J . included the 
right to hold property as being a "fundamental right . "6 
In addition, the opponents of the Amendment agreed that 
equal rights to property were also protected by it . Thus, 
Representative Rogers declared:? 
"This section of the joint resolution is no more nor 
less than an attempt to embody in the Constitution of the 
United States that outrageous and miserable Civil Rights 
Bill ••• 11 
It is interesting to note that the Civil Rights Bill 
provided that all persons shall have the right "to make and 
enforce contracts to sue, be parties , give evidence, inherit, 
-17-
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property . 118 
Thus, a court could have reached (with ease} the con-
elusion that discrimination in housing is prohibited by the 
fourteenth amendment . Yet, as we shall now see, the courts 
chose to carve out a thorny path of delay . 
VI . The Pre-Shelley Era 
The earliest American case probing the constitutionality 
of discrimination in the sale or occupancy of land is Gandolfo 
v . Hartman . 1 In that case, plaintiff took title to land under 
a deed containing an agreement that the land was never to be 
rented to a "chinaman . " The plaintiff having conveyed a part 
of the property to the defendant brought suit to enjoin the 
latter from renting to "chinamen" who were joined and made 
p:1rties defendant . In refusing relief, the court stated: 
"It would be a very narrow construction of the con-
stitutional amendment in question, and of the decisions 
based upon it , and a very restricted application of the 
principles upon wh i ch both the amendment and the decisions 
proceed , to hold that, while state and municipal legis-
latures are forbidden to discriminate against the Chinese 
in their legislation, a citizen of the state may lawfully 
do so by contract, which the courts may enforce . Such a 
view is, I think, entirely inadmissable . Any result in-
hibited by the constitution can no more be accomplished 
by contract of individual citizens than by legislation, 
and the courts should ho more enforce the one than the 
other . " 
It took the Courts a half century to revive and return 
to this thinking . In subsequent cases involving restrictive 
- 18-
covenants against Negroes the Gandolfo case was generally 
overlooked, or, when noticed, it was distinguished . 2 The 
precedent value of Gandolfo was further diminished by the 
fact that the court, in the latter half of its opinion, stated 
an alternative basis for its decision - that enforcement of 
the agreement would also violate the most-favored nation clause 
of a treaty between the United States and China . 3 
Thirty years elapsed before the question was again pre-
sented to the Federal courts in the landmark case of Corrigan 
v . Buckley . 4 This was a suit to enjoin one defendant, a white 
land-owner, from conveying his land to the other defendant, a 
colored would-be purchaser, in violation of a restrictive coven-
ant against sale or leasing to a colored person . The colored 
defendant took the position that the covenant was void since it 
was violative of due process . The lower court rejected this 
argument and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal for want of 
jurisdiction . This opinion was relied upon by the state courts 
as settling the constitutionality of court enforcement of race 
residential restrictions . 5 
However, was Corrigan v . Buckl e~ really authority for 
such a proposition? Professor McGovney feels that the case is 
a square holding only for the proposition that racial resi -
dential restrictions do not create slavery or involuntary 
servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment . He feels 
that the court's statement that court enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant does not violate due process, is a "very off hand 
-19-
dictum . " He also points out that: 
"More important, it is obvious that the case did not 
decide anything with respect to the effect of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a limitation on the states . "6 
Nevertheless, it was upon such a thin ground that a 
fortress-like structure of discrimination was erected . 
This development is made even more enigmatic by the 
Court ' s activity in a closely related area - the racial zoning 
ordinance. 
The leading case of Buchanan v . Warley,? held a city 
ordinance unconstitutional which forbade any white person or 
any Negro person to move into and occupy as a residence any 
house in a city block in which a majority of the houses were 
already occupied by persons of the other race or color . The 
attack in this case came from a white man who had contracted 
to sell to a Negro a lot in a block in which a majority of the 
houses was then occupied by whites . The white seller sought 
specific performance and challenged the ordinances' constitu-
tionality . The specific ground of decision was that the or-
dinance curtailed the white owner's property rights without due 
process of law . The court did not rest its decision on the 
ground that the ordinance abridged a potential Negro buyer's 
rights without due process of law . However, Buchanan does con-
tain a far reaching statement rejecting the argument that racial 
zoning was necessary in order to avoid racial conflict . Said 
the Court: 
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"It is urged that this proposed segregation will 
promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts . 
Desirable as this is, and important as is the preserva -
tion of public peace , this aim cannot be accomplished 
by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or pro-
tected by the Federal Constitution . "8 
In all likelihood, the reason why the Courts did not 
follow the approach of Buchanan in the area of the restrictive 
covenant was their inability or unwillingness to find state 
action where the legislature was not involved . 
VII . Shelley and Barrows 
A. Shelley v . Kraemer 
The status of the law on the subject has been aptly 
described by one commentator as follows: 1 
n "The main claim made by the Caucasians upon the 
judicial system from 1915 to 1945, was for the en-
forcement of racial restrictive covenants . The 
courts made good this claim. " 
It was only in the late 1940 ' s that a new civil rights 
climate became manifest and that the problem's importance 
became obvious . Hence, the Court agreed to review a number 
of covenant cases . For the first time, the Supreme Court 
passed judgment on the constitutional validity of racial 
restrictive covenants . In 1948, the Court decided the com-
panion cases of Shelley v . Kraemer, McGhee v . Sipes, and Hurd 
v . Hodge . 2 
The court ' s decisions were revolutionary . Since Gandolfo, 
judicial doubts as to the constitutionality of these covenants 
were seldom expressed . 3 
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All of these cases came up to the Supreme Court via 
certiorari . In Shelley, suit was brought in a circuit court 
of St . Louis to restrain Negroes from taking possession of 
property and to forfeit their title to the property which was 
subject to a restrictive covenant . The trial court denied the 
relief requested, not on constitutional grounds, but because 
the agreement in question was not effective due to a lack of 
signatures . The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the lower 
court which was directed to grant the relief requested . It 
held that the covenant was effective and constitutional . 
The McGhee case exacted a large amount of public interest 
because of the policy arguments founded on a huge volume of 
social data advanced in the amicus curiae briefs . The Michigan 
Court in this case dismissed the arguments based upon public 
concern and welfare by noting that "these pronouncements are 
merely indicative of a desirable social trend •••• u 14 
In Hurd, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
upheld a perpetual deed covenant against transfer, lease, rent 
or conveyance . The majority opinion was firm on the point that 
the restriction was not an unlawful restraint on alienation . 
The Shelley and McGhee cases were decided in a unanimous 
opinion by Vinson, C. J . (Reed, Jackson and Rutledge did not 
participate -- possibly because they owned property subject 
to such restrictions) . The key issue decided by the Court was 
that judicial enforcement by state courts of such covenants 
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violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment . 
The Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that the agree-
ments, standing alone, were valid since the fourteenth amend-
ment only relates to state ac'tion . But here there was more 
than a mere private contract . Here there was, in addition, the 
power of the judiciary, a branch of the state, behind the en-
forcement of the contract - this is state action . Vinson, C. J . , 
reviewed the cases, starting with Twining v . New Jersey5 hold-
ing that a State could act as well through its judiciary as 
through its executive, or legislature, in the enforcement of 
its laws . Thus, Vinson points out : 
nThese are not cases, as has been suggested in which 
the states have merely abstained from action, leaving 
private individuals free to impose such discrimination 
as they see fit . Rather , these are cases in which the 
States have made avai l able to such individuals the full 
coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on 
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property 
rights on premises which petitioners are willing and 
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are 
willing to se11 . »6 
However, the discriminating parties were still not 
vanquished . They tried to contend that even granting that the 
action herein was in fact State action, it was not violative 
of the equal protection clause, since the State courts were 
open on exactly the same basis for the enforcement of Negro 
restr i ctive covenants excluding white persons . Vinson disposed 
of this argument by saying: 
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"The rights created by the ••• Fourteenth Amendment 
are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual . The 
rights established are personal rights . It is, there-
fore, no answer to these petitioners to say that the 
courts may also be induced to deny white persons rights 
of occupancy on grounds of race or color . Equal pro-
tection of the laws is not achieved through the indis-
criminate imposition of inequa 1 i ties . " 
It is to be noted, however, that in none of these de-
cisions was the validity of the covenant itself attacked or 
questioned by the Court. Thus, the Court stated at the out-
set: 
"We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agree-
ments standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of 
any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements 
are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, 
it would appear that there has been no action by the 
State and8the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated . 11 
In the Hurd case, Vinson reached the same result by a 
different line of reasoning . The enforcement of the covenants 
in the District of Columbia was held to violate the Federal 
Civil Rights Act and to contravene the public policy of the 
United States not to permit action to be taken in the Federal 
Court which is forbidden by the Constitution to be taken in a 
state court . Thus, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to 
pass upon the contention that such agreements violated the Due 
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment . 9 
B. The Impact of Shelley . 
Although public reaction to these cases was not as strong 
as it was to the Brown case, these decisions had a profound 
impact upon the community . 
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On the one hand, some were overly optimistic . A Negro 
newspaper greeted the decision with a headline reading: "Live 
Anywhere You Can Buy . ulO Others were more cautious . Thus, 
The Notre Dame Lawyer reported that: 
" ··· the Negro who seeks entrance into the holy of 
holies, a 'white neighborhood,' still must face onerous 
difficulties . "ll 
These decisions also evoked statements betraying the 
prejudice of the speaker . Thus, the New Republic declared that 
the Court's action was to be regarded as ''a reaffirmation of 
the basic principle that the law can ' t be used as weapon to 
deprive Americans, regardless of their color, creed or social 
condition, of equality of opportunity . nl2 On the other hand, 
John Rankin remarked:l3 
"Mr . Speaker, there must have been a celebration is 
Moscow last night; for the Communists won their greatest 
victory in the Supreme Court of the United States on 
yesterday, when that once august body proceeded to 
destroy the value of property owned by tens of thousands 
of loyal Americans in every state in the Union by their 
anticovenants decision . " 
However, at least one SouthBrn law review justified the 
decision on the ground that the Court was forced to formulate 
public policy in this area, since no other agency of government 
was prepared to undertake the challenge.l4 
Other writers were in disagreement as to the decision's 
meaning in the context of the Negro ' s place in American public 
law . One critic could not reconcile these cases with decisions 
sustaining segregation in education . 15 Another believed that 
the anomaly would be ended to the advantage of Negroes . 16 
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In terms of legal consequences in future cases, much was 
left to speculation . Thus, the Harvard Law Review stated that:17 
"The scope of this novel extension is difficult to 
define . For example, will it be ' state action' for a state 
court not to enforce a restrictive covenant specifically, but 
to use it as a basis for an award of damages, or as the reason 
for failing to act in behalf of a Negro seeking specific per -
formance? What should a court do in cases arising out of 
rights of entry and other conditions in deeds or leases? And 
how should it treat devices - as a corporation's retention of 
title to all lots in a new development and exercise of continuing 
control through ' leasing ' to would be purchasers- whose only 
purpose obviously is to avoid the result of the instant case?" 
Although the Court's opinion may have been revolutionary, 
these questions indicate that Vinson did not illumine the 
area at all. 
Furthermore, in terms of precedent, one has difficulty 
in finding state action on the facts of Shelley and its compan-
ion cases . 18 The cases relied upon by Vinson merely appear 
to hold that there is state action only when procedural due 
process is involved . While it is true that in some of these 
cases there was no procedural due process issue, these cases 
can be distinguished on the basis that they were criminal 
actions and the state was a party so that state action was 
clear in any event. In addition, some have criticized Vinson 
for his failure to rest the decision in Shellex on the broader 
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ground that these restrictive covenants violate public policy 
as expressed in the United Nations Charter . Thus, Sayre con-
cl udes that: 
"In the Shelley case we ignored the Charter entirely . 
Here, in effect, we broke a solemn treaty of this Govern-
ment . This was not only betrayal morally; it was stupid 
and needless betrayal . n19 
With all due respect to Professor Sayre, hindsight reveals 
that Vinson ' s approach may have been the wiser one . The Canadian 
Court after having relied upon the U. N. Charter in striking down 
such a covenant in Re Drummond Wren20 reversed itself four years 
later . 21 Hence, Vinson ' s action can be said to have strengthened 
the result reached . This tends to prove that judges must know 
their logistics . 
C. Between Shelley and Barrows 
Following Shelley, four similar cases appeared . The first 
of these cases was Weiss v . Leaon . 22 Here an adjoining property 
owner conveyed to Negroes in violation of a restrictive agree-
ment and the plaintiff sought to oust the Negroes and to collect 
damages for the breach of the agreement . The Missouri Supreme 
Court pointed out there was not even dicta in Shelley concerning 
the constitutionality of granting damages . It then went on to 
discuss the differences in relief between damages at law and 
specific performance by injunc t i on in equity . The court held 
that although one remedy, injuncti on, was prhibited by Shelley, 
that in itself did not rule out other remedies such as damages . 
"Thus it indicated its belief that the method of enforcement 
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and not the right to jucicial relief was what was unconstitu-
t ion a 1 . tt 23 
The second case to appear was Roberts v . Curtis24 in 
which the court interpreted Shelley as validating these covenants 
only if their purposes could be achieved by voluntary adherence. 
The third case was Conell v . Earley . 25 Here the court 
sustained an award for damages . Some writers have justified 
the result on the peculiar facts of the case - a conspiracy 
had been entered into in order to destroy a racial covenant . 
They feel that if no such factor had been present, the court 
would have given a wide sweeping interpretation to Shelley . 26 
The fourth case was Phillips v . Naff . 27 Here the court 
concluded that Shelley was broad enough to prbhibit this 
11 indirect" method of enforcement, that is, the giving of damages 
for the breach of the covenant . Thus, the state courts were 
divided 2-2 on the issue of whether damages could be awarded 
for the breach of such a c0~enant . The problem was finally 
resolved by the Supreme Court in Barrows v . Jackson decided 
in 1953 . 28 
D. Barrows v . Jackson . 
This case involved an action at law for damages for an 
alleged breach of a restrictive covenant by a co-covenantor 
who had conveyed real estate to non-caucasians . The California 
state court had sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and 
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certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court . 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court . 
The Court felt that an award of damages would tend to support 
indirectly covenants which it already decided could not be 
enforced directly . Oddly enough , Vinson , C. J . , who had written 
the opinion in Shelley dissented . 
The petitioners contended that to refuse to enforce the 
covenant is to impair the obligations of their contracts under 
Section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution . The Court (Minton, J . ) 
answered this by citing Tida l Oil v . Flanagan29 which held that 
the "impairment of obligations" clause is directed against legis-
lative action only, and not judicial action . Petitioners also 
contended that they were denied due process and equal protec-
tion of the laws by the failure of the courts to enforce the 
agreement . Mr . Justice Minton answered this contention as 
follows : 3° 
"The Constitution c onfers upon no individual the 
right to demand action by the state which results in the 
denial of equal protection of the laws to other in-
d i vi d ua 1 s . n 
Although the Court declared that a judicial award of 
damages constitutes state action (and thus plugged the gap 
left open in Shelley), the Court reiterated its prior posi-
tion that : 3l 
" ··· so long as the purposes of those agreements are 
effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it 
would appear clear that there has been no action by the 
state and the provisions of the Amendment have not been 
violated . n 
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In reaching its conclusion that an award for damages 
constitutes state action, the Court appears to have glossed over 
a major problem- that of standing to raise the constitutional 
issues decided . Vinson makes much of this in his dissent . It 
was vigorously argued before the Court that the respondent who 
was being sued for money damages for her breach of a restric-
tive covenant was relying on the rights of prospective Negro 
purchasers as a defense, and thus she was not claiming an 
abridgment of any constitutional right of her own, but was 
asserting the rights of others not parties to the action . 
Mr . Justice Vinson accepted this argument asserting that:32 
uThe majority identifies no non-caucasian who has 
been injured or could be injured if damages are assessed 
against respondent for breaching the promise which she 
willingly and voluntarily made to petitioners ••• Because 
I cannot see how respondent can avail herself of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of total strangers - the 
only rights which she has chosen to assert - and since 
I cannot see how the Court can find those rights would 
be impaired in this particular case by requiring respondent 
to pay petitioners for the injury which she recognizes 
she has brought upon them, I am unwilling to join the 
Court in today t s decision . " 
The other judges acknowledged that as a general rule a 
party has no standing in the Supreme Court to raise the con-
stitutional rights of others, but that under the peculiar facts 
of this case a departure from the rule was justified . The 
Court went on to say that in order to have 'standing," two 
conditions must be fulfilled : 
-3~-
(1) There must be a "case" or "controversy"- that 
is, there must be a party with a direct legal interest at 
stake who may suffer some sort of damage or injury. There 
must be a real controversy between actual litigants. The 
court will not decide hypothetical problem cases. This con-
dition is imposed by Article III of the Constitution. Thus, 
Mr. Chief Justice John Mar shall has said:33 
"The article does not extend the judicial power 
to every violation of the Constitution which may 
possibly take place, but to a 'case in law or equity,' 
in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a 
court of justice. If the questions cannot be brought 
into a court, then there is no case in law or equity 
and no jurisdiction is given by the words of the article." 
It is obvious that this constitutional condition was 
satisfied in Barrows. As the Court points out:34 
"This principle has no application to the instant 
case in which the respondent has been sued for damages 
totalling $11,600 and in which a judgment against respondent 
would constitute a direct, pocketbook injury to her." 
(2) In addition tolliis constitutional condition, the 
Court has adopted a self-imposed rule of restraint that it 
will not decide constitutional issues if the party whose 
constitutional rights have been abridged is not before the 
Court. The Court had greater difficulty showing that this 
condition had been satisfied. In fact, it conceded that this 
self-imposed condition had not been satisfied. Rather, it 
chose to depart from the rule. Thus, the Court said:35 
"This is a salutary rule, the validity of which we 
reaffirm. But in the instant case, we are faced with 
a unique situation in which it is the action of the 
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state court which might result in the denial of con-
stitutional rights and in which it would be difficult 
if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted 
to present their grievances before any court. Under the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the rea-
sons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise 
another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are 
outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights 
which would be denied by permitting the damages action 
to be maintained.~ 
It is true that to sustain an award for damages would 
result in discrimination in a future case. That is, the enforce-
ment of the covenant would result in discrimination against non-
Caucasians through higher prices to them induced by vendors 
fearing contracts' actions. In addition, enforcement would 
also probably lead to the insertion of liquidated damage clauses 
in the covenants and thus further discourage their breach.36 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the parties to be dis-
criminated against are not before the court - in fact, they 
are not even involved in this case. The Negroes who purchased 
the property in Barrows would not have suffered any loss even 
if their vendor had been compelled to pay damages for breach of 
contract. Hence, one has difficulty in justifying the Court's 
departure from this self-imposed restraint. 
This action constitutes a serious departure from the 
Court's own precedents. In Tiletson v. Vllman,37 the Court 
held that a doctor, subject to prosecution for disseminating 
birth control information, could not set up his patient's 
constitutional right to life. Likewise, in Tyler v. The Judges,38 
the petitioner sought to have a land registration act declared 
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unconstitutional on the grounds that the rights of parties 
might be foreclosed without actual notice to them . The 
petitioner himself had actual notice . Hence, the Court rea -
soned that it could not pass upon the general question of 
whether the statute would deprive others of their property 
without due process of law . 
The Court attempted to justify its departure from its 
own self- imposed rule by relying upon other cases in which it 
had followed the same practice . It relied heavily upon Pierce 
v . Society of Sisters . 39 In Pierce, a state statute required 
all parents to send their offspring to public schools . Certain 
private schools sought to enjoin the enforcement of the statute 
as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . The Court held for the private schools and 
stated:4° 
" we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control . " 
Thus, the Court in Barrows could point out that its self-
imposed rule was not an inflexible one . The Court had departed 
from it in Pierce to permit a litigant to assert another person ' s 
constitutional rights as a part of his case, since those rights 
were closely involved with the litigant ' s position and the issue 
was important enough to the Court . Yet Barrows is distinquish-
able from Pierce . For in Pierce the constitutional rights 
asserted were those of parents presently threatened with injury 
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while in Barrows the only non-caucasian actually involved is 
safely in possession of his property.41 Furthermore, in 
Pierce, the denial of the constitutional rights of the parents 
did threaten the existence of property of the private schools, 
and also to a degree interfered with the schools' liberty to 
teach.42 
Another justification for the departure from the general 
rule was that the Court holds the rule inapplicable where the 
persons discriminated against had no means of bringing the 
question before the Court for its determination . 43 Thus, in 
Greene v . State,44 a defendant, convicted under a statute which 
made it a penal offense to commit blackmail against residents 
of Nebraska, successfully attacked the statute by reason of 
the fact that it only protected residents, and therefore dis-
criminated against non-residents . It could be contended that 
the would-be future, hypothetical purchasers (in Barrows) whose 
constitutional rights will be infringed, will never be in a 
position to assert their own constitutional rights . Neverthe-
less, the Court could have followed its own self- imposed rule 
to a greater extent by requiring the non-caucasian purchaser to 
sue for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the contract 
between his seller and the covenantees . Arguing by analogy 
from Truax v . Raich,45 the declaration could have been granted .46 
Furthermore, the Court (in Barrows) appears to be guilty of 
making too sweeping a statement that it would be impossible for 
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a non-caucasian to assert his own rights. Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and a few states codes, it might be 
possible to join the non-caucasian if an indemnity clause were 
inserted in the contract of sale.47 
Perhaps, the action of the Court can be justified under 
the doctrine of Thornhill v . Alabama.48 Under that theory, 
hypothetical persons' constitutional rights may be asserted 
against a statute restricting free speech. Departure from the 
general rule may be easier in Barrows than in the ordinary case 
because minority rights as well as free speech are regarded as 
having a "preferred position . " This reasoning, however, would 
necessarily involve the finding of a rationale different from 
that of the free speech cases, which were based on the special 
protection of basic democratic processes.5° 
Serious analysis of the standing problem raised in Barrows 
compels the author to join in the following conclusion:5 1 
"Certain of the policies which justify rules of stand-
ing seem to be ignored by the instant holding. It tends 
to upset the equality of the legislative branch of govern-
ment by resolving problems where the injured parties are 
not before the decision- making body. Furthermore, 
allowing persons to raise the rights of others causes a 
commensurate increase in the practical burden of litiga-
tion in the Court. Nevertheless, the holding is certainly 
justifiable because • • • the alternative would be to allow 
state action resulting in discrimination to go forever 
unchallenged. Since a primary purpose of the decision 
was to supplement Shelley, it may be that Barrows will 
be limited to its facts ••• " 
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Thus far, we have been merely criticizing the procedural 
aspects of Barrows. An examination of the substance of Barrows 
and its predecessor Shelley also tends to indicate that the 
Court has brought its processes into disrepute . 
VIII . Hand to Wechsler to Pollack: A Legal Thinkers to 
Evers to Chance . 
Since its decision in Brown, the Court has found itself 
engulfed in controversy . The Court has become the target of 
criticism aimed at it from many sources . Some of this de-
nunciation can be attributed to the Court's own failures . 
As Professor Henry Hart has recently revealed: 1 
"The opinions of the Justices, if one turns to them, 
confirm the conclusion that the Court is trying to de-
cide more cases than it can decide well . Regretfully 
and with deference , it has to be said that too many of 
the Court ' s opinions are about what one would expect 
could be written i n twenty- four hours . There are able 
opinions, to be sure, including many that have mani-
festly taken much more t i me than that in thought and 
composition . But few of the Court's opinions, far too 
few, genuinely illumine the area of law with which they 
deal. Other opinions fail even by much more elementary 
standards . Issues are ducked which in good lawyership 
and good conscience ought not to be ducked . Technical 
mistakes are made which ought not to be made in decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the United States . The measured 
judgment of two thoughtful commentators expressed two 
years ago has lost none of its force in the two terms 
which have elapsed since: The Court's product has 
shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic 
statement of the formulation of results accompanied by 
little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, 
of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders 
that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the 
authorities they cite and the results they decree . " 
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In many respects, Shelley and Barrows can be said to be 
prime examples of the Court's failures. Whether they are or not 
has become the cardinal question in a new wave of controversy. 
This new controversy was ignited in 1958 by a series of 
speeches delivered by Learned Hand at Harvard.2 Hand took the 
position that the Supreme Court's power to review the consti-
tutionality of acts of other branches of national and state 
government is not one which can be found in or inferred from 
the words of the Constitution . However, in order to prevent 
anarchy, the Court had to assume the power of keeping govern-
mental officials within their prescribed limits . Hand con-
eludes that the Court's power is to be used as sparingly as 
possible merely to confine officials to actions within the 
spheres of their allocated power, but the Court was never to 
have the power to review the substance of such actions . Hand 
contended that the current Court, in exercising its "powers" of 
review, had assumed the role of a ••third legislative chamber . n3 
Hand's comments provoked Professor Wechsler to write a 
learned article contradicting the learned justice . 4 Wechsler 
demonstrated that the power of judicial review was grounded in 
the language of the Constitution . Wechsler finds the power to 
be derived from the Supremacy Clause . 5 Wechsler, however, 
concedes that there are limitations to the review power . These 
limitations form the core of Wechsler's thesis. Wechsler states 
his concept of "neutral principlestt as follows: 6 
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n • • • The Courts have both the title and the duty 
when a case is properly before them to review the 
actions of the other branches in the light of constitu-
tional provisions, even though the action involves 
value choices, as invariably action does. In doing 
so, however, they are bound to function otherwise than 
as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of 
law . This calls for facing how determinations of this 
kind can be asserted to have any legal quality . The 
answer, I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are-
or are obliged to be - entirely principled. A principled 
decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that 
rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the 
case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved . When no 
sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for over-
turning value choices of the other branches of the 
Government, or of a state, those choices must, of course, 
survive . " 
Wechsler concludes that the Court departed from "neutral 
principles" in its adjudication of the constitutionality of the 
restrictive covenant . ? 
Professor Wechsler has no difficulty with the thought 
that judicial action is "state action" for fourteenth amend-
ment purposes . He is troubled, however, by the fact that 
"the state may properly be charged with the discrimination when 
it does no more than give effect to an agreement that the in-
dividual involved is, by hypothesis, entirely free to make . "8 
The Court had indicated rather clearly that it still thought 
the underlying agreement to be valid . Hence, Wechsler is 
puzzled at the notion that the enforcement of the private 
covenant is deemed state discrimination rather than a legal 
recognition of the freedom of the individual to contract . 
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Wechsler is unable to discern any underlying principle that 
guided the Court . He asks:9 
"What is the principle involved'? Is the state for-
bidden to effectuate a will that draws a racial line, 
a will that can accomplish any disposition only through 
the aid of law, or is it a sufficient answer there that 
the discrimination was the testator ' s and not the 
state ' s? May not the state employ its law to vindicate 
the privacy of property against a trespasser, regardless 
of the grounds of his exclusion, or does it embrace the 
owner ' s reason for excluding if it buttresses his power 
by the law? •••• None of these questions has been 
answered by the Court nor are the problems faced in the 
opinions . " 
Wechsler concludes his discussion of Shelley and Barrows 
by stating that he fails to perceive any principle su~ceptible 
of broad extension that was applied in these cases . He feels 
that these decisions are ad hoc determinations of their narrow 
problems, "yielding no neutral principles for their extension 
or support . nlO 
The ball was tossed to our "legal Mr . Chance," Prof . 
Pollak . Pollak has leaped to the defense of the Court . 
Pollak begins his defense by pointing out a major fallacy 
in Wechsler's line of reasoning . Wechsler had difficulty 
reconciling the imputation of discrimination to the state when 
the state merely gives effect to an agreement that the individw 1 
is free to make . Professor Pollak points out that: 
"Law is a statement of the circumstances in which 
the public force will be brought to bear upon men 
through the Courts . ~l2 
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To Pollak, it is the disposition of this "public force" 
which is in issue in every case . The disposition necessarily 
involves a choice. "And when the arrangements contemplated 
by the instrument will fail but for the intervention of 
'public force' -when 'it becomes not respondents' voluntary 
choice but the state's choice that she observe her covenant 
or suffer damages'", Pollak concludes that the fourteenth 
amendment is then called into the picture. 13 
Pollak continues by asserting that in Shelley and Barrows 
the Court did not announce a new principle . Rather, the Court 
was returning to the principle enunciated thirty years earlier 
in Buchanan v . Warley . 14 There the Court had unanimously voided 
a racial zoning ordinance . Pollak concludes this part of his 
analysis by saying that:15 
" ••• if Buchanan was right, the result at last reached 
in Shelley was foreordained; for it had long been clear 
that whether a challenged discrimination is legislative 
or judicial is a matter of no consequence in finding the 
state action on which the fourteenth amendment operates. " 
However, Professor Pollak does concede that one has 
difficulty in predicting the results in future cases on the 
basis of Shelley and Barrows. 16 Nevertheless, he indicates 
that, in any event, a critic must bear in mind that the ends 
sometime justify the means. That is, "the decisive constitu-
tional principles here relevant are in a vital sense not neutral . n 17 
In other words, the goal of the emancipation of the Negro jus-
tifies the Court in departing from Wechsler's concept of 
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neutrality in adjudication. 
Regardless of one's subjective judgments as to the 
merits of the controversy within the legal fraternity, one 
feels uneasy about the speculative future course that 
decisions of the Court may take in this area. 
For example, the Florida courts were recently confronted 
with this situation.l8 In this case, a real estate broker 
accepted a listing of real property for sale to Christians 
only . He knowingly negotiated a sale to a Jew, representing 
to the seller that the buyer was not Jewish . An information 
was filed with the Florida Real Estate Commission, a state 
body having quasi-judicial powers, requesting suspension of 
the defendant's license on the ground that his action con-
stituted a violation of the Real Estate License Law . On 
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the court held that there 
was no violation of the fourteenth amendment since the purpose 
of the proceeding was not to enforce the religious restriction, 
but to punish the broker for breach of his fiduciary relation-
ship . Was the state court correct? 19 
On the one hand, it might be contended that the Commission ' s 
action in disciplining the broker would deter other brokers 
from violating such restrictive covenants. Hence, under 
Barrows which tried to avoid discrimination against "unidenti-
fied" persons, this would be a denial of equal protection to 
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prospective Jewish purchasers . Or it might be argued that 
if the state in effectuating a valid and substantial state policy, 
incidentally permits discrimination against private individuals, 
there is no denial of equal protection. Under this line of 
reasoning, the state policy of regulating fiduciaries would outweigh 
the discrimination . If so, how can we distinguish the state in-
terest present in Shelle~ and Barrows . Another approach is to 
say that Shelley and Barrows apply where the party seeking to 
enforce the discrimination is not a party to the immediate trans-
action . In the Florida case, the owner of the property was a 
party to the immediate contract . Hence, the state ' s action 
should be classified as "non- state" action . Another alternative 
is to say that Shelley and Barrows are applicable only when no 
effective discrimination could take place in the absence of 
judicial proceedings . The application of this test to the 
facts of the Florida case raises doubts as to the wisdom of 
the result reached . 2° In any event, this case illustrates the 
lack of guidance given us by Shelley and Barrows . 
This lack of guidance was made evident to everyone in the 
leading case of Rice v . Sioux City Memoria 1 Park . 21 In~' 
the petitioner's husband was refused burial because he was not 
white . The cemetary relied on its contract with the plaintiff 
which permitted burial of members of the Caucasian race only . 
The Iowa court held that recognition of that defense in that 
n~ 
action was ~affirmative state action in violation of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment . The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and by an evenly divided court, affirmed the Iowa 
decision without opinion . Some commentators 22 declared that 
the action of the Court was suprising in view of the Barrows 
case . Others said the case was not to be given too much 
weight . 23 They said that~ did not involve as substantial 
a denial of rights as does the divestiture of a bona fide pur-
chaser's title . But is unconstitutionality only a matter of 
degree? 
Likewise, suppose the grantor goes upon the land and is 
sued for trespass . The grantor then defends by pointing to the 
breached racial limitation . 24 The Supreme Court has not ruled 
on this specific question . On the basis of Shelley and Barrows, 
and Rice, speculation as to the outcome appears futile . 
The failure of the Court to clearly define the basis of 
its holdings in Shelley and Barrows has had another adverse 
effect . It has invited the cunn ing to invent techniques for 
evading the objective which the Court sought to a t tain in those 
cases . 
IX . Techniques for Evasion 
Because of the many questions left open in Shelley and 
Barrows, some have thought that there are still methods 
available for evading or avoiding (depending upon one's point 
of view) the results reached in those cases . 
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Shelley and Barrows were concerned with the constitution-
ality of the restrictive covenant ' s enforceability. Following 
these decisions, there remained the question as to whether 
court enforcement of similar but more subtle devices would also 
amount to state action . 
A . The Possibility of Reverter 
One such device is the possibility of reverter . This 
device was used in the case of Charlotte Park and Recreation 
Commission v . Barrin9er . The facts of the case may be 
summarized as follows: In 1929, several private individuals 
conveyed lots of land to a recreation commission "for the 
use of, and to be used and used by persons of the white race 
only . " The deeds provided that "in the event that the said 
lands shall not be kept, used and maintained for park, play-
ground and/or recreational purposes, for use by the white race 
only ••• then ••• • the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee 
simple , n to the grantors . The Commission sought a declaratory 
judgment determining the validity of the reverter clause . The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the provision in the 
deed that the State shall terminate operates by its own limita-
tion automatically without judicial enforcement by the state 
courts; therefore, non-whites seeking to use the park will 
not be denied equal protection of the laws through the 
operation of the possibility of reverter . 
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In o r der to fully understand the implications of this 
decis i on, we must first grasp the essential nature of the 
possib i lity of reverter . From the point of view of property 
law , the key distinguishing feature of the possibility of 
reverter is that it takes effect automatically on the happen-
ing of the condition or event named in the creating instrument . 2 
Hence, property law provides some justification for saying that 
a possibility of reverter does not constitute state action 
with i n the meaning of the fourteenth amendment . Nevertheless, 
it is submitted that the Supreme Court would probably strike 
down the possibility of reverter as an attempt to evade 
Shelley and Barrows . 
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Barringer, no inferences as to the validity of the action 
taken by the state court should be drawn therefrom . The 
Court, has said on many occasions in the past that no infer-
ence should be drawn from the denial of certiorari . We may 
merely speculate . On the one hand, the Court may have thought 
that the matter was obviously unconstitutional and hence there 
was no need to expend valuable court time on the matter . On 
the other hand, the Court may not have been prepared to extend 
Shelley and Barrows to the determinable fee at this time be-
cause it was waiting for a more receptive public opinion . It 
appears that wise adjudication sometimes has its own time 
for ripening . 
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Furthermore, other state courts have refused to follow 
the result reached in Barringer . Thus in Smith v . Clark,3 
the Colorado Court declared: 
"Every refusal to abide by the terms of the restric-
tion, requiring suit to make effective such restrictions, 
removes the case from the rule of voluntary adherence . 
Such is the present suit (to quiet title); the parties 
are in court, and the court must withhold its hand to 
enforce in any wise the covenant . " 
In other words, the difference between the possibility 
of reverter and the restrictive covenant is one of form . Even 
if you claim 11 automatic 11 rights under a possibility of reverter 
you must still go into court to enforce your rights . In the 
case of a breach of a covenant it is only when legal force is 
given to the occurrence that liability arises . Likewise, 
although the owner of a possibility of reverter theoretically 
acquires title upon the breach of the condition, this ri~ht of 
title is meaningless unless it is enforced in a court of law . 
Ubi Jus Ubi Remedium. Without the remedy, there is no right. 
However, this does not mean that the possibility of re-
verter does not present difficulties . It is obviously an un-
constitutional device where the owner of the possibility of 
reverter seeks court aid to regain possession of the land . 
This is patently state action . On the other hand , more 
difficulty is met in the situation where the owner of the 
reverter has managed to regain possession by himself and 
seeks to invoke his title as a defense to a suit by the 
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grantee to eject him . Here the conceptualistic reasoning of 
property law may well lead the court, if it recognizes the 
title of the grantor, not to eject him in favor of a person 
who has no title once the condition has been breached . How-
ever, it is submitted that this analysis loses sight of the 
fact that legal terms are defined relatively . For example, 
the term npossession 11 is considered a many splendored thing . 
It may mean one thing for civil purposes and another thing 
for purposes of criminal liability . Domicile is another term 
that is given different meanings in different contexts . Like-
wise, what is considered a completed gift for property law 
purposes may not be considered perfected in the area of taxa -
tion . 4 Hence, although property law deems the title of the 
owner of a possibility of reverter to take effect automatically 
and upon breach of the condition , the Court may well say that 
for constitutional law purposes the reverter has no legal 
force until judicial sanctions are extended to it . 
Furthermore, the argument that the owner of the rever-
sion would be divested of a property right without due process 
of law is met by the long established rule that whenever a 
determinable fee is based on an invalid limitation, the 
limitation is inoperative and the estate becomes a fee simple 
absolute {absolute ownership) . 5 
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B. The Penalty Bond 
Another plan would be the use of a cash penalty bond, 
given by each successive grantee to insure compliance with a 
restrictive covenant . The bond would be held in escrow and 
payable to the original grantor by the escrow agent if there 
was a wrongful transfer . However, this device also presents 
problems . From a legal point of view, it is doubtful whether 
the covenant could be used as a defense in a suit brought by 
a grantee (who has breached the covenant) to recover the deposit . 
It is only the Rice case6 that appears to sustain the use of 
the covenant as a defense in a collateral proceeding . Further~ore, 
there are practical problems . Suppose the escrow agent refused 
to transfer the bond back to the grantor upon the breach of 
the condition . Under Barrows, the escrow holder could probably 
not be forced to return it to the grantor? In addition, it 
really does not prevent a breach - all it does is provide greater 
incentives for self-adherence to the contract . Furthermore, 
it is doubtful that many purchasers would accept such a contract . 
To be an effective deterrent, the deposit would have to be 
substantial and few persons would be willing to contribute 
to such a scheme since it would be to their immediate economic 
detriment . 8 
c. The Option to Repurchase 
Another technique would be to insert an option to re-
purchase in the deed . Such a clause might read as follows:9 
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nNo sale of said lot shall be consummated without 
giving at least 15 days notice to the grantor, and 
the owners of the two adjoining lots on the sides, ••• 
and any of them shall have the right to buy said lot 
of such terms . '' 
This clause would allow the grantor to repurchase with-
out the question of discrimination being brought before the 
court, even though this might be the sole purpose for the 
grantor exercising the option . This device presents practi-
cal as well as legal problems . For one thing, how many buyers 
would be willing to have such a clause inserted in their deeds . 
Second of all, the ciause may be deemed invalid as a violation 
of the common law rule against Perpetuities . 1° Finally, a 
court might look behind the option and deem it to be part of 
a discriminatory scheme . 
D. The Intervention of an Entity 
Another technique for evasion is the "Club Membership 
Plan . n This is coming into use in connection with real estate 
sub divisions which are sold in conjunction with a golf club, 
tennis club, or a garden club . The title to the land remains 
with the club and the members of the club own shares of stock 
entitling them to club privileges . Certain minorities would 
be excluded from membership . The member would have no title 
to any particular piece of property . All that he could convey 
would be his membership rights subject to approval by the 
Club's board . Suppose the club member allowed possession to 
pass to an undesirable? Could the club assert legal title and 
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evict the buyer? The Court might wel'l look at the substance 
of the entire scheme and void it as an illegal attempt to 
evade Shelley and Barrows . 
A variation of the club plan leaves title to the land 
in a business corporation . The Board of Directors of the cor-
poration would then determine the persons to whom the land is 
"leased . " However, this plan has certain obvious practical 
disadvantages . It runs counter to the natural tendency of 
persons to desire their own homes . The experience of some lead-
ing realtors in the San Francisco area has been that in es-
tablished communities the number of persons who could be 
persuaded to join and convey title to such a corporation 
would be well under 50% . 12 To avoid the advantages of the 
leasing plan, title could be vested in the individual residents, 
but permission of the board of a non-profit corporate organiza-
tion would be a requisite for sale or occupancy. 
These devices basically cast the question of discrimina-
tion into the realm of proof . However, the person who has 
been denied permission to sell to the minority group knows the 
truth and hence, can testify as to the real reason for exclus-
ion . Furthermore, a consistent history or rejection of members 
of one race, supports the inference that discrimination has been 
practiced . Nevertheless, this may be difficult for almost any 
-50-
purchaser has some characteristic which may support a claim 
that he is undesirable . 13 This, of course, assumes (although 
Shelley and Barrows leave much to speculation) that these 
devices are violative of the fourteenth amendment if discrimina-
tion can be proven. 
X. Public and Publicly-Assisted Housing 
Thus far, we have been concerned with discrimination 
in private housing . Now we move on to a consideration of the 
problems present in the area of "public housing . " 
The government itself has been responsible for a large 
proportion of the discrimination practiced . From its incep-
tion, the Fede~al Housing Administration (FHA) set itself up 
as the protector of the all-white neighborhood . 1 It exerted 
pressure against minorities to keep them from buying homes in 
certain neighborhoods . It insisted upon racial "homogeneity" 
in all of its projects as the price of insurance. Thus, its 
official manual provided: 2 
"If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is 
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied 
by the same social and racial classes . " 
Furthermore, the Home Loan Bank System has followed the FHA 
practice . When loans were made, the policy was to encourage 
segregation . 3 In addition, the government's urban renewal 
program has resulted in more segregation . 4 If this was not 
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bad enough, Public Housing Authority (PHA) funds have been 
used to aid segregation in locally owned housing projects . 
The PHA has vacillated from a policy intimating acceptance 
of separate but equal projects,.5 to a policy of leaving 
general decisions concerning segregation to local authorities . 
Thus, a PHA official has stated that the PHA did not enforce 
segregation and had neither a policy for or against it . 6 
In this area, we are not confronted with the problem of 
whether judicial enforcement constitutes state action . Rather, 
we are concerned with the question of whether a person can 
force a housing project in which some arm of government has 
played a role to admit him . As far as private housing is 
concerned , the state action doctrine absolves a private 
discriminator from liability. You cannot be forced by a 
projective purchaser to sell to him . However, in the field of 
so-called npublic housing , " the role played by the government 
may in and of itself constitute state action justifying a 
suit for admission by a discriminated party . 
In order to adequately cope with the problems presented, 
we must deal with the various types of public housing separately . 
A. Publicly Built and Operated Housing 
First of all, let us consider publicly-built and operated 
housing . The Brown doctrine (that segregated education is per 
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se unequal) is as applicable to publically-built and operated 
housing as it is to other types of governmental facilities • 
• Every case that has considered the question has invalidated 
the discriminatory practices involved. The Supreme Court 
itself has not ruled on the question. The closest it has come 
to so doing was in Banks v. Housing Authority. 8 In Banks a 
California court had ordered a local housing authority to 
admit the Negro plaintiffs to the project . The defendant 
had been operating several projects, only one of which was 
open to Negroes and that one exclusively so. However, the 
total number of Negro tenants was proportionate to their mem-
bership in the community . The court discussed the separate 
but equal doctrine, but decided the case without expressly 
rejecting it . The court stated that equal protection is an 
individual, and not a group right . As the projects were 
designed for a certain income group's benefit, the plaintiffs, 
members of that group, were denied equal protection when they 
were considered as members of a racial group. The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari . Some constructed this to mean that 
since Brown was then before the Court, that Brown controlled 
and Banks required no discussion . Others construed it, however, 
as meaning that the Court was not taking a position ·at that 
time . 9 
In any event, suits against the local housing authorities 
have been sustained, However, the more difficult question in 
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this area is whether suit may be brought against the PHA . 
Although public housing is owned usually by local housing 
authorities, these projects could never have been built 
withoug PHA financial assistance . 10 In addition, federal 
control of these projects is thoroughgoing and significant . 
That the PHA plays a dominant role should be evident from 
the following facts: 11 
1 . The need for the project must be demonstrated to 
the satisfaction of PHA . 
2 . PHA must approve the agreement between the local 
housing authority and the local government body . 
3 . PHA makes a preliminary loan to the local authority 
for the purpose of starting the project . 
4. PHA reviews, approves and submits to the president 
the contract providing for annual contributions . 
5. PHA reviews and approves tenant income limits, 
rentals, size and cost of contracts, sites, personnel 
policies, and budgets . 
6 . PHA has final and conclusive authority to determine 
whether there has been a default with respect to 
federally imposed obligations . 
If PHA adopted an anti-segregation policy, it would spell an 
end to locally compulsory segregated public housing . 12 Hence, 
there have been attempts to require PHA to cease payments to 
local segregating authorities . 
PHA has presented two major defenses to these suits. 
First of all, it contends that procedural rules prohibit suit 
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against it . A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia seems to sustain the PHA position . 13 
That case held that the local housing authority is a "condition-
ally necessary" party . Because of federal venue rules, local 
housing authorities may be sued only in their own districts . 
PHA then argues that neither can it be sued in the district 
of the local authority, but rather, only in the District of 
Columbia. Hence, procedural rules may absolve the PHA from 
responsibility for the activities of local housing authorities 
except that of the District of Columbia . As a second line of 
defense, PHA contends that it has no power to desegregate . l3a 
This contention obviously is contrary to the wide powers en-
joyed by the PHA . Furthermore, the PHA statutel4 itself may 
be deemed to outlaw segregation . The statute lists several 
groups which must be given housing priority . It would seem 
that a member of such a group, such as a disabled veteran, 
would seem to be able to demand housing equivalent to that 
given other members of his group (disabled veterans) regardless 
of his race . Although a non- discriminatory amendment to PHA 
was proposed in 1949 and defeated, no negative inferences 
should be drawn therefrom . It was defeated on the grounds 
that it was not needed 15 or that it would cause the bill's 
16 
defeat . Hence, it might be contended that the PHA statute, 
aside from constitutional considerations, requires integration . 
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B. Privately Built and Operated Housing Receiving Public 
Assistance 
Housing owned and operated by private parties, but 
built with some quantum of governmental assistance, presents 
more difficult problems . A leading case in point is: Dorsey 
v . Stuyvesa.nt Town . l7 In this case, eighteen square blocks of 
New York's east side were cleared and redeveloped to house 
25,000 families by a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company . This private housing corporation had ac-
quired the land as a result of an agreement with New York 
City whereby the city had condemned property, granted large 
tax exemptions, and exchanged city streets within the project 
for land outside it . The private corporation entered into a 
policy of racial exclusion . The New York City Court of Appeals 
refused to order an end to the corporation ' s discriminatory 
policies holding that it would be too great an extension of 
the "state action" doctrine . The United States Supreme Court 
refused to grant certiorari . 
A closer scrutiny of Dorsey raises doubts as to the 
wisdom of that decision . The project involved therein was 
built under the Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law . 18 That 
statute limits the rents and profits of private urban re-
development corporations, and requires community approval of 
plans for acquisition, clearance, and rebuilding . This 
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relationship was described by Justice Fuld dissenting in 
Dorsey as follows : 19 
11 In sum, the companies and the enterprises were to 
be governmentally aided and effectuated, as we 11 as 
supervised and regulated, in numerous ways . " 
Mr . Justice Fuld continues his dissent by adding that: 20 
11 To intimate that this is just another instance of 
a government subsidy is to misconceive the case ••• Un-
mistakable are the signs that this undertaking was a 
governmentally conceived, governmentally aided and 
governmentally regulated project in urban redevelopment . 
Everywhere in evidence are the voice and authority of 
the State and City ••• In addition, there is the exceed-
ingly significant fact that the City's Board of Esti-
mate approved and authorized the contract ••• after having 
been appraised ••• that Negroes would be excluded ••• here 
was action •• 1 consciously exerted' by the state 'in aid 
of' the discrimination being practiced ••• 11 
In the light of Mr . Justice Fuld's dissent, the majority 
opinion appears even more unconvincing. Nevertheless, the 
majority opinion in Dorsey tried to distinguish previously 
decided "state action" cases on the theory that "they disclose 
the exertion of government power directly to aid in discrimina-
tion,"21 while the government role here assumed the guise of 
being ''indirect, ••• helpful cooperation . 11 22 
The Stuyvesant Corporation had one equity in its favor . 
While negotiating with the government authorities, it expressly 
declared that it could not make the necessary investment unless 
it adopted a racial exclusion policy . The contract was entered 
into without provision for the selection of tenants . The 
Stuyvesant Corporation relied upon a sort of tacit government 
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agreement not to interfere in the selection of tenants . It 
could be said that Stuyvesand relied to its detriment since it 
invested not less than ninety million dollars of its own private 
funds . This appealing aspect of Stuyvesant's case may well 
have offset the inequities created by their policy of racial 
exclusion . Nevertheless , even if there was a government con-
tract (even an express agreement) not to interfere with 
Stuyvesant ' s policy with respect to the selection of tenants , 
this contract would not be enforceable . A contract that vio-
lates the constitution is null and void . 23 
The New York Court of Appeals decision also failed to 
grasp the possibility of the doctrine of Marsh v . Alabama 24 
being applicable to the facts of Dorsey . In Marsh the United 
States Supreme Court ind icated that a private person who has 
gained a position of significant societal power and is per-
forming the functions usually performed by the government 
itself is subject to the fourteenth amendment . Marsh in-
volved a private company town outside Mobile, owned by the Gulf 
Shipbuilding Corporation . Describing the project, the Court 
said: 
n ••• the property consists of residential buildings, 
streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and 
a business block on which business places are situated ••• 
in short the town and its public district are accessible 
to and freely used by the public in general and there is 
nothing to distinguish them from any other town and 
shopping center except the fact that title to the 
property belongs to a private corporation . " 
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Can Marsh be readily distinguished from Dorsey? Is it 
enough to say that Marsh was a free speech case and that Dorsey 
was an equal housing case? If so, are we to assume that the 
Constitution has established a hierarchy of freedoms and that 
adequate housing is less important than free speech? To the 
contrary, studies indicate the inter-relationship between dis-
crimination in housing and the abridgment of other civil rights . 25 
Can it be said that a project designed to accommodate some twenty-
five thousand persons was not of such proportions as would warrant 
the application of the Marsh principle? 
It would seem as if Mr . Justice Fuld was correct when he 
concluded that : 26 
"All in all, the resemblance between Stuyvesant Town 
and the company town of Marsh v . Alabama (326 U. S . 501) 
is strong, the analogy between this case and that one, 
clear . 11 
In addition, it appears difficult to reconcile this 
result with the court ' s decisions in the field of the nwhite 
primary . " Until World War 2, the white primary was the princi-
pal device by which the South banned Negroes from effectively 
voting . It was widely assumed that relinquishment of state 
controls over the primary would permit the Democratic party 
to conduct the primary as a ttnon-statett venture . But in 
1944, the Court held that such a system constituted nstate 
action . " 27 And in 1953 the Supreme Court struck down a subtle 
device which had been invented to evade the Court's earlier 
edict . The Court, in Terry v . Adams 28 held that pre-primary 
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exclusion of Negroes from voting in a poll conducted by the 
Jaybird Democratic Association also constituted illegal state 
action . The Court held in these cases that the state could not 
abandon a situation "in a form which permits a private organiza-
tion to practice racial discrimination . " 29 Arguing by analogy 
to the facts present in Dorsey, one could contend that the State 
of New York could not abandon its urban renewal project to the 
constitutionally immune whims of a private corporation . 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Dorsey . Some have 
justified the court's failure to review Dorsey on the grounds 
that the passage of New York City legislation forbidding dis-
crimination in all similar future projects solved the problem 
for the city and eliminated the necessity for the court's 
deciding the important constitutional issues involved at that 
time . 3° Others, like Charles Abrams, were more critical . 3 1 
Thus, Abrams points out that: 
" ••• No technical reasons for refusing review existed, 
and Justices Black and Douglas dissented from t he 
majority's refusal to hear the case . These d'ssents in 
themselves spotlighted the need for airing th e issue ••• 
The points remain •••• that the very refusal to review 
which today may be salutary, may in the hands of a less 
enlightened court tomorrow represent the most flagrant 
and frustrating denial of justice •••• From an adverse 
decision by the Court, the aggrieved might have a 
remedy ••• From the refusal to hear there is no protest 
and no appeal . The refusal often encourages continua~ 
tion of the wrongs of oppressions from which the com-
plainant sought relief . " 
Perhaps, the best justification for the Court's refusal 
to review Dorse_;t lies in our earlier observation that "wise 
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adjudication has its own time for ripening . »3 2 
The unsoundness of Dorsey is further highlighted by the 
contrary result reached in Ming v . Horgan . 33 In Ming suit was 
brought to enjoin a project developer from discriminating in 
the disposition of his property which was wholly privately 
constructed and financed . The court granted the relief re-
quested and found the requisite state action in the fact that 
the developer's houses were approved for FHA financing to buyers . 
Dorsel is an a fortiori case, on this basis, for finding the 
requisite state action . Hence, if New York went to one extreme 
inDorse~, the California court went as far in the opposite 
direction in Ming . 
In order to fully understand Ming, we must first examine 
the activities of the FHA . Basically, FHA relieves banks of 
the risk involved in placing mortgages on homes approved by it, 
for if the for~gagor defaults, FHA will indemnify the bank for 
its loss . FHA benefits three groups: the mortgagees, the pur-
chasers, and the builders . 34 The banks are protected against 
the ris~ of any loss on the loan, the purchasers are benefited 
by being able to finance on terms more favorable than they 
could otherwise obtain, and the builders are benefited by 
having their market widened as a result of the financing ad-
vantages that FHA offers purchasers . 35 
An examination of the FHA system revea Is that the 
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activities of the builder are to some extent aided and regulated 
by the federal government. Before construction is commenced, 
the FHA may issue a commitment to the bank that the FHA promises, 
subject to certain conditions, to insure the mortgages of pros-
pective purchasers . 36 As stated in the commitment, thB FHA will 
insure mortgages only if a certain percentage is paid as a down 
payment, the term of the mortgage is limited, and the interest 
rate does not exceed FHA limits . Before approval of the 
commitment, the FHA requires submission of the plans and the 
bill of materials for the construction in order that the FHA 
may appraise the economic value of the home . 37 After approval 
and during construction, the agency makes at least three in-
spections to ascertain whether the building is in accordance 
38 
with the approved plans, and satisfactory performance is 
a prerequisite to the issuance of the FHA insurance . On these 
facts, was there enough to find "state actiontt or (in this 
case ufedera 1 act ion) tt in Ming? 
The Ming .opinion does not clearly indicate whether the 
California court granted relief on the theory that the de-
fendant had violated the FHA statute rather than the constitu-
tion o r whether relief was granted because the constitution was 
violated by the builder's discriminatory activities . 
In any event, the builder's activities do not seem to 
be an essential function of the federal government . The Federal 
Housing Authority has not the authority to implement any national 
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housing policy by actually engaging in the construction of 
private housing . Hence, on this basis, it becomes difficult 
to find nstate action" in Ming . 39 
Furthermore, it has not been decided that private action 
becomes state or federal action merely because the project 
received financial assistance from the government.4° Thus, 
in Eaton v . Board of Managers,41 a hospital which was a 
private corporation receiving public funds on a contractual 
basis to care for indigents, was upheld in its refusal to 
admit Negro physicians to its staff . Likewise, in Norris v . 
Mayor,42 a Negro was successful in seeking entrance to a pri-
vate vocational institute which received financial assistance 
partially on a contractual basis from the state and local 
governments . Hence, the mere fact that the FHA extends finan-
cial aid in the form of mortgage insurance should not make this 
ttstate 11 or 1tfederaltt action . 
Would the fact that financial assistance is coupled 
with regulation .make this a "state" action? Nevertheless, 
the element of regulation should be deemed relevant only if 
it is imposed in sufficient quantity . On the facts of Ming, 
it is doubtful as to whether it is present in sufficient 
degree . 43 In fact , a 1955 federal district court case involv-
ing Levittown , Pennsylvania, reached a conclusion opposite to 
the Ming result . 44 In the Levittown case, the federal d i strict 
court held that an operative builder's activities did not 
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constitute federal governmental action. As to Levitt, the 
developer, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
him, since there was no claim that he had acted under 
Pennsylvania state law . The federal jurisdictional questions 
were by- passed in Ming . The builders sued in Ming did not 
appeal to the California Supreme Court . They were probably 
fearful of a state supreme court affirmance .45 
Ming and Dorse~ are extreme cases . Yet one feels 
that there should be a workable middle ground . Certainly, 
the Stuyvesant Towns and Levittowns should not be allowed to 
go their own merry way . Unfortunately, the court has failed 
to provide definitive guidance in this area . 
c. Urban Renewal 
Another important area in the field of public housing 
is urban renewal . Under the urban redevelopment program, 
federal loans and grants are made available for the purpose of 
slum clearance, redevelopment , or conservation . 46 State enabl-
ing acts place the actual work of slum clearance and demolition 
in the hands of local authorities . Discrimination has resulted 
from the administration of this program. The majority of the 
families displaced by urban redevelopment projects are non-
whites . 47 If the area is to be redeveloped for commercial 
purposes, no new housing wi l l be provided on the pr oject site . 
Even if the cleared area is to be redeveloped for housing, 
population density is reduced . 48 Housing that is provided may 
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not be available to the non-white because of the high cost . 49 
When non-whites look elsewhere, they find that they can be 
relocated only in existing segregated sections which are them-
selves slum-like . "The urban renewal program- operating with-
in a pattern of segregated housing - is creating slums faster 
than it is clearing them . n50 
It could be contended that the federal relocations pro-
visions, as administered, violate the guarantees of the four-
teenth amendment . If the local authority, by condemning the 
Negroe ' s homes, forces the Negro to relocate in a housing market, 
which is known to be prejudiced against Negroes, it may be deemed 
to violate due process and equal protection . 
Victory for a Negro in a condemnation case would stop 
renewal at the crucial point . However, the Negro would be 
confronted with the argument that courts need not presume that 
illegality is going to take place at some future date . 5 1 
D. The Benign Quota 
Another interesting problem present in the field of 
public housing is the reverse of the one we have been consider-
ing up to this point . Not withstanding the removal of legal 
barriers to integrated housing, racial segregation may continue 
to exist . Integrated housing presents this problem . An over-
whelming majority of one ethmic group may occupy a housing 
development . This may be due to a number or different factors:52 
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1. They may be holdovers from a period of racial 
segregation . 
2 . Other racial groups may have gradually removed . 
J . Other groups may be reluctant to accept the 
facilities . 
4 . One group predominates in the segment of the popula-
tion eligible to occupy the development . 
Experience with integrated projects reveals that where 
the minority only has token representation difficulties arise .53 
Members of the token minority feel out of place . In projects 
where the minority accounts for more than half the tenants , 
the majority may feel like a minority . They try to be trans -
ferred elsewhere . Soon the project becomes all Minority . 54 
It is difficult to determine the best ratio, for much depends 
upon the proportion of the minority members in the area , the 
type of project management, the site selected , and the attitude 
of the community . 55 One learned commentator feels that the 
most successful projects have been those in which minority 
representation has ranged from 6 to 30 per cent . 56 He fe e is 
that this ratio works out we l l since the minority has 
sufficient representation to give it security, while the 
majority does not feel dominated by a group that is different . 
The suggestion has been made that the government institute 
·some sort of 11 controltt or "quotatt to maintain a balanced 
representation of ethinic groups in each housing project in 
order to overcome the phenomenon we have described . Thus, 
the Chairman of the New York State Commission Against Dis-
crimination has said that the state ' s housing projects will 
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be 11 ghettoized 11 unless this quota problem is solved . He has 
indicated that a public housing program could not prevent 
segregation if it rented solely on the basis of need and 
if at the same time "the need happened to be all Negro . 11 .5? 
Bearing in mind this problem, could a housing project 
institute a quota system? Some communities have done this . 
New Haven sometimes withholds vacant apartments from Negroes 
while waiting for white applicants . Pittsburg has solicited 
white applicants through advertisements • .58 One author has 
justified this practice from the following point of view:.59 
"There may be some who would call this a 'quota' 
system. But it is far from that . A quota system is 
a device to exclude people, not include them; to 
effect segregation not to break it down . " 
On the other hand, others have replied that: 60 
11 
••• we would have the law invoked against us if we 
followed the policy ••• We would not have white apart-
ments and black apartments and brown apartments set up 
in our projects . " 
In actuality, the adoption of a 11 quotatt system presents 
practical and legal questions . 
The practical considerations may be summarized as 
61 follows : 
1 . There is a resulting possibility that needier 
applicants will often be rejected in favor of 
those who can complete quota demands . 
2 . Fears must be overcome that quotas will not be 
used to effectuate discrimination . 
J . There may be difficulty in obtaining and retaining 
the necessary variety of tenants needed to maintain 
the quota system . 
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4. The quota system must conform with certain federal 
administrative regulations which condition the 
receipt of federal aid . 
5. It may be difficult to pinpoint the desired quota 
with scientific accuracy . 
6 . The moral judgment must be made that it is more 
desirable for the government to engage in a quota 
system than to permit the continuance of defacto 
segregation . 
Many of these problems can be solved by such plans as 
locating projects in undeveloped or already racially mixed 
areas, raising income limitations, and educational programs 
for the public . 62 However, the legal and administrative 
barriers are more difficult . 
One of the basic PHA regulations requires that there be : 63 
n •• equitable provision for eligible families of all 
races for such housing . " 
The key here is the mean i ng of the term nequitable . " What is 
meant by it7 In some regulations a "color blind" policy is 
prohibited . 64 At one time a regulation was in effect which 
appeared to permit the es ta bl ishmen t of 11 separate but equa 1" 
facilities . 66 It has~now been deleted which may indicate a 
change in policy. In any event , the regulations do provide 
that : 67 
" ••• selection of tenants and the assignment of dwelling 
units are primarily matters for local determination . " 
This tends to indicate that the federal government would not 
object to a locally adopted quota system provided it made "pro-
vision for All ••• races determined on the approximate volume 
and urgency of their respective needs . n68 
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Despite the fact that a ttquota 11 system may be able to 
overcome this administrative hurdle, it still may be deemed 
to ~ violate the constitution . The Supreme Court has never 
passed upon the Constitutionality of this so called benign 
quota system . Hence, we must rely upon analogous precedents 
in order to discern its legality . 
The closest situat i on which the Court has ruled upon is 
racial discrimination in the selection of a jury . A leading 
case in this area is Cassel v . Texas . 69 In Cassel, a Negro 
sought a reversal of his conviction of murder . He based his 
appeal on the ground that his indictment by the grand jury 
was invalid because Negroes had been purposefully excluded 
therefrom . Although some members of his race had been admitted 
to grand jury service, jury service by them had been limited 
to not more than one each grand jury. This number was in exact 
proportion to the number of Negroes living in the community . 
In reversing his conviction, the Court said . 7° 
11 Proportional representation of races on a jury is 
not a constitutional requisite •••• Obviously the number or races 
and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our citizens 
would make it impossible to meet a requirement of proportional 
representation . Similarly , since there can be no exclusion 
of negroes as a race and no discrimination because of color, 
proportional limitation is not permissible . " 
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The concurring opinion in Cassel viewed the problem even 
more cogently when it said : 71 
" ••• It is not a question of presence on a grand jury 
nor absence from it . The basis of selection cannot 
consciously take color into account . Such is the 
command of the constitution . " 
In another closely related area, the Court has intimated 
that the benign quota is unconstitutional . In Hughes v . 
Superior, 72 the court ruled upon the validity of a state court 
injunction against the picketing of a retail store to enforce 
a demand that the employer hire negro employees in proportion 
to the amount of negro customers patronizing the store . In 
the course of his opinion, Mr . Justice Frankfurter noted that: 73 
11 To deny California the right to ban picketing in the 
circumstances of this case would mean that there could 
be no prohibition of the pressure of picketing to secure 
proportional employment on ancestral grounds of Hun-
garians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans 
in Mi lwaul{ee, of Portugese in New Bedford, of Mexicans 
in San Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in 
New York, and so on through the whole gamut of racial 
and religious concentrations in various cities . States 
may well believe that such constitutional sheltering would 
inevitably encourage use of picketing to compel employ-
ment on the basis of racial discrimination . In dis-
allowing such picketing, States may act under the belief 
that otherwise community tensions and conflicts would 
be exacerbated . 11 
Although this case does not present a square holding 
that a state may not constitutionally enforce a quota, there 
are strong indications in the opinion that the court would not 
acknowledge any benefits that could flow from a quota system of 
employment . 
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What is the true rationale of these cases (especially 
the grand jury case)? It is that (even though proportional 
representation might in a given case lead to less discrimina-
tion) the Constitution prohibits per se the taking of race into 
account . After all, if Negroes were granted proportional rep-
resentation there would probably be less probability of dis -
crimination occuring . Giving Brown v . Board of Education, its 
widest reading we would say that the Constitution is now 
11 color blind . n74 
Furthermore, the quota system adopts a "group" approach 
to discrimination and submerges the rights of the ind ividual 
member of the minority . The Supreme Court has held that:75 
"It is the ind ividual who is entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws •••• " 
The Court has continued to reiterate this philosophy . Thus, 
a railroad had adopted the practice of alloting ten tables 
exclusively to white passengers and one table exclusively to 
Negro passengers . In striking this system down the court said:76 
11 0ther Negroes who present themselves are compelled to 
await a vacancy at that table, although there may be 
many vacancies elsewhere in the diner . The railroad 
thus refuses to extend to those passengers the use of 
its existing and unoccupied facilities . " 
Hence, it could obviously be contended t hat an individual 
Negro who had been denied occupancy in a housing project be-
cause the uquota" was filled (and there were vacant apartments 
waiting for whites) had been individually deprived of equal 
protection and due process . 
-72-
Nevertheless, it might be contended that the benefits 
that would flow from the benign quota make it constitutional . 
It could be contended that a housing authority was merely 
righting a situation created by discriminatory practices in 
the past, whereas the grand jury decisions were aimed at dis -
criminatory practices . Thus, piercing mere form, the Court 
might justify the practice . Nevertheless, the Court rejected 
such an argument in Buchanan v . Warley . 77 In addition, it 
could be reasonably argued that harmful effects might flow 
from the adoption of a quota . 78 Some feel that governmental 
imposition of a quota is itself undesirable. In addition, a 
quota may result in needier applicants for housing being re-
jected in favor of the less needy majority members in order 
to fill quotas . In addition, scientific data has not really 
been accumulated as yet to determine the exact point at which 
a quota become benign rather than malign. Hence, the benefits 
that might flow in a given case might be too conjectural . 
Hence, in the absence of a square holding from the Supreme 
Court, one must entertain serious doubts as to the constitu-
tionality of the so called benign quota . 
XI . Discrimination and the Anti-Trust Laws 
Admirable as the results sought to be obtained in 
Shelley and Barrows are, there are practical difficulties 
in the path of the effecuation of those decisions . One major 
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obstacle is the organized movement of realtors who have 
combined in an effort to resist integrated housing . 
For example, by 1950, the National Association of 
Real Estate Boards was composed of 1100 member boards and 
43,539 realtors who contributed dues of more than $400,000 
annually . It maintained a lobby in Washington . 1 Another 
group, the National Association of Home Builders, had a 
membership of 16,350 . At least once a month the wire ser-
vices put the realty lobby 1 s releases to real estate editors on 
the wires as authoritative comrnent . 2 In one month newspaper 
stories of the NAREB totaled 2500, an average of 83 per day . 3 
In addition, such radio and TV commentators as Fulton Lewis, Jr . 
are known to faithfully sta t e the realty lobby's point of view . 4 
Until 1950, the official code of ethics of the Associa-
tion carried the following canon : 5 
"A realtor should never be instrumental in introducing 
into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, 
members of any race or nationality, or any individual 
whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property 
values in the neighborhood . 11 
Violations of this rule exposed a board to expulsion . In 1950, 
the canon was modified (on the advice of Counsel perhaps6) so 
that it now reads: 
''A realtor should never be instrumental in introducing 
into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy 
of any race or nationality, •••• which will clearly be 
detrimental to property values in that neighborhood . " 
Impractice, local real estate boards continued to give the 
canon its original interpretation? 
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How can such an organized movement m•litating for 
discrimination in housing be handled? One obvious method is 
the passage of anti-bias legislation. We shall discuss such 
legislation in our next chapter . In addition, it has been 
suggested that the activities of these groups might be deemed 
to be violative of the anti-trust laws . B The refusal to sell 
or rent homes to a certain class might be deemed a violation 
of the anti-trust laws if it reaches such proportions that it 
bars a large segment of the community from the city's housing 
market . The concer t ed refusal of lending institutions to 
deal with Negroes might be deemed an illegal boycott . 9 In 
fact, in 1946, the federal government did obtain a consent 
decree against the Mortgage Conference of New York, enjoining 
an agreement among its members to refrain from making mortgage 
loans for Negro and Spanish speaking occupancy . lO The major 
difficulties to be expected with respect to such an action 
would be the showing of the affect of the restraint on inter-
state commerce and the proof of the conspiracy . n However, some 
state anti-trust statutes are broad enough to include real 
estate discrimination within their prohibitory scope . 12 
XII . Anti - Bias Legislation 
A. Summary of Existing Laws 
T~e pendulum has begun to swing in the opposite direc-
tion . Minority group interests have become more vocal . They 
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have gained greater political representation. This has 
resulted in the enactment of statutes in various states barring 
discrimination in housing . 
The status of existing state anti - bias legislation with 
respect to housing can be summarized as follows: 
1 • 
2 . 
J . 
4. 
5. 
6 . 
8 . 
9 . 
Some statutes prohibit discrimination only in 
publically assisted housing, including housing 
receiving assistance in the form of FHA and 1 Veterans Administration Mortgage Insurance . 
Some statutes only apply to multiple dwelling units . 2 
Some statutes regulate all real estate owners re-
gardless of the noncommercial nature of the 
property as long as at least indirect governmental 
assistance has been furnished . 3 
Some statutes do not require that public assistance 
be furnished before they are applicable . They are 
applicable as long as the property in question is 
part of a multiple unit development . 4 
Some laws permit a person discriminated against 
direct access to the courts . 5 
Most laws provide that relief must first be sought 
before an administrative agency . 6 If after a hear-
ing the agency concludes that there has been dis -
crimination, it will issue a cease and desist order . 
Under some statutes , the agency may order the vio-
lator to sell or rent to the person who has been 
discriminated against . 
ProvisiQn is made for judicial review of the agency ' s 
action . ~ 
Only a few laws impose criminal sanctions . 9 
None of the enacted laws are applicable to purely 
private housing . However, the Lawyer's Guild has 
proposed a model bill which would include dt scrimina-
tion in all housing accommodations (except lodgers) 
within its anti~bias ban . lO This model bill was 
introduced in the Rhode Island Legislature last year 
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but it encountered strong opposition. In fact, 
the opponents organized a Committee for Individual 
Liberty to express their sentiments . " This 
Committee issued the following statement:l2 
"The Committee for Individual Liberty will continue 
to defend the right of all people in this state to 
sell or rent their houses to anyone of their own 
choosing . We shall, therefore, oppose any legisla-
tion, whatever its label and however subtly camou-
flaged, which would deny this right . 
We continue to receive many letters and telephone 
calls from people in every part of the state ex-
pressing opposition to the passage of a so-called 
'fair housing ' bill in any form. In their behalf, 
we shall be prepared to do what is necessary to 
inform the public the real issues involved and to 
use every lawful means at our disposal to defeat 
any such legislation if it is introduced in the 
coming session of the General Assembly . 
The issue, and the only issue as far as our 
organization is concerned, is individual liberty for 
all . (It is not segregation versus integration of 
any particular race, despite the efforts of the pro-
ponents of this legislation to dress it up in that 
light . ) To substitute governmental coercion for 
freedom of choice in the area of private housing 
should be abhorrent to every freedom - loving 
American . On that issue there can be no compromise . " 
B. The Constitutionality of Anti-Bias Legislation 
Opponents of anti-bias legislation have based their 
objections on constitutional grounds . They claim that such 
legislation deprives them of property without due process of 
law . Attempts to limit the scope of a proposed bill to multiple 
dwelling units have been met with the contention that this 
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution . 
Thus, the committee for Individual Liberty has proclaimed that:l3 
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"The present bill (S . 27) is, of course, class legis-
lation of the rankest sort . " 
Others have contended that anti-bias legislation deprives them 
of a constitutional right to choose one's own neighbors -
freedom of association . l4 Hence, without further ado, let us 
attempt to determine the constitutionality of legislation 
barring discrimination in housing . 
These bills will probably be sustained as a valid exer-
cise of the police power of the state . Thus, as Justice Rugg 
has so eloquently said:l5 
"The police power is recognized as an attribute of 
government . It may be put forth in any reasonable way 
in behalf of the public health, the public morals, the 
public safety and, when defined with some strictness 
so as not to include mere expediency, the public welfare . 11 
Every form of property may be controlled by the pollee power . 16 
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared: 17 
Hfrom time to time for a generation, as arose, this 
court has held that there is no such inherent difference 
in property in land, from that in tangible and intangible 
personal property as exempts it from the operation of 
the police power in appropriate cases . " 
The tren d of Supreme Court decisions has been to extend 
the def ini ti on of "genera 1 welfare" so that today there is hardly 
any need which may not be remedied by the exercise of the 
policy power . The statute will be deemed constitutional as 
long as it has some "reasonable rela t ionn to a valid state 
public policy. 18 Furthermore, the Court, will not substitute 
its judgment for that of the legislature . Thus the Supreme 
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19 Court has declared that: 
The trend of Supreme Court decisions has been to extend 
the definition of "general welfare" so that today there is hardly 
any need which may not be remedied by the exercise of the police 
power . The statute will be deemed constitutional as long as it 
has some !treasonable relationtt to a valid state public policy . 18 
Furthermore, the Court, will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the legislature . Thus, the Supreme Court has declared 
19 that: 
11When the subject 1 ies within the policy power of 
the State, debatable questions as to the reasonableness 
are not for the courts but for the legislature, which 
i s entitled to form its own judgment . " 
Assuming for purpose of argumentation (and this has been 
disproven as indicated earlier) that the adoption of an anti-
bias statute would have an adverse effect on property values, 
is this the deprivation of property without due process of 
law? As has been indicated, the police power is a limitation 
upon due process . The police power has been applied and sus-
tained in other areas to control or regulate the use of 
t Th . t f 20 proper y . ey cons1s o : 
1 . Laws prohibiting advertising billboards except of 
a prescribed size and location, or their use for 
certain kinds of advertising . 
2 . Laws authorizing encroachment by party walls in cities . 
J . Laws fixing the heights of buildings . 
4. Laws regulating the character of materials . 
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5. Laws regulating the method of construction . 
6 . Zoning Laws excluding certain buildings from 
designated neighborhoods . 
Rent control laws . 21 
8 . Urban Renewal laws . 22 
In upholding the constitutionality of an Urban Renewal Law, 
the Supreme Court has reiterated the applicability of the 
police power to property:23 
"We deal ••• with what traditionally has been known 
as the police power . An attempt to define its reach 
or trace its outer limits is fruitless for each case 
must turn on its own facts ••• Subject to specific con-
stitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well - nigh conclusive . In such cases the legislature, 
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public 
needs to be served by social legislation, whether it 
be Congress legislating concerning the District of 
Columbia ••• or the States legislating concerning local 
affairs •• •• u 
In addition, statutes which required non-discriminatory 
policies in semi-public activities have encountered no constitu-
tional barrier . In District of Columbia v . ThomQson,24 the 
Court decided the validity of legislation barring discrimination 
in restaurants . The Court held that: 25 
" • •• so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned 
there is no doubt that legislation which prohibits dis-
crimination on the besis of race in the use of facilities 
serving a public function is within the police power of 
the state." 
Likewise, in Bob - Lo v . Michigan, 26 the Court sustained the 
power of the state to ban discrimination by a pleasure boat . 
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Arguing by analogy, it appears that housing would seem to ful-
fill the same basic "public Function" and hence, anti-bias 
housing legislation should be deemed a proper exercise of the 
police power . 
However, even though the United States Supreme Court 
concludes that such a statute does not violate Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process, it does not follow that a state court 
will give the Due Process clause of its own constitution the 
same interpretation. The states tend to view the police power 
more strictly, for purposes of interpreting their own state 
constitution, than does the Supreme Court in viewing Fourteenth 
Amendment problems. 27 States courts tend to give their own 
legislatures less latitude . 28 Hence, an interesting "state 
action" problem would be raised under the Fourteenth Amendment 
if a state court were to hold an anti-bias statute unconstitu-
tional under its own state constitution . The question raised 
is whether state court in validation of such a statute involves 
"state action," since such private discrimination is legally 
possible only after the state, through its courts, invalidates 
the statute. One formal way out of this dilemma would be to 
say that an unconstitutional statute is a comple nullity- so 
that it is never deemed to have existence. Nevertheless, the 
State court by its action, would seem to be placing the stamp 
of judicial approval on discriminatory practices . 29 
Some statutes are only applicable to multiple dwelling 
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units, others to publicly assisted housing . It might be con-
tended that such a statute violates the equal protection clause 
of the constitution . It would seem, however, that such a classi-
fication would be deemed justified . A classification is not 
repugnant to equal protection guarantees where, considering the 
subject matter and object of the legislation, it rests upon 
some reasonable basis and where no "invidious discrimination" 
can be found . 30 The prior separate regulation and classifica-
tion of multiple dwelling units may be justified on the grounds 
that there is a greater need for regulating them. Furthermore, 
no genuine question of "invidious discrimination" can be raised 
since "commercial 11 and "single-residence" properties are not 
in substantial competition with each other . 3 1 More difficulty 
may be encountered in sustaining the validity of statutes 
barring discrimination in publicly- assisted housing . It is 
difficult to see how indirect governmental assistance, such as 
FHA insurance, justifies the carving out of a separate regulated 
class . Furthermore, such housing may be in direct competition 
with non-aided housing . Hence , isn't this "invidious discrimina-
tion?" The New York Supreme Court32 justified this classifica-
tion on the basis of the 11 step- at- a- time" rule formulated by 
the United Supreme Court that : 33 
"Reform may ta ke one step at a ti me, addressi ng itself 
to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative min d . 11 
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The next objection to this legislation is based upon 
the contention that such a statute is violative of one's 
freedom to choose his own neighbors - freedom of association . 
Where a single dwelling is involved, this argument lack 
vitality since the violat· 1 of the statute would be moving 
out of the neighborhood once he is compelled to sell or rent . 
It is a much more forceful argument wher e multiple dwelling 
units are involved . To some, like Professor Wechsler,35 the 
Court failed to adequately come to grips with this issue in 
Brown v . Board of Education . Nevertheless, the Court has 
indicated fairly strongly that freedom of associatlon must 
bend to a more urgent public need . Thus, in Railway Ass. v . 
Corsi,36 the Supreme Court sustained the validity of a state 
statute which required that labor unions admit all applicants 
to membership without regard to race, creed, color or national 
origin . The Court stated in Corsi:37 
1~ judicial determination that such legislation vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment would be a distortion 
of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was 
adopted to prevent state legislation designed to per-
petrate discrimination on the basis of race or color . " 
C. Additional legal problems have been raised by the 
attempts of municipalities to legislate in this field . 38 Since 
many of the problems will vary from state to state and are 
primarily within the domain of the Law of Municipal Corporations, 
we will merely summarize these problems:39 
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1. A city ordinance barring discrimination in housing 
may not be a proper ttmunicipal function . tt 
2 . Such a city ordinance may be invalid as a depriva-
tion of common law rights. 
3. The city ordinance may be inconsistent with a state 
law on the subject . 
4. The state may be deemed to have preempted the field 
of housing regulation . 
In view of the complexity of the questions, one should hesi-
tate before he advocates the adoption of anti - bias legislation 
on a municipal ordinance basis . 
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XIII . Conclusion. 
It is the belief of the author that the development of 
the law in this area, although admirable in many respects, has 
been an uneven one. The decisions of the Courts fail to truly 
illumine the areas with which they deal. In addition, the 
Supreme Court has added to the existing confusion by refusing 
to grant certiorari in many critical cases. 
The practice of law has been defined by many scholars 
as consisting of the art of prediction . The existing decisions 
fail to provide a clear enunciation of principles upon which 
future decisions can be based . 
To the Court's credit, the individual and human dignity 
have been riding the crest of a wave of social philosophy that 
has greatly submerged the more - reactionary arguments in favor 
of discrimination in housing . The Court has come a long way in 
Shelle~ and Barrows . The Court is no longer living in the 
shadow of Corri9an v . Buckle~ . The Court has now placed a 
higher premium on human values than on· property rights. Hence, 
it may fairly be concluded that the burden of proof has shifted 
to those who advocate discriminatory practices. Thus, it is 
submitted, that the history of adjudication in this area 
supports an inference that the Court has evolved a general 
philosophy in which human rights are being elevated . Neverthe-
less, if the Court is to retain public respect, it must do more 
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than announce decisions based upon admirable value judgments . 
The Court is bound to decide cases in accordance with sound 
principles of constitutional law . The Court's decisions have 
been woefully weak in this respect . 
The key constitutional provision that is involved in 
this area is the fourteenth amendment. Before the amendment 
can be applied, "state action" must be present . Shelley and 
Barrows clearly tell us that there is state action where suit 
is directly based upon a breach of a discriminatory contract . 
The Court, however, leaves us in a penumbra as far as the 
validity of such a covenant is concerned in a collateral pro-
ceeding . The failure of the Court to define "state action" 
with exactitude has resulted in evasive techniques being 
adopted and being sustained by the Court's certiorari policy . 
Furthermore, the lack of a precise analysis of "state action" 
has had ramifications in the field of public and quasi-public 
housing . The validity of the Stuyvesant Towns and Levittowns 
remains in doubt . 
In addition, the Court has failed to correlate its de-
cisions in the field of housing with those in the area of edu-
cation. More specifically, there has been no clear cut de-
termination that "separate but equal" housing is per se uncon-
stitutional . This judicial inaction has resulted in some doubts 
as to the constitutionality of certain public housing programs 
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and certain aspects of urban renewal . Furthermore, such an 
absolute per se attitude is a two edged sword . The prevalence 
of such an attitude could spell defeat for the adoption of a 
benign quota . 
Even within the framework of general legal philosophy, 
the Court has had some shortcomings . Indeed, the Court has 
stated that the discriminatory contract is valid - it becomes 
tainted with illegality only by judicial action . Thus, one 
may not sue for the breach of a valid contract l Furthermore, 
the Court has failed (both here and in Brown) to come to grips 
with the problem of evaluating the constitutional weight to 
be attached to argumentation based upon the principle of free-
dom of association . It will be recalled that this principle 
is now being utilized with vigor by the opponents of fair 
housing legislation . 
In addition, although Brown presents somewhat of a clue, 
one would not want to hazard a guess as to the extent to which 
the Court will utilize societal facts in its determinations . 
For example, would the Court recognize the recently produced 
scientific data to the effect that integration in housing does 
not adversely affect property values? 
However, these problems are not due exclusively to a 
deficiency in judicial personnel . Rather, it may be due to 
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the fact that the courts have had to assume a role that 
should have (and still should be) played by the legislative 
and executive branches of the government . The Commission 
of Civil Rights has recently reported that the other branches 
of government should assume the responsibility of constructive 
leadership . 1 The Courts should not have to be placed in the 
position of being the exclusive creators of public policy in 
the field of housing . 
TI1e enactment of anti - bias statutes may be a step in 
the right direction . Nevertheless, one must ponder and in-
quire as to whether equality can be legislated . The under -
lying problems have deeper roots . They require a spirit of 
benevolence, goo d will and mutual understanding . We will 
not have the brotherhood of man unless we first have the man-
hood of brothers . 
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APP.l:!:NDIX A 
A C 1PILA.TION OF RECENT ST T1JTORY ENACTI1ENTS IN 
THE FIELD OF HOUSH\G. 
I 
Race Relations Law Reporter 
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY 
NASHVILLE 6, TENNESSEE 
February 1, '· 1960 
Professor William Schwartz 
Boston University School of Law 
Boston 8, Massachusetts 
Dear Professor Schwartz: 
I am sorry to have delayed so long in giving you a reply to 
the questions you asked about legislation relating to dis-
crimination in housing. About the time I returned to tb! 
office our secretary becane ill, and I am just now catching 
up on back correspondence. 
As I told you in St. Louis, the Reporter will carry all 
legislation that we know has been enacted. I have been 
looking over all the material which has cnme across my desk 
and am enclosing a copy of an item which I believe may be 
of interest to you. It is taken from a publication entitled 
"From tre State Capitals, 11 published by Bethune Jones, 234 
River Road, Red Bank, New Jersey, and relates to discrimination 
in private housing. 
I am sorry that I cannot be of mare assistance to you in 
this connection. If you feel at any time in tm future that 
we could supply you with furtb!r information on your question, 
please do not hesitate to let us hear from you. 
Sincerely yours, 
T. A • Smedley, 
TAS/a 
enclosure 
P .s .: I am also enclosing a copy of the "Housing" section, taken 
from 11SUMMARY OF 1958 and 1959 STATE ANTI-DXS:CRJMINATION IAWStt 
prepared b,y Commission on Law and Social Action of the American 
Jewish Congress, 15 East 84th Street, New York 28, N.Y. 
This may be helpful. 
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DIST!\IC't OP OOWHBIAt Urging leade-rs ot business and lab to give up Ehe W1ruxurji or job d1aer1m1nation against Negroes, Director David A. 
Sawyer of the D1atriot Coumissioners 1 Council on Hwnan Relations asser-
ted that unleas job openinga are · tilled on the baaia or ekill, "we will 
be continuing w1. th the tragic merry. ... go-round where racial bias in em-
ployment continues to be a major taetor to the problem surrounding de-
pendency and poverty in Washington." · 
He ama the human relations commission and the district oammiaaioners 
agree that Begro ywth must be given wider opportunities to learn a 
trade. 
Addressing a meeting or the Washington Area Conference on Inter-Group 
Relations, Sawyer said the commissioners were "greatly disturbed" over 
report of ho~douts mo e1nployers in tb ildin ra e a ern-
plo era, when faced wit epp al o end d1 c iruinat1o. i hi~'ng for 
government construction work tend to blwne unions and he untona tend 
to blame e.mplo ~ ers. 
Soma local busin~sses, he added, have moved on their own initiative to 
end job bias. However , qualified resident Negroes may be cast aside in 
preference to outsiders. 
"This kind or disorimina tio , tt Sawy r aa1d, "1 too oost y in terms of 
relief. It is the kind of luxury that a progr ssive metropolitan com-
munity can no longer afford to enjoy." 
While many department and specialty stores find it good busines to 
ploy by merit, the majority still doe not f vor equal job pportun1-
t1es, Sawyer declar ed, adding: "I bop that business and labor will a-
lax their tim dity about instituting a merit employment program. Em-
ployers take much greater r·isks in many other things they do in their 
daily business ventures -- ri s ks t aken with much lea prospect of gain 
-- not only t o business but, in reality, gain to the total and economic 
welfare of a community in which tbey do business." 
for consideration by the New York 
cri nll in ale o:r ren .. al o · 
The pr·oposal, known as the :Hetcalf-Baker fa1I" housing bill, is expected 
to lead to a major legislative struggle. Outcome of the struggle may 
depend on bow strong a stand is taken by Governor Rockefeller. 
The governor said he did not expect to support the bill, but would in-
trod ce his own proposal. uwe have made cur own investigation and stud-
ies on this sub jeot," he said, "and I l-1111 aubmi t a bill of my own. 1 
Declining to say hat his bill would contain, the governor 
"I can't say tbat there can be any bill in thi field th 
meet some opposition, either from people who say 1t doe n t 
enough or rraa *bose who say it goes too far." 
(o er) 
b rved, 
ouldn't 
go r 
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Sponsors of the filed bill are Senator George P. Metcalf of Auburn and 
Assembl yman Bertram L. Baker of Brooklyn, who also sponsored present 
New York State law prohibiting discrimination in housing that receives 
any form of publ i c aid. 
The new proposal would pr ohi bit discr imination because of race, creed, 
color, or national origin in the sale or r ental Gf al l housing except 
one - family homes oc cupied by the owner and two-fami l y homes in which 
the owner occupies one unit. 
This bill, in addi ti on t o extending to the en t ire s t ate t hose prohibi -
tions agains t di scrimination already in f orce in New York City, also 
wo ld ban such di scrimination by re al e state brokers, sale ~en, mortgage 
m , banks and other lending in titutions. In hese mat ers, the 
m· asure ~oea beyond Ne York City's Sharkey-Brown-Issaes an i-blas law, 
-1 "j f'f' • s t"HH~ ~ tn "' '-Peso sine e pril 1 1958. 
The new provi s ions also would ext end to New York City if the Metcalf-
Baker bill, or some sub titute bill ret aining i t s condit i ons , be c ame 
law. ~he proposed law would be en orceable by the Sta t e Commiss i on 
gainst Discrimination hrough the same procedures t he commission now 
u es in en arcing laws against discrimination in employment. education , 
places v pub ic accommodation, and publicly assisted housing. 
In Ne1.-r York City, this " JUld mean a transfer of enforcement powers f r m 
the City Commission on ntergroup Relations, which now bas r espons1bil· 
ity for obt aining compl ~ ~ce with the Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs law. 
A press conference cal d by the New York State Commi ttee on Discrimina-
tion in Housing indicated expectation of a legislative struggle and the . 
possibil i y that the bill might be somewhat modified to garner suffici ... 
ent votes i.n the legislature. 
The commi ttee repre ents 38 organizations throughout the stat e . Commit-
tee Chairman Algernon D. Black ~aid Governor Roc efelle had indicated 
soon after h i s election in 1958 tha t he favor ed a s t atewide ban on dis-
i!11in t on in h n.sin , al thou e an h d not been spelled out. 
'lb6 11etc alf - ak r b11 wot.-ld 1ake .i. t a viol at !. on for- a oroker to · •eruse 
to show a home-seeker any listed property, even though the owner could 
refuse legall y -- in the case of s ome on&-family and two-fami ly h ouses 
- - t o r ent or s ell. 
Bills under the same spon screhip died 1n comm1 ttee in the 1958 and 1959 
New York St ate legislatures. These propo ala would have banned bias in 
selling or renting real estate in apartment buildings with separate ao-
commodations for three or more familia an 1n housing raats of 10 or 
more dwelling borderir . on each other. 
In another 
crimination 
b rred from 
the Planned 
ew York St te development, tb a te Commise on A ainat Dis-
said. it had no jurisdiction. in the ease of a doctor who was 
a Rom Catholic hospital becaus of his connect ion with 
Parent ood Association. 
(over) 
Vl.t lv, .P.r 
r r -l th l 
'ld. en~ ed n a\-lf 
only crd r j ~ U1 ~easP ar ct de .... 1.si;. . UnJe! '1., amenim n . i C'<'!n rpqu re 
affim 'ltjve a"tion , ~uch ac; grar.~n· reinstdtP.rnent ar 4 •ac' pay. The 
same b. aMended th · lav.r by redur·in~" th1 t i ,e ~:1 thin wh.; ~r-1 a CO''lD laint 
Inus ~ b• f ·1 d fmm f:-1 ,. :'!len ths to 9 days. { fl ~epa E • 1 "'m 'rFie d the 
New t-1exico amended 1 ts Fair Employment Prac tices Act t o make it a 
misdemeanor to spend public money in violation of the Act. Violation of 
this section is punishable by a fine of $50 to $500 and/or impn son~ent 
for not roore than 90 days. The same bill reworded the definiti')n of 
unfair employment practices but Hithout making subs tan tive changes in 
the statute. 
Mi~souri a dopted a bill prohibiting discrimination i n state employ-
ment . Ho\lev er, all enforcement provisions were reooved f rom the bill 
b efore i t s •'inal a pproval. 
HOUSING 
Laws relatin~ to discrimination in housing were adopted by six 
states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon and 
~shington) and by New York City and Pittsburgh. 
Up to the end of 1957, all laws relating t o discrimination in 
housing were limited to housing receiving some form of public assistance . 
The break t hrough into tile general housing market occurred in New York 
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)C 
~( r tee 
"he ( Yor~ Ll y 1 w rr ~its dis"r 
rent.a.l ,)f mu l t1 fli d\:el "irw:=- {i.e., l uj 1 nr ·c 
apa rt. ePts\ .r!1 ~r · ct,s u' rtn or rr.c 1' !JOT'!" cr: 
1 1"'~" r e 
+, ... o · . c I ! • ""! e 
..... r not c"Jr ~ .. '11 ~(n~ oJlc · L> •• om ! er n, ··":. ·1 1,-.r- .rA'l<t lefor 
' .. , r 
'. < 
".r •; :w. • >tl; 'lllows CC'IJ·, jnts by th.e coo"lis..:ion i t c; .lf and. " hy an 
o -p;:,r.'izfd,i n l!h...Lch na s as onr.> of i ts purpo s es the -::omba t t ing of 
dis crir.ination or t he p r omo t ion of equa l housin!? 0ppo r t uni t ies." 
The Pit tsburgh comnis sion is a ut ho rize d to insue a f f i rmati ve 
or ders f::1 f c rceable i n the cou rts ~ In Hew York City, tbe cormnis..;ion, if 
it finds dis crimination , refers t ile case to an tnde! endent panel, 
a ppo ted by the Mayo r, whic ' has pc ·t~ e r t o i s sue o r ders eelf o r cPatle 
in +J., co urt s . 
I n 9c9 , U1e e xam le se t by t hese two cities wa s f ollowed by four 
s ta t e s: Colo ra do, lbnne cticut , Massachuse t t s 1 and Or e £?Qn . Three of 
these s ta tP s had a l r eady enac ted laws pro hi bi t ing dis cr imi nation i n 
publicly a ssi f;ted ho usi ng but t t-e f our t h , Cb l oraoo , tvas enacting its 
f i r s t law in t hi s a r ea. 
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• 
... lorar:i \y n li s t all he 1rlg facil +ie xcePt t 
wn r 
• x · cep 
t.l. t • ne "'a rti r ntal acconrno a '"io 
of cnE> ex.) 
Cnnnt:ctlcut•s s._atu•.e app.li s :.o ... ny ri u:;in~ accomodation wh c.n is 
one ! r· 
or· roore such &ccoarrpd tions or-ated on cc ntiguous land and 
·~~1:-:ed r_.. r oontrolled by one person. 
Tile MassachusPtts law applies to multiple dwel ings (that is, build-
ings Hi th three or mre units) and tc on and two family homes sold or 
rented in projects of ten or roore ccnti.;uous ho es. Thi 
c ,.I es all pro, ects of ten or m:re hones in tra~ts whose plans are sub-
rni t ted under th& state' r subrti vis :ion contr'"~l lal-.•. C'nce a ract :i:: so 
subi'li tted, the houses are cc ve1·ed by the law even n ree;ales by the 
original purchaser•,. ~t is believed that most r.ne-f:uni ly home projects 
Will be covered by this I rovi s~on. 
-·-""" .............. ~~ Oregon replaced its statute dealing With discrim1nation in publicly 
assisted housing '.Ii th new proVisions broadly prohibi tin.:; discriminat·ion 
in the sale or rental of any real property by a person who selle or 
leases real property "as a business enterprise" or "in connection With or 
J as an incirtent to his business onterprise." Th's drnvrs the l ine roughly I 
i 
l between per sons who handle t>..ousin~ as a conroodity an•J tr...ose '-1ho enter the ~
market only jncidentally to sell their own homes • 
- ... _ 
The aw further Provides that real estate brok r :> may not a ccept a 
prope :-'ty listinr· wi tJ: an uncierstanding that a purchaser may be d:iscrimi-
natP.d ar;ainst . This Hill apply not only t.o listings by persons engaged in 
the business of selling real property but also to listings. by indiVidual 
home owners , Thus, although the individual horne owner is allowed to 
discriminate, he cannot use the aid of a broker in doing so. 
It may be noted that this la'-1 applies to all real estate, business 
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• 
as well as residential. . All the other lawe apply only to residenta.l 
property. 
All four of these laws are to be adm:inistered by existing anti-
discrimination a~encies. In Connecticut, Massachusetts and Oregon, the 
a gencies will apply t he same procedures they already apply in cases o f 
discrimination in employment and public a cco!'l'lJ1X)dations. The Colorado 
la.w contains a new set o.f procedural provisions that differ in oome 
respects from these now applicable to employment!" 
~ .... ...:--. Oregon enacted an addi t1onal law \-lhich makes violation of the fair 
housing law a ground for suspension or revocation o ~ r l est.ate 
broker' s or salesman's license. 
---:calii'ornia passed two laws dealing with discrimination in 'Ublicly 
assisted housing. The fllB.jor bill applies to housing that enjoys tax 
exemption, housing that has been built on land assembled by condemnation 
proceedings and redevelopment ho sing ba~lt under the 19h9 Federal 
Housing Act. It also applies to FHA and VA housing in multiple dwellings 
(three or mre units to a building) and 1n projects of five or mre 
contiguous homes. Under this law, ~?;grieved parties may su for dam&ges 
or for an injunction to halt tne di.scrlmina tion. There is no 
provision for enforcell\ent by a state agency. 
The o th r California. bill, l-Jhi h was a eneral ll. with 
it to bP the policy Of th state t ther should b no di crimination 
in such projects . 
__.. 
A no ted below, shingt.on e cted bi.l.l b dly prohibiting 
di criminatory stions on a lica t.ions fur lo • 
This bill would 
apply to fi cing of oou ceo tion • If---- - 8-
APPENDIX B 
A COMPilATION OF i"lATERIALS OF THE OPPONENTS OF 
FAlli HOUSING lliGISLATION. (THE AUTHOR 
ACKNOIILEDGES THE AID OF ROBERT B. DRESS.tlli , ESQ . 
IN THE GATHERING OF THESE NATERIALS . ) 
(' 7F I 
15 Westminster Street 
Providence 3 
Rhode Island 
Note. 
Published by the Journal 
Jan.ll,l959, with the paragraph 
on page 2 marked X omitted. 
Editor, 
The Providence Journal Company, 
75 Fountain Street, 
Providence, R. I. 
December lS, 195S. 
Dear Sir: Re Proposed Fair Housing Law. 
According to recent press reports a Rhode Island group having 
the title, "Citizens United For a Fair Housing Law", are preparing 
a bill for introduction in the Rhode Island General Assembly de-
signed to prohibit discrimination because of race, color, religion 
or national origin in any kind of housing, public or private, 
single homes, or multi-family units. 
According to these reports, the following are the facts: 
The bill would apply equally to the rental and sale of resi-
dential property, and to the issuing of mortgages or loans for 
housing. 
The bill would give the Commission Against Discrimination 
authority to enforce the law. Court orders could be obtained 
against the persons judged to be practicing discrimination, and 
they could be cited for contempt of court if they failed to obey. 
The president of the group stated: 
"When our proposed law becomes law, we will be the 
first state to have a comprehensive measure covering 
all property, both public and private." 
This is an amazing proposal. I do not question the sincerity 
or good intentions of the proponents of the measure. I do, however, 
seriously question the soundness of their proposal. 
As the president of the group stated, it is very comprehen-
sive. It applies not only to single houses, but to multi-family 
houses, and to rentals as well as sales. As an example of its 
• 
-2-
application, the owner of a two-family house who wished to rent 
one of the apartments would be forbidden to choose the tenant if 
his choice were based upon considerations of race, color, religion 
or national origin, and the reason for his choice would not be 
determined by the landlord but by the governmental Commission 
Against Discrimination or by the courts. 
This, I submit, is an outrageous and unconstitutional inter-
ference with the right of private property and personal freedom. 
These rights, guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, 
constitute the basic difference between a free society and a 
Socialistic or Communistic society in which the government dictates 
and the people obey. 
If a law of this sort can be passed, it is but a short step 
X to extend it to owners who· rent rooms or take in boarders. Or 
does the bill apply to those who rent rooms? 
Is there no longer any respect for the Constitution or for the 
concept of private property and personal freedom? 
Have we at last reached a stage in our country's history when 
a person is no longer allowed to choose his own associates,--no 
longer master of his own house and undisputed owner of his own 
property? 
If so, a major step has been taken toward the destruction of 
the great American experiment in individual liberty. 
The issue is not whether any racial or religious group is 
superior or inferior to another. The issue is whether a person, 
regardless of his race or religion, is to be free to exercise 
certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On 
this there should be no difference of opinion. 
Very sincerely yours, 
/s/ R. B. Dresser 
Robert B. Dresser. 
EDITORIAL 
THE PROVIDENCE SUNDAY JOURNAL 
Providence, R. I. January 18, 1959 
THE FAIR HOUSING LAW WOULD BENEFIT R. I. 
A citizens' committee has laid before the General Assembly 
a bill that would seek to guarantee all citizens of Rhode Island--
regardless of race, color, religion or national ancestry--an 
equal opportunity to rent, lease or buy a home. 
This is in one sense a revolutionary proposal, because for 
the first time it would deny the right of an individual to refuse 
to dispose of his private property purely for reasons of racial 
discrimination. No other state in the union has such a law in 
force, although a New York City ordinance closely approaches it. 
Precisely because it is unique in its scope, the proposed 
bill is certain to provoke controversy. This is as it should be, 
because no new departure in public policy ought to be undertaken 
without thorough-going democratic debate. We have no doubt that 
all of the reputable citizens who endorse the plah have done so 
with good will and in good faith. By the same token, they should 
be prepared to accept honorable and open opposition to the bill 
in the spirit in which it is offered. To oppose the bill in good 
faith will no more mark a man as a bigot than lip-service to 
integration converts a hypocrite into an honest man. 
There are two questions implicit in the draft act: Is it 
constitutional, and is such a measure necessary and wise for Rhode 
Island? 
Competent legal op1n1on indicates that the law would stand 
up in a test of its constitutionality. Both state and federal 
courts repeatedly have upheld statutes designed to discourage 
discriminatory practices because of the social evils they breed. 
In the field of housing, these decisions nearly always have 
affected property in which public money is involved. The difference 
here is that purely private housing also would be affected. But 
the principle is well established in law that property rights are 
not absolute. Where the exercise of property rights in a particular 
way adversely affects the public good, the latter repeatedly has 
been held superior, and the property rights have been restricted. 
The most familiar example of this, perhaps is zoning legislation. 
The proposed law proceeds on the same principle. It assumes 
that there is racial discrimination in housing in this state--
aimed largely at the Negro--and that this discrimination produces 
tangible and serious social evils which do harm to the entire 
community. These assumptions seem to us demonstrably true. 
.. 
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The bill therefore restricts the rights of the property-
holder by forbidding him to refuse to sell or rent on racial 
grounds alone. It sets up a rather elaborate system for com-
plaints, investigations, consultations, persuasion, education, 
hearings and administrative decisions. Only after all this pro-
cedure had been exhausted might a recalcitrant property-owner be 
ordered by a court to desist from discrimination, and punished, 
if he refused, under the normal contempt of court process. 
Is such a law necessary in Rhode Island, and is it wise? 
On the assumption that it would be administered sensibly, we think 
that it is both. 
Nobody with two eyes in his head could seriously deny that 
racial discrimination in housing does exist in this state. 
Nobody who took the trouble to think about it could reasonably 
question that such discrimination does inflict real social evils 
upon the community as a whole. If these things are true, then 
does it not make sense to restrict property rights by way of for-
bidding racial discrimination, in order to serve the greater good 
of a healthier community? 
Ideally, of course, the eradication of racial prejudice and 
discrimination should be sought, not through governments and laws, 
but through those social institutions most directly concerned 
with individual and community morality--the home, the school, the 
church. When, however, these agencies fail to accomplish such an 
objective through education and persuasion, and when in conse-
quence the whole community suffers, then government and law 
become society's final recourse. So far as discrimination in 
housing is concerned, we think this is what has happened in Rhode 
Island. 
Passage of such a law will not, of course, eliminate racial 
discrimination in housing overnight. Nor should any such thing 
be attempted. Persuasion, education and orderly legal process 
are far preferable to bulldozing police tactics in such work. 
But these approaches would be far more effective, without real 
damage to anyone, with a law to back them up. 
The law would be administered by the same commission that 
oversees the state's fair employment practices system, designed 
to discourage racial discrimination in hiring and firing. Though 
its inquiries may have irritated some people from time to time 
(as what government agency does not?), the commission's overall 
record is one of quiet persuasion far more than of legalized 
black-jacking. We think the same thing is likely to be true in 
the field of housing, if the bill becomes law, and we think that 
in the end Rhode Island will be the better for it. 
THE CASE AGAINST 
THE FAIR HOUSING BILL 
By ROBERT B. DRESSER 
The so-called "Fair Housing Bill" is 
based upon the premise that there are 
many people in Rhode Island who are liv-
ing under depressed or sub-standard hous-
ing conditions, and that this situation can 
and should be cured by prohibiting dis-
crimnation because of race, color, religion 
or nationa l origin in the sale or rental of 
housing accommodations or land, or the 
taking of mortgages on such property. 
Such discrimination can be made the 
subject of an order t o cease and desist 
issued by the Commission against Dis-
crimination, which, if not obeyed, can 
thereafter be enforced by decree of the 
Superior Court. Disobedience of this decree 
is punishable by fine or imprisonment, or 
both. 
In discussing this subject it should be 
borne in mind tha t the issue is not whether 
the unfortunate housing conditions exist 
and steps should be taken to remove them, 
but whether the burden of such action 
should be borne by the portion of our 
population that has houses or land for sale 
::>r to rent, rather than by the government 
or some charitable organization. 
Also, the proponents of the Bill seem 
to assume in their arguments that the Bill 
relates only to discrimination against 
Negroes. This , of course, is not the fact. 
All races and religions are involved; so 
that if the owner of a house with two or 
more apartments, whether he be white, 
colored, Protes tant, Catholic, Jew, Italian, 
Irish , French , Yankee, etc., wishes to rent 
the other apartment or apartments in the 
house in which he lives to a person or per-
sons of his own race or religion, he does 
so at his peril, and should he be found 
guil ty of racial or religious discrimination 
\\'hich he fails t o stop or correct he could 
be fined a nd even sent to jaiL And the 
same rule applies to sales. 
The only offense committed by the un-
forun a te owner is the exercise of what has 
heretofore been regarded as inviolable per-
sonal rights, namely, (1 ) the right to 
choose one's own associates and (2 ) the 
right to enjoy the benefits of property 
ownership. 
If these are not rights protected by 
the Constitution of the United States, I am 
certain that it is a very different Consti-
tution from what its authors intended and 
students of the Constitution have for gen-
NOTE! 
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erations supposed. It is not ·surprising that, 
in the words of the Providence Journal, 
"No other State in the Union has such a 
law." 
And let there be no mistake, if this 
breach in the wall of Constitutional pro-
tection is permitted, it will be only a be-
ginning. It would be but a short step to 
extend the law to owners who rent rooms 
in their own homes or take in boarders. 
The history of legislation of this charac-
ter is that it seldom ends with the original 
act. This is but a beginning. 
The restrictions upon the use of priv-
ate property cited by the proponents of the 
Bill , such as zoning legislation and the for-
bidding of nuisances, are obviously of a 
very different character. 
Who would have thought that in this land 
of much-vaunted freedom ser ious consideration 
would ever be given fo a proposal to de-
prive a person of the right to sell or rent his 
house , or an apartment in his house, to a re-
spectable , law-abiding citizen of his own 
cho ice , and to put him in iail i f he d id so? 
And yet this is precisely what this Bill does. 
I wonder if all those who have endorsed the 
Bill have fully understood its provisions and its 
possible consequences. Have they by any 
chance fe lt that they were not in a position, or 
not likely to be in a position , where the law 
would affect them? 
Would if be presumptuous to suggest that if 
would be entirely possible for them to do 
VOLUNTARILY what the Hous ing Bill COM-
PELS. and by their example to insp ire others 
to do the same? Th is could readily be ac-
complished by purchasing or renting a neigh-
bor's house and making if available to a fam-
ily hav ing sub-standard housing accommoda-
tions , as was rightly suggested in a recent let-
fer to the Journal , or by renting rooms in their 
own homes where such homes are above the 
average size. This would make the proposed 
law unnecessary. 
As I have above pointed out, there are 
two r ights of the individual involved in this 
measure: ( 1) the right to choose one's own 
associates, and ( 2) the right to enjoy the 
benefits of property ownership-rights 
which by any reasonable interpretation of 
the Constitution of the United States can-
not be violated. I submit that under no 
circumstances should a ny bill giving coun-
tenance in the slightest degree to a viola-
tion of these rights be enacted . 
With the exception of the paragraphs in italics, the foregoing is a copy of a 
letter written by me to the Governor and Members of the General Assembly 
on January 19. Although a copy was given to the Journal, it was, I believe, 
neither published nor referred to by the Journal in any of its publications. I 
am, therefore, publishing it as a paid advertisement. 
I urge you to let Governor Del Sesto and your State Senators and Represen-
tatives know as early as possible how you feel about the Bill. 
January 26, 1959 ROBERT B. DRESSER 
ROBERT B. DRESSER 
15 Westminst€r Street 
Providence, R. I. 
February 16, 1959 
re "FAIR HOUSING .J}lkb" 
Opponents of the "Fair Housing Bill" will be given an 
~pportunity to express their views at a public hearing before 
the House Judiciary Committee. 
Place State House, Providence 
Room 313 
Friday 1 February 20, 1959-1 
at 7:30 P.M. 
I urge you to attend this hearing and to bring with you 
as many people as possible. 
You may wish to speak before the Committee, but you will 
be under no obligation to do so. Even if you do not speak, 
your presence in the hearing room will help to demonstrate 
that a large number of people are opposed to the Bill. This 
is extremely important. 
Let us make it clear to the Members of our General Assembly 
that we, with the majority of the people of Rhode Island, are 
opposed to the passage of this Bill because of its extreme, un-
fair and unwarranted interference with basic individual rights 
which belong to all of our people. If we do so, there is .good., 
reason to believe that the Bill will be defeated. 
Please do not fail to attend the hesring. 
Very s~ncerely yours, 
ROBERT B. DRESSER 
STATEMENT OF 
ROBERT B.DRESSER 
In Opposition to the so-called 
IIFAIR HOUSING BILL" 
(S.3l: H.l037) 
Presented to the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives of the Rhode Island General Assembly, 
February 20, 1959. 
The so-called "Fair Housing Bill" (S. 31: H. 1037) is based 
upon the premise that there are many people in Rhode Island who are 
living under depressed or sub-standard housing conditions, and that 
this situation can and should be cured by prohibiting discrimination 
because of race, color, religion or national origin in the sale or 
rental of housing accommodations or land, or in making loans with 
respect to such property. 
Provisions of Bill. 
Under the Bill an owner is forbidden (l) to make any written or 
oral inquiry concerning the race, color, religion or national origin 
of a prospective purchaser or tenant, or (2) to refuse to sell or 
rent his property for any such reason, or (3) to discriminate 
against an individual on any such ground in the terms of sale or 
lease. There are similar provisions regarding loans. 
Enforcement of the Act is placed in the hands of the Commission 
against Discrimination, which is empowered to act on its own 
initiative or on complaint of an aggrieved individual or an organ-
ization chartered for the purpose of combating discrimination or 
racism or of safeguarding civil liberties. Failure to obey a decree 
of the Court entered to enforce an order of the Commission is 
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punishable by 11 fine or imprisonment, or both." (R.I.Gen.Laws S-6-l.) 
The proponents of this....Bill have sought to convey the impres-
sion that those opposing it are opposed, to removing the existing 
unfortunate housing conditions and are opposed to giving aid to 
those who are living under such conditions. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth. 
The issue is not whether the unfortunate housing conditions 
exist and steps should be taken to remove them, but whether the bur-
den of such action should be borne by the portion of our population 
that has houses or land for sale or to rent, rather than by the 
government or some charitable organization. 
Also, the proponents of the Bill seek to give the impression 
that the Bill relates only to discrimination against Negroes. This 
is not the fact. All races and religions are involved; so that if 
the owner of a house with two or more apartments, whether he be 
white, colored, Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Italian, Irish, French, 
Yankee, etc., wishes to rent the other apartment or apartments in 
the house in which he lives to a person or persons of his own race 
or religion, he does so at his peril, and should he be found guilty 
of racial or religious discrimination which he fails to stop or 
correct he could be fined and even sent to jail. And the same 
rule applies to sales. 
The only offense committed by the unfortunate owner is the 
exercise of what has heretofore been regarded as inviolable per-
sonal rights, namely, (l) the right to enjoy the benefits of 
property ownership, and (2) the right to choose for one's self 
the persons with whom one associates in connection with his own 
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property. 
If these are not rights protected by the Constitution of the 
United State s, I am certain that it is a very different Constitu-
tion from what students of the subject have for generations 
supposed. ttNo other St ate in the Union has such a law." 
If this Bill is passed it will be only a beginning. It would 
be but a short step to extend the law to owners who rent rooms in 
their own homes or take in boarders. The history of legislation 
of this character is that it seldom ends with the original act. 
This is but a b eginning. 
~~~o would have thought that in this land of bo a sted freedom 
s erious consider at ion would ever be given to a proposal to deprive 
a person of the right to sell or rent his house, or an apartment 
in his house, to a respectable, law-abiding citizen of his own 
choice, and to put him in jail if he did so? And yet this is 
precisely what this Bill does. 
I wonder how many of t hos e who support this Bill have ever 
read it. 
Constitutionality of Bill . 
And now a word regarding the constitutionality of the Bill. 
Arguments on this question pro a nd con have been made. The answer 
lies with nine men sitting in Wa shington as members of the Supreme 
Court of the United St ates. 1rlhat they would decide if the question 
should come before them no human being today knows. The proponents 
of the Bill argue that during recent years the Supreme Court has 
been stee1dily expanding the concept of "Civil Rights" by conferring 
on certain groups rights which they did not previously have, and 
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depl' iving others of rights which they had the retofore enjoyed. 
Whether the Court would still further expand this concept 
t o include the present ca se one can only guess. All I can say is 
that if the Court does so expand this concept it will have taken a 
major step toward the destruction of individual liberty in the 
United States of America, --a step that would have shocked their 
pr edecessors of not too many years ago. 
In the circwnstances, are we going to take the position that 
because there is a chance that the present Supreme Court might 
hold the pending measure constituti onal it should be passed? A 
holding by the Supreme Court that the Bill is constitutional would 
not make it a good Bill. 
The real guestion is whether in any reasonable view of the 
facts the rights of which an individual is deprived by this Bill 
2re basic rights which belong to him in any free society. On this..L. 
I submit, there sh ould be no difference of opinion. 
The letters and telephone calls that I have received, and the 
large number of signatures that have been obtained t o our petition 
indicate that the great maj ority of the people of this State are 
against this Bill. Up to last Monday, February 16, almost 1500 
signatures to the petition opposing the Bill ha d been received, and 
only a small fraction of the petitions in circulation had been 
returned. 
Let me read a few letters I have received. 
(Letters read). 
• 
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175 years ago the illustrious English statesman, William Pitt, 
a staunch friend of America, arose in the British House of Commons 
and made one of his great speeches. In it he said: 
"Necessity is the plea for every infringe-
ment of human freedom. It is the argument of 
tyrants. 
"The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid 
defiance to all the force of the Crown; the 
wind may blow through it, the storms may enter, 
the rain may enter, but the King of England may 
not ent er." 
How sad it is that an Englishmanrs appeal for freedom ·n . l7S3 
is mAde a travesty in the State of Rhode Island in 1959. 
I implore you, with all the power at my command, to give this 
Bill the burial it deserves. 
15 Westminster Street, 
Providence, Rhode Island 
February 20, 1959. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. DRESSER 
is to stretch things pretty far. The unrestricted 
right to choose for himself any law-abiding citizen 
as the purchaser or tenant of one's property can-
not injure property owners and will n1'>t create an 
unhealthy community. 
Where does the process end? 
By such reasoning, individual liberty is being 
eaten away, supposedly for the common good, until 
before long there will be nothing left. 
In these times, isn't the Bill valuable as a gesture 
of brotherhood? 
There is a lot of irrelevant chatter along these 
lines. It is unlikely that true brotherhood will result 
from situations in which people, accused of bias, 
are forceJ;l to sell or rent their property against 
their will or in which they evade the restrictions of 
the law by subterfuge. 
Isn't there a logical connection between the 
"Fair Housing Bill" and the Fair Employment 
Practices Act of 1949? 
Both are anti-discrimination laws and involve 
similar procedures. It is unnecessary to review the 
arguments for and against FEPC, because the real 
effect of that law is quite different, involving the 
more impersonal categories of the labor market 
rather than the individual relationships of the 
home and family. 
It should also be remembered that real estate 
transactions are usually more complex and many-
sided than job applications. More than one inter-
ested purchaser and his broker may be involved, 
as well as banks and title companies. In the variety 
of considerations which influence an owner's de-
cision may be an exacting time schedule, as when 
the family breadwinner is transferred to a new 
job outside the State. Yet all these things, affecting 
the time and money of many people, could be 
thrown into confusion by the charge of an ag-
grieved individual or pressure group under the 
proposed law. What happens to the property in 
the meantime? What happens if a deed has already 
been delivered to a party whom the Commmission 
deems the wrong party? These and many other 
questions are left unanswered. 
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But ' doesn't the experience with FEPC prove 
that people have nothing to fear from the "Fair 
Housing Bill", since the same Commission against 
Discrimipation would administer the law? 
No. Just because the Commission has shown re-
straint in the us~ of its broad powers does not 
mean that it will always continue to do so. Many 
considerations, political and otherwise, can influ-
ence the Commission's activities, and the subject 
of housing is a more personal and sensitive matter 
and more likely to involve controversy. 
There is a great deal of talk about conciliation 
and persuasion and the lack of need for Court en-
forcement. If the enforcement provisions are un-
necessary, why have them? 
Why aren't the endorsements of the Bill by 
leading citizens and organizations, civic and re-
ligious, a good indication of its soundness? 
They have been attracted by an appeal for 
brotherhood rather than by what the Bill actually 
provides. 
With sincere conviction, many well meaning 
people have endorsed the Bill. In a stream of let-
ters to the press, they are trying to impress on the 
public ( 1) that the issue raised by the Bill is sim-
ply a moral issue, which opponents will not meet, 
(2) that opposition to the Bill is based on prejudice 
against colored people, and (3) that the argument 
is between property rights and human rights. 
These contentions are misleading and untrue, as 
already pointed out. The issue is not so simple. 
Many rights and interests are involved- moral, 
legal, social and economic, which effect all our 
people. Alleged wrongs are being exaggerated far 
out of proportion to what is being sought by this 
Bill. 
Don't some people think that fair housing legis-
lation is an inevitable part of Rhode Island's his-
toric record of freedom and tolerance? 
No type of legislation is inevitable. The historic 
record of Rhode Island is that of people from 
many lands who overcame difficulties and earned 
a respected place for themselves and their children, 
unaided by police power legislation. By a natural 
and orderly development, they have acquired 
homes of their choice in every community of the 
State, without the intervention of Commissions 
and Courts and without high level planning to 
integrate them by force. 
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Who are the opponents of the "Fair Housing 
Bill"? 
The great majority of us- all kinds of people 
from every community and in every sort of occu-
pation. We include civic leaders, businessmen, 
lawyers, the Rhode Island State Association of 
Real Estate Boards and its five member boards, 
The Home Builders Association of Rhode Island, 
and, most important, thousands of ordinary men 
and women who value the human rights and priv-
ileges of home ownership. In other words, the op-
ponents represent at least 9/ 10 of the STATE'S 
POPULATION. c 
Why are people opposed to the Bill? 
Because it would take away basic human rights 
which belong to them in any free society - the 
right to enjoy the benefits of property ownership 
and the right to choose for themselves the persons 
with whom they would freely associate in connec-
tion with their own property. 
What can people do to oppose the Bill? 
An unorganized majority is at a disadvantage 
as compared to an organized pressure group, with 
a ready-made program and an inner circle of de-
votees. But bad laws do not have to pass by de-
fault. 
You can help in this important fight by (1) in-
forming yourself about the real nature of the 
so-called "Fair Housing Bill"; ( 2) passing on in-
formation to others; (3) contacting your State 
Senator and Representative (and getting your 
friends to do likewise) so that they will know how 
you feel; ( 4) joining in and circulating petitions 
in opposition to the Bill; and ( 5) encouraging 
other people, through letters to the press and by 
other means, to stand up for the rights of every-
body against the Bill. 
DO IT NOW- TODAY! 
HURRY! 
This material has been prepared jointly by 
The Rhode Island State Association of Real Estate 
Boards and The Home Builders Association of 
Rhode Island. 
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IS THIS A 
FAIR 
HOUSING 
BILL? 
~ 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
ON THE 
SO-CALLED "FAIR HOUSING"'BILL" 
What is the "Fair Housing Bill"? 
In January, 1959, identical bills (S. 31, H. 1037 ) 
were introduced in the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the Rhode Island General Assembly. 
The professed purpose of each bill is to prohibit 
discrimination because of race, color, religion or 
national origin in the sale or rental of housing 
accommodations or land or in making loans with 
respect to such proper ty. 
If the Bill becomes law, to whom will it apply? 
To everybody in the State, and his agent, who 
has a hou:;e, an apartment or land for sale or rent, 
except a religious body or a person renting rooms 
in the house where he lives. Mortgagees and finan-
cial institutions are also involved. 
How will it actually affect the ordinary citizen 
who wants to sell or rent his property? 
Until now, the ordinary citizen has been free to 
make his own choice as to whether he will sell or 
rent his property to a particular person. There may 
be many good reasons why he prefers to sell or 
rent to one person instead of another. But, under 
the proposed law, if the disappointed party con-
tends that the owner's choice was based on race, 
color, religion or national origin, he (or an organi-
zation in his behalf) can complain to the Commis-
sion against Discrimination and subject the owner 
or agent to an investigation and the burden of 
justifying his choice. 
Who will enforce the law? 
A politically appointed State agency, the Rhode 
Island Commission against Discrimiation. 
How will complaints get started? 
The Bill provides that whenever an aggrieved 
individual or an anti-discrimination group (e.g., 
The National Association For The Advancement 
of C olored People or similar organization) makes 
a charge that someone has violated the law, the 
Commission may start an investigation. The Com-
mission may also do this on its own initiative. 
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What specific acts would violate the law? 
Unlawful practices would include making any 
inquiry about the race, color, religion or national 
origin of any prospective purchaser or tenant; re-
fusing to sell or rent to any person because of race, 
color, religion or national origin; discriminating 
against any person for the same reasons in the 
terms, conditions or privileges of sale or lease; etc. 
How about mortgagees and financial institu-
tions? 
Banks and other mortgagees and lenders would 
be involved in this way. The Bill provides that no 
person to whom application is made for a loan or 
other form of financial assistance, secured or un-
secured, in connection with acquiring, construct-
ing, repairing, etc. any housing accommodatiop, 
may inquire about the race, color, religion or na-
tional origin of the applicant or of any existing or 
prospective occupants or tenants. Nor may such 
person discriminate in the terms, conditions or 
privileges relating to such financial assistance. 
It should be noted that the term "person", when 
used in the Bill, includes one or more individuals, 
partnerships, associations, organizations, corpora-
t~on~, legal representatives, trustees or other fidu-
cmnes. 
Do these violations relate only to Negroes? 
No. This is a common misconception. All races 
and religions are involved, so that if the owner of 
a house with two or more apartments (whether 
he be white, colored, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, 
Irish, French, Yankee or Italian) wishes to rent an 
apartment to someone of his own background, he 
does so at the risk of having someone else of a 
different background charge him with discrimina-
tion. 
Then what happens? 
The Commission is supposed to begin with in-
formal methods to "conciliate" the complaint. If 
these methods don't work to its satisfaction, it can 
serve a formal complaint upon the offender, with 
notice of hearing. At the hearing the Commission 
is not bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in 
the Courts. After the hearing it can issue an order 
requiring the offender to cease and desist from his 
unlawful practices and to take such further action 
as will carry out the purposes of the law. 
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How are the Commission's orders enforced? 
By decree of the Superior Court. Disobedience 
of a decree is punishable by fine or imprisonment, 
or both. · · 
Are there rights of appeal? 
Yes. Any party to proceedings before the Com-
mission may obtain judicial review of its final 
orders by the Superior Court. This applies to the 
complainant (including any anti-discrimination 
group which might have made charges or inter-
vened in the proceedings), as well as to the prop-
erty owner or agent, so that the latter, even if 
successful before the Commmission, could be sub-
jected to further trouble and expense in the Courts. 
Would such a law be Constitutional? 
No one can predict with certainty what the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island or the Supreme 
Court of the United States would do if the ques-
tion of constitutionality came before it. The result 
ought to be that such an extreme and unwarranted 
interference with basic individual rights is uncon-
stitutional. Certainly the background of our laws 
and institutions fully supports this position. Even 
if such a law were held constitutional, as being 
within the police power of the State, that would 
not make it a good law. 
But the present issue is not so much constitution-
ality as fairness and common sense. vVe are not 
now so much concerned with what the General 
Assembly can do as we are with what it ought to 
do, as a matter of legislative policy in the interest 
of ALL the people of Rhode Island. 
Why do the Bill's supporters claim that such a 
law is necessary? 
In order to aid in the correction of certain evils, 
they say (in the preamble of their Bill) , it is 
necessary to safeguard the right of all individuals 
to equal opportunity in obtaining housing accom-
modations free of discrimination. 
What are these evils? They are the discrimina-
tory practices which, it is claimed, "tend unjustly 
to condemn large groups of inhabitants to dwell in 
segregated districts under depressed living condi-
tions in crowded, unsanitary, substandard and un-
healthful accommodations." 
Naturally, any such conditions would arouse 
sympathy and a desire to find a remedy. Are the 
discriminatory practices of property owners in 
general primarily to blame, or are there other 
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important causes, social, administrative and eco-
nomic? And does "THE PUNISHMENT FIT 
THE CRIME"? These are proper questions. They 
deserve complete and unbiased answers. 
During the past year there has been a well-
organized effort to build up public support for this 
Bill by exaggeration of every alleged instance of 
housing discrimination and by repeated newspaper 
publicity. The problems of relocation affecting the 
residents of Lippitt Hill have been used to the 
fullest extent. But the actual situation does not 
justify any law of this kind. 
What about Lippitt Hill? 
The relocation of three or four hundred families 
is a difficult problem under most circumstances, as 
the Providence authorities were aware when they 
planned the project. But the problem can be 
handled through existing channels for housing 
accommodations, private and public, if it is not 
blown up all out of proportion to what it really is 
and used as an excuse to saddle the ENTIRE 
POPULATION of the sta te with the burdens of 
this unjust, unnecessary law. 
Isn't any protection which can be given to hu-
man rights worth some additional restriction on 
property rights? 
There are no rights but human rights. What are 
spoken of as property rights are only the human 
rights of individuals to property. The man who 
puts his savings into a two or three-family hpuse 
to provide his family a home and some rental in-
come is typical of thousands of hard-working peo-
ple in this State. Real estate is their basic invest-
ment. Is it not their human right to exercise free 
choice as to occupants of their property? 
Supporters of the Bill are trying to dress up the 
issue as conflict between human values and prop-
erty values. This is nonsense. While opponents of 
the Bill may properly call attention to its adverse 
effect upon the owneship of real estate and upon 
the stability of real estate values, the most impor-
tant thing is the LOSS OF HUMAN FREEDOM. 
But, in modern society, isn't a property owner 
already restricted by zoning and other regulations? 
Yes, but for the mutual benefit of himself and 
other property owners. To argue that the "Fair 
Housing Bill" is just an extension of this kind of 
regulation and that it is for the mutual benefit of 
all, because it will create "healthy communities" , 
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More About The So-Called 
"FAIR HOUSING BILL" 
by ROBERT B. DRESSER 
Among the letters to the editor supporting the so-
called "Fair Housing Bill,"-more correctly called "A Bill 
to Destroy Individual Liberty and Create Disunity in the 
U.S.A."-is a letter published in The Evening Bulletin for 
Monday, March 2, 1959, and signed by a minister of the 
Methodist Church with an editor's note stating that the 
letter was signed also by 11 oth~ Rhode Island citiZens. 
I quote from the letter as follows: 
"One of the opening sentences of the Declaration 
of Independence affirms as a self-evident truth that 
'all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness." These are the rights of every American citi-
zen regardless of his race, color, creed, or country of 
ancestral origin. The enjoyment of these rights is the 
heart of the American way of life. Their abridgement 
anywhere is a blow to American democracy every-
where. 
"Those unalienable rights affirmed in the Dec-
laration of Independence and guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of the United States are the primary civil 
rjghts of every individual citizen. Without them life 
is meaningless, and upon them depends the vitality of 
our free society. The compromise of the democratic 
ideal anywhere weakens the national structure every-
where. Only free men have anything worth defending. 
!he unfree life is not worth living. 
"The right to acquire private property is a valid 
expression of the unalienable rights of the Declara-
tion of Independence. Without the right to private 
ownership of property, those unalienable civil rights 
exist in a social vacuum and have no concrete reality. 
The most fundamental form of private property Is a 
man's home. This is the center of his world, the veri-
table castle of privacy In which his life finds fulfill-
ment, his liberty comes to its profoundest expression, 
and his highest happiness is achieved. Such a home 
is the basic bulwark of our free society." (Emphasis 
supplied). 
After thus admirably stating the case against the 
Housing Bill, the letter proceeds to the surprising and 
wholly irrational and illogical conclusion that the Bill is 
a good bill and should be passed, and a number of our most 
prominent citiZens are named as SUpporters of the Bill. 
Through some strange quirk of reasoning on the part 
of the authors of this letter, the rights of the owner of a 
home suddenly become subordinate to the "unalienable'' 
right of someone else to buy or rent that home in whole 
or in part-a right which the authors say must now be 
recogniZed by statute. The man who thought he was free 
and that his home was his own now discovers that he 
was wrong. 
What a shock it would be to the author and signers 
of the Declaration of Independence to know that their 
great declaration of freedom had been so distorted! 
The Declaration of Independence was not a demand 
for more governmental interference in the lives of the 
citizens, but less. The Revolutionary War was fought to 
secure liberty, not to destroy or restrict it. 
In the words of Samuel B. Pettingill in "Jefferson, 
The Forgotten Man" (pp. 17-18): 
"The Revolutionary War * * * was a war of 
independence against too much government. * * * It 
was to free themselves from the restrictions placed 
upon them and upon their business and commerce by 
the government of England that our fathers declared 
their independence * * * The Declaration declared 
war against these restrictions." (Emphasis supplied). 
I wonder how many of the supporters of the Housing 
Bill have carefully studied the Bill, or even read it, and 
how many fully understand its provisions and their con-
sequences. The Bill incorporates by reference thirty-nine 
(39) sections of the Rhode Island General Laws of 1956, 
hich do not appear in the Bill itself. 
The public mention of the high business and profes-
sional positions which these men hold is doubtless in-
tended to create in the minds of the public the impression 
that the directors, stockholders or members of the cor-
porations or· institutions which they represent also sup-
port the Bill, an impression which, I am confldent, is in 
most cases contrary to fact. 
Signatures to the "Petition in Opposition to the •Fair 
Housing Bill' " continue to come in. A fourth batch of 
signatures to the petition, numbering 955, was mailed to 
Governor Del Sesto and all members of the General As-
sembly under date of March 5, 1959. Up to that date a 
total of 3409 such signatures had been received, and more 
are coming in daily. 
If you wish to join in recording 
your opposition, please sign the 
attached coupon and mail it to ••• 
B. I. Park, 
1103 Hospital Trust Building, 
Providence, Rhode Island 
ROBERT B. DRESSER 
March 12, 1959. 
r
--------------· COUPON ·--------------1 
I I am opposed to the pauage of the so-called 1 
"Fair Housing Bill" in ally form whatsoever and I 
desire to join in the petition against it. I 
[
!Name ................................. I 
Address ............. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 1 I 
-----~--------------------------------4 
' 
Notice To The Many Thousand 
Opponents Of So-Called 
FAIR HOUSING LE.GISLATION 
It is reported that plans are being made 
to introduce again the so-called Fair 
Housing Bill in the coming Session of the 
Rhode Island General Assembly. 
It . is rumored that the Bill may be 
"watered down" or "less drastic" than the 
one introduced in the last Session. The 
terms "watered down" and "less drastic" 
mean merely that the Bill applies to fewer 
persons, not that it is in any sense less ob-
jectionable. The purpose is, of course, to 
reduce the opposition by leading those not 
covered by the Bill to believe that they are 
going to remain permanently immune. 
This was the strategy used in Massa-
chusetts where a "watered down" form of 
bill was passed earlier this year by the 
legislature of that . State. In commenting 
upon the bill the Evening Bulletin com-
mended the clever way in which the mat-
ter was handled by the proponents of the 
measure. 
Credit for their success was attributed 
in large measure to the "quiet, gradualist 
approach." By "quiet" was meant evi-
dently that as little publicity as possible 
was given to the matter. By "gradualist 
approacn" was meant acceptmg as a oe-
ginning a less drastic bill than desired, 
with the expectation of more later. This 
is the usual course of legislation of this 
character-a small beginning, with further 
expansion later until the ultimate objective 
is fully achieved. Such legislation must be 
stopped at the beginning. It must not be 
passed in an.Y form, hoT»elJer harmless it 
ma.Y appear. 
The movement to enact this legislation 
is nation-wide. Already it has been passed 
in several states. 
As an example of what is in store for 
us if this movement is not checked, we call 
your attention to an order issued by the 
New York State Commission Against Dis-
crimination on July 18, 1957, excerpts 
from which appear below. We strongly 
urge you to read these passages most 
carefully. 
ORDERED 
* * * 
"ORDERED, b.Y the New York 
State Commission against Discrimination, 
"That the Respondents, Pelham Hall 
Apartments, Inc., its officers, directors, 
agents, successors, and assigns shall: 
"2. Take the following affirmatilJe ac-
tion which, in the judgment of the State 
Commission Against Discrimination, will 
effectuate the purposes of the NeT» York 
State LaT» Against Discrimination: 
"a. With regard to the housing ac-
commodations sought b.Y complainant: 
~ ---"(+) 
"(ii) 
Set aside for, and off to 
lease forthwith Co the com-
plainant the four and one 
half room apartment at Ro-
chelle Arms for which he ap-
plied or a substantiall.Y similar 
four and one half room apart-
ment at a rental of $158 a 
month, for a period of not 
less than tT»o ,Years from the 
date of execution of the lease. 
The complainant shall halJe a 
reasonable period of time 
within which to accept or re-
ject said offer to lease. 
/f the complainant accepts 
such offer to lease, the re-
spondents shall within filJe 
( 5) da,Ys after receipt of 
written notice of such accept-
ance provide complainant 
with a lease. Tne terms and 
conditions of such lease shall 
be substantiall.Y similar to the 
terms and conditions of leases 
executed b.Y tenants of other 
apartments at Rochelle Arms 
during the period f anuar,Y I, 
1957 to june 30, 1957; and 
the complainant shall be ac-
corded substantiall.Y the same 
prilJileges, serlJices, benefits 
and rental concessions ac-
corded Lo the most falJored 
tenant or tenants in Rochelle 
Arms, whether such prilJ-
ileges, serlJices, benefits or 
rental concessions, halJe been 
granted b.Y terms of lease or 
otherwise to such tenant or 
tenants. 
"(iii) /f the complainant accepts the 
apartment and executes ~ 
lease therefor as aforesaid, 
respondents shall make said 
apartment alJailable to the 
complainant full.Y read,Y for 
occupanc.Y within ten (I 0) 
da,Ys after the executi.on of 
the lease. 
e. Transmit to the Commission forth-
with a statement listing each of the apart-
ments at l"<ochelle Arms, T»htch on·-......-the -.u---~..., 
date of this order, J»as not rented or 
leased, gilJing the designation of the apart-
ment, the number of rooms, and the rental 
being asked. 
"f. For a period of one ,Year from the 
date of this order, transmit to the Commis-
sion b.Y the I Oth da.Y of each month, a 
record of the following information for the 
preceding month with respect to the hous-
ing accommodations at Rochelle Arms: 
"(i) The total number of apart-
ments rented; the total num-
ber of apartments lJacant; and 
as to each apartment lJacant, 
the number of rooms and the 
rental being asked. 
"(ii) The names and addresses of 
all persons who halJe applied 
for apartments. 
"(iii) The names and addresses .of 
all applicants who halJe been 
accepted (and the names and 
addresses of all persons who 
halJe been rejected), specif.Y· 
ing as to each person ac-
cepted, the designation of the 
apartment, the number of 
rooms and the rental; and 
specif.Ying as to each person 
rejected, the reason for re-
jection." 
* * * 
While the above order was issued in 
the case of an apartment house on which 
there was an FHA insured mortgage that 
was used by the Commission as the basis 
for its jurisdiction, there can be no doubt 
that the purpose is to extend the power 
ultimate! o ases .w no gooremment:--1-1~-----
aid of any sort is involved. This, in fact, 
was the case with respect to the bill intro-
duced in the Rhode Island General As-
sembly during its last Session. 
The line of distinction between private 
housing with a federal insured mortgage 
and private housing without such a 
mortgage is too thin to be permanent. 
The issue is clear. Are individual lib-
erty and the right of private property to 
be preserved, or are they not? 
The issue is not whether relief should 
be afforded those who have been dis-
possessed of their homes by the government 
as in the case of Lippitt Hlll. Of course it 
should be provided where necessary, but 
through the usual public channels, and not 
by the people who own houses. 
Certainly we want no such law in 
Rhode hland, and we must all do every-
thing in our power to prevent it, fully real-
izing that any bill, however "watered 
down" it may be, would be only an enter-
ing wedge. 
COMMITTEE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
Robert B. Dresser, Chairman 
October 22, 1959. 
Charles H. Lawton, Vice-Chairman 
Frank A. Martin, Jr., Vice-Chairman 
John V. Kean, Vice-Chairman 
Frank S. Shy, Treasurer 
Edwin T. Scallon, Secretary 
Excerpt from letter of Robert B. Dresser, 
dated November 23, 1959. 
"This country was founded by those seeking individual 
liberty. The Revolutionary War was fought for that purpose~ 
and the Constitution of the United States expressly provides 
for the protection of individual liberty. 
"There are no more sacred rights than the right of 
private property and the right to choose one 1 s own associates. 
No person can be said to be free if these rights are denied. 
"To substitute government coercion for freedom of choice 
snould be abhorrent to every freedom-loving American. That 
is , the issue involved in the controversy over so-called "Fair 
Housing" legislation,--and the only issue. It is the issue 
that has aroused thousands of people about the State to oppose 
and protest vigorously against this outrageous legislation. 
I am confident that if the proposal were submitted to the 
people it would be overwhelmingly defeated. 
"This is an issue that is far more fundamental than any 
other issue before the people today. It is the sort of issue 
that cannot be compromised, and it will be the endeavor of 
our organization to use every lawful means at our disposal to 
prevent the enactment of any such legislation," 
COMMITTEE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
1103 HOSPITAL TRUST BUILDINGI 
PROVIDENCE 3, RHODE ISLAND 
December 24, 1959 
Dear Sir: 
Re: So-called "Fair Housing" Legislation. 
There is a nationwide movement to secure the enactment by 
state legislatures of so-called "fair housing" legislation to 
prohibit discrimination because of race, color, religion or 
national origin in the sale or rental of housing accommodations 
or land, or in making loans with respect to such property. The 
st·ory is told in the enclosed doctmtents. It is of such funda-
~ental importance that we are taking the liberty of calling your 
a~tention to it in the hope that you may see fit to take some 
action to prevent its enactment in your state. 
A very competent judge of such matters in our nation's 
capital, commenting upon the Rhode Island Fair Housing Bill 
last winter, wrote as follows: 
"I had heard that similar legislation was 
pending in several of the states. It is, of course, 
completely destructive of the right of property and 
is a farm of nationalization of private property. 
"This as'sault upon the right of property in 
this country has prevailed in some areas and I 
predict that it will be quickly followed by other 
efforts which can but eventuate in a nationali-
zation of property and a dictatorship akin to that 
which prevails in Soviet Russia." 
Very sincerely yours, 
(]Q9~ 
· Chairman. 
7th BATCH - 210 signatures 
Total signatures to date - ~ 
Robert B. Dresser 
f 
PETITION IN OPPOSITION TO 
11FAIR HOUSING BILL" 
His Excellency, Christopher DelSesto, 
Governor of the State of Rhode Island, 
June 4, 1959 
and Honorable Members of the General Assembly. 
We urge you to o:ppose the passage of the so-called "Fair 
Housing Bill" (S.3l,H.l037). 
The professed purpose of the bill is to prohibit discrimi-
nation because of race, color, religion or national origin in the sale 
or rental of housing accommodations or land or in making loans with 
respe.ct to such property. This kind of discrimination on the part of 
any citizen wishing to sell or rent his own property could become the 
subject of an order to cease and desist issued by the Commission 
against Discrimination, enforced by Court decree, with the penalty 
of fine or imprisonment for disobedience. 
, Regardless of the social objectives claimed by supporters of 
the bill, and regardless of their emotional, high-sounding arguments, 
what is the real effect of this bill? It is to deprive the individual 
of basic rights which belong to him in any free society -- the right 
to enjoy the benefits of property ownership and the right to choose 
for himself the persons with whom he associates in connection with 
his own property. 
Passage of any bill of this nature will represent an extreme 
and unwarranted interference with basic individual rights. We urge 
you to do everything in your power to oppose it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Address 
•• 
SO-CALLED 
FAIR HOUSING BILL 
Comments on Proponents' Announced Intention 
to Press for Passage Next Year 
Recent press reports indicate that the proponents of 
the so-called Fair Housing Bill are "more determined than 
ever" to push for its passage next year. 
This is most unfortunate, since it is bound to stir up 
still further discord and strife. 
The thing that has amazed me most about this 
unfortunate controversy is the persistent refusal on the 
part of the proponents of the Bill to recognize the real 
issue. It is not, as I have time and time again said, 
whether housing relief should be provided for those who 
are in need of it, but rather by whom such relief should 
be provided. 
It is difficult for me to understand how any fair-minded 
person can contend that the portion of the public that 
happen to own houses should be compelled to provide this 
relief. If the City sees fit to tear down houses accommo-
dating over 400 families, as it is proposing to do in the 
case of the Lippitt Hill Redevelopment Project, is it 
reasonable for the City to dump in the laps of the other 
property-owner& the job of providing accommodations for 
the displaced families? 
Moreover, how can any reasonable person who believes 
in mdividual· freedom insist that a person shall not be 
permitted to choose those with whom he associates in 
connection wit!! his own property? 
It has been made to appear that the present con-
troversy is purely a Negro question. This is not the fact. 
If the members of any race wish to live together in a 
house or a comxp.unity, whether they are English, Irish, 
Italian, Yankee, Negro, or any other race, who can reason-
ably contend ·that they should not be permitted to do so? 
And likewise, if individuals prefer living in mixed 
racial households or communities they should be allowed 
to do so. The rule should work both ways. 
The thing that concerns me most about this proposal 
is the trend which it indicates-a trend toward the ulti-
mate abolition of the right or private property, which is 
an extreme form of Socialism. 
One wonders what will be the next move of the social 
planners. There can be no doubt that this is not the final 
step. 
Are we to sit idly by and allow our nation,.. which has 
led the world in the struggle for individual liberty, to 
become a nation of robots subject to the complete domina-
tion and control of government bureaucrats? That cer-
tainly is the trend, as is evidenced in many directions. 
The proponents of this bill are, I am sure, sincere 
and conscientious American citizens. Do they realize what 
they are doing ? 
If a person is to be deprived by government order 
of the right to choose his own associates and to have 
full enjoyment of his own property may he not eventually 
be deprived of freedom of speech and other rights which 
he now enjoys on the plea that the exercise of these rights 
is against the public interest? Where is the line to be 
drawn? 
No, the issue is much broader than that of housing. 
It is whether we shall have (1) liberty or (2) serfdom 
imposed by a government dictatorship. 
May I add a personal note. I have thus far refrained 
from paying any attention to the charges leveled against 
me of racial antagonism and bigotry. These charges are 
utterly false . • Neither race, creed nor color affects in 
the slightest degree the respect and regard in which I 
hold an individual. 
June 3, 1959 ROBERT B. DRESSER. 
Opponents of the So-Called 
"FAIR HOUSING BILL" 
Permanent Organization 
To Be Formed 
Nature of Opposition 
There appears to be a misunderstanding on the part 
of some of our citizens as to the nature of the opposition 
to the so-called "Fair Housing Bill." It is not in any sense 
a matter of emotion that will disappear with the passage 
of time. 
The opposition is based upon a firm conviction that 
the real issue is the preservation of individual liberty. 
This was the issue that prompted the Declaration of In-
dependence. It was the cause for which the Revolutionary 
War was fought. 
That people ~ould be indignant at an assault upon 
their freedom should cause no surprise. A burglar who 
tries to break into a house will be resisted by any red-
blooded owner with all the power at his command. Further 
attempts will be met with like resistance. It is not a mat-
ter of emotion, but a matter of self defense. 
Misleading Title of Housing Bill 
In these days when there are so many important and 
complicated issues before the country, it is understandable 
that persons, misled by the appealing title of a proposal, 
such as "Fair Housing", should endorse it without a full 
examination of its terms. It is to be hoped, however, that 
all such persons, when they have become fully aware of 
the facts, will withdraw their endorsement, as many have 
already done. 
Property Rights versus Human Rights 
The proponents of the Housing Bill still continue to 
declare that "human rights" are "more sacred than prop-
erty rights," despite the absur4ity of-the distinction. Prop-
erty itself has neither rights nor value, save only as hu-
man interests are involved. There are no rights but"human 
rights, and what are spoken of as property rights are only 
the human rights of individuals to property. 
"The ownership of property is the right for 
which, above all others, the common man has 
struggled in his slow ascent from serfdom. 
* * * * * * * 
"A man without property rights--without the 
right to the product of his own labor-is not a 
free man. He can exist only through the generosi-
ty or forbearance of others" (Essay by Paul L. 
Poirot, of the Foundation for Ecanomir li'AI•""-
tion). 
l•tetr.tlon in Housing 
On the subject of housing M e 
stated in earlier articles, the government should neither 
forbid people living together nor compel them to do so 
against their will. Any such legislation would be a gross 
violation of individual liberty. 
Influence Behhid "Fair Housing" Movement 
I am convinced that somewhere behind the "Fair 
Housing" movement now in progress about the Country 
there is a sinister influence. I am further convinced that 
in due time the nature of that influence and those exerting 
it will be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Permanent Organization 
The American people will never knowingly permit 
their liberty to be taken from them. The people of this 
State are aware of the serious menace posed by the Hous-
ing Bill. Over 5,000 of them have signified their opposition 
to it by signing petitions to that effect. 
Many have expressed a desire to form a permanent 
organization to safeguard individual liberty and to oppose 
the passage of legislation designed to destroy or restrict 
that liberty. The Housing Bill In its present or any other 
form is a measure of this character. 
Such an organization should be formed. It would, I 
am confident, attract the support of thousands of our citi-
zens who would on all occasions and without regard to 
political affiliations make the preservation of individual 
liberty paramount to all other issues. 
It is my intention to submit for consideration a plan 
for such an organization. 
ROBERT B. DRESSER 
~- -
.. 
The Case Against The So-Called 
"FAIR HOUSING BILL" 
Further Statement 
By ROBERT B. DRESSER 
As the session of the General Assembly draws to a 
close, the proponents of the so-called "Fair Housing Bill" 
are increasing their efforts to secure support by wholly 
irrelevant arguments which tend to obscure the real issue 
and confuse the public. 
Massachusetts Bill. 
An instance of this is the recent passage by the Mas-
sachusetts Legislature of a housing bill which is much 
weaker than the Rhode Island Bill and is the weakest of 
several bills in Massachusetts. In articles published in the 
Providence Evening Bulletin on April 22 and 24, the story 
is told of how the bill was passed by the Massachusetts 
Legislature on a voice vote without debate, with no re-
corded opposition and with little or no public opposition. 
The strategy used by the proponents, the Macsachusetts 
Committee for Fair Hous'ng Practices Legislation. was 
similar to that used by its counterpart in Rhode Island. 
The passage of the bill in Massachusetts is hailed by the 
proponen.ts of the Rhode Island Bill as a great victory 
and as establishing a precedent that should be followed 
here. 
Of course the bill passed, and the reason was that 
the Massachusetts public did not understand its real na-
ture and- its consequences. Had they understood, the bill 
never would have been enacted. 
The Bulletin articles commend the clever way in 
which the,matter was handled by the prop:ments. Credit 
for the success is attributed in large measure to 'the 
"quiet 'gradualist approach." By "quiet" is meant, I sup-
pose, that as little publicity as possible wa<> given to the 
matter. By "gradualist approach" is meant the acceptance 
of a less drastic bill than desired as a beginning with the 
expectation of more later. As I have pointed out in earlier 
articles, this is the usual course of legislation of thi'i sort. 
- a small beginning with further expansion from time to 
time until the ultimate objective is fully achieved. Such 
legislation must be stopped at the beginning. It must not 
be accepted in any form, however harmless it may appear. 
All that is required to prevent the .enactment of such 
legislation is for the people te understand its nature and 
effect. What has happened in Massachusetts and earlier 
in Colorado could not, l' am canvinced, happen here, for 
the reason that the public of this state are aware of the 
evil nature and consequences of the proposed legislation 
and are overwhelmingly opposed to its passage in any 
form. 
Incidentally, it should be noted that similar legis-
lation failed to pass in New York this year. 
Resignations from "Citizens United 
for a Fair Housing Law". 
In view of the recent advertisement of "Citizens 
United" listing its members, it may not be inappropriate 
to observe, that apparently a number of the memb~rs have 
resigned. A comparison of an earlier list with that re-
cently published indicates that there have been as many 
as twelve resignations. 
' 
'Real Issue. 
To repeat what I have said in earlier statements, the 
]C!_I:!110 --.!:l _n _..-:1 t _ha onl]l iccuo invohrod in _thi~;;:. flnntrOV:Jol"C'' ico 
Integration in Housing. 
The proponents' continued insistance on forced in-
tegration in housing displays a callous disregard for in-
dividual freedom. To force people to live together against 
their wishes is a gross violation of a basic right without 
which a person cannot be said to be free. 
Loss of Freedom. 
For some years we have seen the rights of the in-
dividual in this country being steadily whittled away and 
the powers of government increased. And now we have 
this major assault on the right of private property. Unless 
this trend is promptly checked, the inevitable outcome 
will be the abolition of the right of private property, lo~s 
of the people's liberty and the establishment of a fully 
sociali7ed state with its autocratic government. 
What an end this would be to the greatest experi-
ment in individual liberty ever tried by man! 
Seven and a half centuries ago, the Barons at 
Runnymede wrung from King John the Magna Carta, re-
garded as the beginning of individual liberty among the 
English-speaking people. During the centuries following, 
a continual struggle was wageL1 to free the individual from 
the domination of the state and make the people, not the 
government. the master. 
Our Declaration of Independence , was a demand for 
less governmental interference in the lives of the citizens. 
and the Revolutionary War was fought for the purpose of 
enforcing this demand. 
But now in the last several decadPS we have witnessed 
the amazing and distressing spectacle of a trend back 
toward autocratic government advocated and promoted 
by persons who call themselves "Liberals" and who de-
nounce their opponents as "Reactionaries." Had anyone 
prior to this recent period suggested that King John was 
a "Liberal" and that the Barons at Runnymede and those 
who have since carried on the struggle to limit the power 
of the state were "Reactionaries," he would have been 
regarded as a fit subject for an insan~e asylum. How. 
easily arc the people fooled by mere titles! 
Socialism has never worked. It will ruin any nation 
that adopts it. 
Freedom. the antithesis of socialism, has been well 
defined as "the right of' the individual to work out his 
destiny, with whatever capacities he possesses. without 
interference from government beyonG that necessary to 
prevent him from interfering with the freedom of others." 
(The Freeman. September. 1954.) 
"Americans will not vote themselves out of freedom 
with their eyes open. But with their eyes half open thr>y 
can be fooled and bit by bit the right of private owner-
ship can be pulled gently awav from them." (Dr. George 
S. ·Benson, President of Harding College.) 
This must not be allowed fo happen here. 
If you wish to ioin in record,ng 
your opposition to the so-called 
.. Fair Housing Bill," please sign 
the attached coupon and mail it to_:_._._ __ 
I 
COMMITTEE against THE SO-CALLED "FAIR HOUSING BILL" 
49 Westminster Street, Room 104 
Providence 3l Rhode Island 
Tel: GA 1-5078 
April 2, 1959 
Dear Friends: 
It is extremely important that you come to the State House 
in Providence on Tuesday, April 7th, at 12:30 P.M. 
Go to the House of Representatives (2nd floor, west side) 
and ask for your own Representative. (If you don't remember his 
name, ask for a Representative from your city or town.) Also visit 
the Senate (2nd floor, east side) and see your Senator. There will 
be people at the State House who can answer your inquiries. 
Make it clear to your Senator and Representative, and to 
everyone else, that you are OPPOSED to the passage of the so-called 
"Fair Housing Bill" in any form. 
Great pressure is being put on our legislators by a small, 
well-organized group to impose on the people of Rhode Island this 
unwise and unfair Bill to control private housing. Join with other 
citizens at the State House on Tuesday, April 7th, rain or shine, to 
convince our legislators that the vast majority of the people are 
against this Bill. Don't leave the job to someone else. 
Your help is needed. It won't take much time on Tuesday, 
although, if you can, I hope you will be with us for an hour. 
COME TO THE STATE HOUSE ON APRIL 7th AND BRING YOUR FRIENDS 
Very sincerely yours, 
The Real Issue in the So-Called 
"Fair Housing Bill" 
Efforts are still being made to confuse the real issue 
involved in the controversy over the so-called ":Fair Hous-
ing Bill." 
In an editorial published in the ProVidence Sunday 
.Journal for February 22nd, under the heading "Lippitt 
Hill Challenges Opponents of the Housing Bill," it is 
stated that "Finding housing for 450 Negro families dis-
placed by the Lippitt Hill redevelopment project will not 
be an easy job." 
After observing that it is unlikely that the Fair Hous-
ing Bill will be passed in time to meet the emergency, the 
editorial continues: "This fact provides an exce lent op 
portunity for opponents of the bill to prove by their own 
action their thesis that the Negro housing problem can be 
licked without a law." 
What an amazing statement! 
The great mass of opponents of the Bill are people of 
modest means-the owners and occupants of sma.l homes, 
many of them two and three family houses. A goodly 
portion of these people have invested their life sav:ngs in 
these houses, and are dependent upon the rents for their 
support. These are the people who the Journal says must 
provide the housing for the displaced Negroes, and not the 
supporters' of the Bill whose names appear in the literature 
of the "Citizens United For a Fair Housing Law" as the 
memberlil or supporters of that organization. These include 
some of our leading citizens-persons of substantial means 
with large single homes, who no doubt feel certain that the 
Bill will not affect them. I wonder how many of them have 
read the Bill. 
I wonder too if they were~ not induced to join the or-
ganization by its appealing title-"C1t1Zens United For a 
Fair Housing Law," without realizing what they were get-
ting into. Who could be so dep1aved as not to be in favor 
of Fair Housing? It is, of course, always open to a person 
to res1gn from such an organization if he feels he has 
made a mistake. 
It is about time that this Bill be called by its right 
name-"A Bill To Destroy Individual Liberty and create 
disunity in the U.S.A." 
As I have again and again pointed out, the issue is not 
whether relief should be afforded the unfortunate people 
who need it. Of course it should be provided-but by the 
usual government and charitable channels, and not by the 
people who own houses. 
The issue, and the only issue, is whether the individual 
should be deprived of rights which are essential to his 
freedom, the loss of which would conshute a major step 
toward the establishment of a fully socialist state. 
If an owner, regardless of his wishes, must under 
penalty of fine and imprisonment accept as a purchaser 
or tenant a person he does not want, how can it be said 
that such a person is free? This is the one and only issue, 
and people should not be misled by all the propaganda to 
the contrary. 
Signatures to the "Petition In Opposition To The 'Fair 
Housing Bill' " continue to pour in. Up to Saturday, Febru-
ary 21st, 2,454 such signatures had been received, and more 
are coming in daily. 
If you wish to join in recording 
your· opposition, please sign the 
attached coupon and mail it to ... 
B. I. Park, 
February 23, 1959. 
1103 Hospital Trust Building, 
Providence, Rhode Island 
ROBERT B. DRESSER 
r--------------- COUPON ---------------; 
' ' 
' ' I I am opposed to the passage of the so-called 1 
'.' "Fair Housing Bill" in any form whatsoever and 
1
• 
t desire to join in the petition against it. 
l Name ................ · ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · I 
. ' 
' ' I Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J' 
~--------------------------------------
(Postcard) 
URGENT~ 
OPPCNENTS OF "FAIR HOUSING BilL": 
Please WRITE and PHONE your State Senator and Representa-
tive without delay. (If you don't have their names, 
CAlL GAspee 1-5078.) 
Tell them that you are strongly opposed to passage of the 
"Fair Housing Bill" in any form, and urge them to vote 
against it. (If possible, send copy of letter to Speaker 
Harry Curvin, House of Representatives.) 
Organized pressure to force passage of this Bill will not 
succeed if YOU and YOUR FRIENDS act NOW. 
March 16, 1959. ROBERT B. DRESSER 
Notice To The Many Thousand 
Opponents Of So-Called 
"Fair Housing" Legislation 
On January 6 a so-called "Fair 
Housing" Bill (5.27) was introduced in 
the Senate of the Rhode Island General 
Assembly. 
Like the misnamed "Fair Housing" 
Bill of last year, which died in Commit-
tee, this Bill (5.27) would deny the right 
of people in this State to sell or rent 
private housing accomodations to any-
one of their own choosing. The Bill seeks 
to accomplish this result through the amend-
ment of an existing criminal statute (Chap-
ter 24, of Title II) of the General Laws, 
which prohibits discrimination on account 
of race, color, religion or ancestral origin 
with respect to "places of public ac-
commodation," by simply enlarging the 
statutory d~finition of "places of public 
accommodation so as to include "any 
housing accommodation offered for sale or 
rent which is one of five or more housing 
accommodations all of which are located 
on a single parcel of land or parcels of land 
that are contiguous without regard to high: 
ways or streets, and all of which any per: 
son owns or otherwise controls the sale or 
rental". 
Enforcement is placed in the hands of 
the Commission against Discrimination, 
which is empowered to act on its own ini-
tiative or on complaint of an aggrieved 
individual or an anti-bias organization. 
Failure to obey a decree of the Court en-
tered to enforce an order of the Commis-
sion is punishable by fine or imprisonment, ·· 
or both. 
This is no "compromise propos-
al,,! This Bill (S.2 7), cleverly camou-
flaged and under a new label, is essentially 
the same "Fair Housing" Bill, so-called, 
which we fought last year, except that it 
applies to fewer persons. The objectives 
and the methods are unchanged. 
In other words, the Bill is of the 
"watered down" or "less drastic" variety 
of which we warned you in our notice 
published as an advertisement in the Provi-
dence Journal on October 22, 1959. 
The terms "watered down" and "less 
drastic" merely mean that the Bill applies 
to fewer persons, not that it is in any sense 
less objectionable. The purpose, of course, 
is to reduce opposition by leading those not 
immediately affected by the Bill to believe 
that they are going to remain immune. 
This is an old trick, well known to those 
versed in such matters,-a small begin-
ning, with further expansion later until the 
ultimate objective (that is, control by the 
State of all private housing) is fully 
achieved. 
Such legislation must be stopped 
at the beginning. It must not be 
passed in any form. 
The present Bill (5.27) is, of course, 
class legislation of the rankest sort. Why 
limit the Bill to owners and occupants of 
property containing five units (for example, 
apartments or new plats) ? Is it not 
apparent that the only purpose is to elimi-
nate the opposition of those whose property 
contains a smaller number of units? There 
can be no other purpose. 
But let no one for a moment think that 
the legislation will end here. The ultimate 
goal of the proponents was and still is to 
include all housing accommodations. This 
was amply demonstrated by the Bill which 
they sponsored last year. Having failed 
in that attempt, they are now seeking to 
accomplish the same thing in a quieter, 
more subtle manner, by installments. The 
present Bill (S.27) is but a beginning. 
This Bill is an outrageous assault on 
individual liberty that any freedom-loving 
American, acquainted with its terms, will 
oppose. All of us must do everything in 
our power to defeat it. 
COMMITTEE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
Robert B. Dresser, Chairman 
January 7, 1960. 
Charles H. Lawton, Vice-Chairman 
Frank A. Martin, Jr., Vice-Chairman 
John V. Kean, Vice-Chairman 
Frank S. Shy, Treasurer 
Edwin T. Scallon, Secretary 
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SO-CALLED FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION 
The Rhode Island Story 
BY RoBERT B. DRESSER 
Foreword 
This is one of the most important Council Letters 
we have ever published. 
A "liberal" combine has set out to take away 
the property rights of every American by dictating 
to the owner to whom he may rent or sell his prop-
erty. It is being attempted through the soft-sound-
ing title of a "Fair Housing Bill," violation of 
which is a crime punishable by fine or imprison-
ment. 
The American people have only to be alerted in 
order to stop this tyrannical scheme in its tracks. 
Four States fell for this Bill this year-Colorado, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts and Oregon. 
The Bill was introduced in the Rhode Island 
Legislature and was backed by a large committee 
of prominent citizens. But one man, Robert B. 
Dresser of Providence, a nationally known lawyer 
and patriot and a director of the National Eco-
nomic Council, realized the dangers involved and 
EARLY last January leaders of both political Parties in the Rhode Island Legislature intro-
duced in both branches a so-called "Fair Housing 
Bill" prohibiting discrimination because of race, 
color, religion or national origin in the sale or 
rental of housing accommodations or land, or m 
making loans with respect to such property. 
Under the Bill an owner is forbidden (l) to 
make any written or oral inquiry concerning the 
race, color, religion or national origin of a pros-
pective purchaser or tenant, (2) to refuse to sell or 
rent his property for any such reason, or ( 3) to 
discriminate against an individual on any such 
ground in the terms of sale or lease. There are 
similar provisions regarding loans. Enforcement 
of the Act is placed in the hands of the Commis-
sion against Discrimination, which is empowered 
aroused the people of the State. As a result the Bill 
never even got out of committee. 
This measure is a threat to personal liberty in 
every State of the Union. On July 13, Governor 
Rockefeller of New York, addressing the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, promised that, at the 1960 Legislative Ses-
sion, he would recommend and push a "Fair Hous-
ing Bill." 
If we want to retain our liberty, someone in 
every State must take the leadership against this 
measure, as Mr. Dresser did in Rhode Island. And 
it isn't too soon to start now. 
Further information regarding the Rhode Island 
experience, including reprints of certain of the ad-
vertisements and other papers used, may be ob-
tained by writing Robert B. Dresser, 15 Westmin-
ster Street, Providence, R. I. 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, INC. 
to act on its own initiative or on complaint of an 
aggrieved individual or an organization chartered 
for the purpose of combatting discrimination or 
racism, or of safeguarding civil liberties. Failure 
to obey a decree of the Court entered to enforce an 
order of the Commission is punishable by "fine or 
imprisonment, or both." 
In short, the Bill deprives a property owner of 
the right to enjoy the benefits of property owner-
ship, and the right to choose for himself the per-
sons with whom he associates in connection with 
his own property-both of them basic rights in any 
free society. 
The Bill was sponsored and promoted by an 
organization called "Citizens United for a Fair 
Housing Law in Rhode Island," of which Irving 
Jay Fain is the Chairman. Members of the organi-
Copyright 1959, Nat ional Economic Council, Inc. 
zation include the leaders of both political Parties, 
prominent hankers, educators, and many of the 
clergy of all faith". 
A substantial numher of the members have since 
resigned. 
The Bill has had the vigorous support of Rhode 
Island's leading newspaper, the Providence Jour-
nal, which has by far the largest circulation of any 
paper in the State. 
During the legislative Session editorials support-
ing the Bill were published by the Providence 
Journal, as well as a considerable number of news 
articles declaring the need of better housing facili-
ties for Negroes and calling for an end of discrimi-
nation in the sale or renting of houses because of 
race, color, religion or national origin and for the 
passage of the so-called "Fair Housing Bill." 
Also, numerous letters were written to the Editor 
.of the Providence Journal and Evening Bulletin 
regarding the Bill. A majority of them supported 
the Bill, doubtless because the proponents were 
well organized and had the support of many of 
the clergy of all faiths. 
T HE movement is nationwide. A bill of this character has been introduced in some 13 or 
more States. It indicates a trend toward the ulti-
mate abolition of the right of private property, 
which is the aim of Socialism. 
While it has been made to appear by the pro-
ponents of the measure that the controversy is 
purely a Negro question, this is not the fact. The 
Bill applies to all races, and they are forbidden to 
discriminate against one another under penalty of 
fine or imprisonment. 
The opponents of the measure take the position 
that if any race wishes to live together in a house 
or community, whether they are English, Irish, 
Italian, Jewish, Yankee, Negro, or any other race, 
they should be permitted to do so. They likewise 
hold that if individuals prefer living in mixed 
racial households or communities they should be 
allowed to do so. The rule, they say, should work 
both ways. It is government compulsion to which 
they object. 
The opponents of the measure say that if a per-
son is to be deprived by government order of the 
right to choose his own associates and to have full 
enjoyment of his own property it is entirely logical 
to expect that he may eventually be deprived of 
freedom of speech and other rights which he now 
enjoys on the plea that the exercise of these rights 
is against the public interest. They ask, "Where is 
the line to be drawn?" 
In their view the issue is much broader than 
that of housing. It is whether the American people 
shall have liberty or ~ventual serfdom imposed by 
government dictatorship. 
The first opposition to the Bill appeared in a 
letter written by me to the Editor of the Providence 
.Tournal, which was published on January 11, 
1959, from which the following is quoted: 
"This, I submi t, is an outrageous and unconstitu-
tional interference with the right of private property 
and personal freedom. These rights, guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States. constitute the 
basic difference between a free society and a Social-
istic or Communistic society in which the government 
dictates and the people obey. ' 
" If a law of this sort can be passed, it is but a 
short step to extend it to owners who rent rooms or 
take in boarders. Or does the bill apply to those who 
rent rooms? (This paragraph was stricken from the 
letter as published by the f ournal.) 
"Is there no longer any respect for the Constitution 
or for the concept of private property and personal 
freedom ? 
"Have we at last reached a stage in our country's 
history when a person is no Ianger allowed to choose 
his own associates,-no longer master of his own 
house and undisputed owner of his own property? 
"If so, a major step has been taken toward the de· 
struction of the grea t American experiment in indi-
vidual liberty. 
"The issue is not whether any racial or religious 
group is superior or inferior to another. The issue is 
whether a person, regardless of his race or religion, 
is to be free to exercise certain fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. On this there should 
be no difference of opinion." 
THIS was followed by a series of articles which I had published as advertisements in the Provi-
dence Journal and Evening Bulletin, from certain 
of which I quote as follows: 
l. Advertisement dated January 26, 1959, and 
published February 3 and 8. 
"The so-called 'Fair Housing Bill' is based upon 
the premise that there are many people in Rhode 
Island who are living under depressed or sub-standard 
housing conditions. and that this situation can and 
should be cured by prohibiting discrimination be-
cause of race, color, religion or national origin in the 
sale or rental of housing accommodations or land, or 
the taking of mortgages on such property. 
~:- ~- * * 
"The only offense committed by the unfortunate 
owner is the exercise of what has heretofore been re-
garded as inviolable personal rights, namely ( 1) the 
right to choose one's own associates and (2) the right 
to enjoy the benefits of property ownership. 
" If these are not rights protected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, I am certain that it is a 
very different Constitution from what its authors in-
tended and students of the Constitution have for gen-
erations supposed. It is not surprising that. in the 
words of the Providence f ournal, 'No other State in 
the Union has such a law.' 
"And let there be no mistake, if this breach in the 
wall of Constitutional protection is permitted, it will 
be only a beginning. It would be but a short step to 
extend the law to owners who rent rooms in their 
own homes or take in boarders. The history of legis-
lation of this character is that it seldom ends with the 
original act. This is but a beginning. 
"The restrictions upon the use of private property 
cited by the proponents of the Bill, such as zoning 
legislation and the forbidding of nuisances, are obvi-
ously of a very different character. 
"Who would have thought that in this land of 
much-vaunted freedom serious consideration would 
ever be given to a proposal to deprive a person of the 
right to sell or rent his house, or an apartment in his 
house, to a respectable, law-abiding citizen of his own 
choice, and to put him in jail if he did so? And yet 
this is precisely what this Bill does. 
"I wonder if all those who have endorsed the Bill 
have fully understood its provisions and its possible 
consequences. Have they by any chance felt that they 
were not in a position, or not likely to be in a posi-
tion, where the law would affect them?" 
2. Advertisement dated February 23, 1959, and 
published February 25 and 26. 
"Efforts are still being made to confuse the real 
issue involved in the controversy over the so-called 
'Fair Housing Bill.' 
"In an editorial published in the Providence Sun-
day Journal for February 22nd under the heading 
'Lippitt Hill Challenges Opponents of the Housing 
Bill,' it is stated that 'Finding housing for 450 Negro 
families displaced by the Lippitt Hill redevelopment 
project will not be an easy job.' 
"After observing that it is unlikely that the Fair 
Housing Bill will be passed in time to meet the emer· 
gency, the editorial continues: 'This fact provides an 
excellent opportunity for opponents of the Bill to 
prove by their own action their thesis that the Negro 
housing problem can be licked without a law.' 
"WHAT AN AMAZING STATEMENT! 
"The great mass of opponents of the Bill are people 
of modest means-the owners and occupants of small 
homes, many of them two and three family houses. 
A goodly portion of these people have invested their 
life savings in these houses, and are dependent upon 
the rents for their support. These are the people who 
the ] ournal says must provide the housing for the 
displaced Negroes, and not the supporters of the Bill 
whose names appear in the literature of the 'Citizens 
United for a Fair Housing Law' as the members or 
supporters of that organization. These include some of 
our leading citizens-persons of substantial means 
with large single homes, who no doubt feel certain 
that the Bill will not affect them. I wonder how many 
of them have read the Bill. 
"I wonder too if they were not induced to join the 
organization by its appealing title--'Citizens United 
For a Fair Housing Law,' without realizing what they 
were getting into. Who could be so depraved as not 
to be in favor of Fair Housing? It is, of course, 
always open to a person to resign from such an or-
ganization if he feels he has made a mistake. 
"It is about time that this Bill be called by its right 
name-'A Bill To Destroy Individual Liberty and Cre-
ate Disunity in the U.S.A.' 
"As I have again and again pointed out, the issue 
is not whether relief should be afforded the unfortu-
nate people who need it. Of course it should be pro-
vided-but by the usual government and charitable 
channels, and not by the people who own houses. 
"The issue, and the only issue, is whether the indi-
vidual should be deprived of rights which are essential 
to his freedom, the loss of which would constitute a 
major step toward the establishment of a fully social-
ist state. 
"If an owner, regardless of his wishes, must under 
penalty of fine and imprisonment accept as a pur-
chaser or tenant a person he does not want, how can 
it be said that such a person is free? This is the one 
and only issue, and people should not be misled by 
all the propaganda to the contrary.'' 
3. Advertisement dated March 17, 1959, and pub-
lished March 22. 
"Letters to the editor continue to be published 
urging the passage of the so-called 'Fair Housing 
Bill' and denouncing its opponents. These letters per-
sist in ignoring the real issue, which is the right of 
private property and individual freedom. They con-
tinue to harp on the plight of the Negroes and the 
need of providing better housing conditions for them, 
which is not the issue at all. They further insist on 
integration in housing which means forcing people to 
live together whether they want to or not. If people 
wish to live together, they should be permitted to do 
so, but they should not be forced to do so against 
their will. 
"The same old line that 'human rights' are 'more 
sacred than property rights' is continually stressed, 
although a moment's thought would reveal the utter 
absurdity of such a distinction. 
* * * * 
"The Housing Bill strikes at the right of private 
property which is the keystone of our economic system 
of private enterprise and of our system of constitu-
tional government. Destroy that right and we descend 
to the degradation and despair of the despotic social-
ist state. 
"Don't think that this is just a figment of my im-
agination. A very competent judge of such matters in 
our nation's capital , commentin~ upo h _Rho_de 
Island Bill, recently wrote as follows: 
'I had heard that similar legislation was pending 
in several of the states. It is, of course, completely 
destructive of the right of property and is a form 
of nationalization of private property. 
'This assault upon the right of property in this 
country has prevailed in some areas and I predict 
that it will be quickly followed by other efforts 
which can but eventuate in a nationalization of 
property and a dictatorship akin to that which pre-
vails in Soviet Russia.' 
* * * * 
"The issue involved in the present controversy is far 
greater than the impact of this legislation upon the 
people of Rhode Island. As a country-wide movement 
it constitutes a serious threat to our entire economic 
system and our system of constitutional government 
under which the United States has become the richest 
and most prosperous country in the world with the 
widest distribution of wealth among its people that 
the world has ever known. 
"Are we going to scrap this system or preserve it? 
Those who believe it should be preserved will oppose 
the Housing Bill, in any form whatsoever, no matter 
how 'watered down' it may be. 
"It is unthinkable that any legislature composed of 
conscientious, patriotic Americans would ever pass 
the Housing Bill, whether in its present form or any 
other form. Even though 'watered down,' it would 
constitute but a beginning and the pressure would be 
continually renewed in the future to extend it to the 
utmost limits." 
4. Advertisement dated April 2, 1959, and pub-
lished April 5. 
"An article in the Providence Sunday Journal for 
March 15 states: 
'Rhode Island, which is considering Fair Hous-
ing legislation, is only one of 13 states in which 
similar legislation is pending.' 
"And the states are named. 
"It is significant that in Colorado and Massachu-
setts, two States in which legislative action has been 
taken, there was little or no opposition. The reason 
undoubtedly was that the real purpose and effect of 
the measure were not understood and that the legis-
lation was slipped through without the people or the 
members of the legislature being aware of its true 
character. There is grave danger that this will happen 
in other States." 
5. Advertisement dated April 27, 1959, and pub-
lished April29 and May 3. 
"MASSACHUSETTS BILL. 
"In articles published in the Providence Evening 
BulletiTIJ on April 22 and 24, the story is told of how 
the Bill was passed by the Massachusetts Legislature 
on a voice vote without debate, with no recorded op-
position and with little or no public opposition. The 
strategy used by the proponents, the Massachusetts 
Committee for Fair Housing Practices Legislation, was 
similar to that used by its counterpart in Rhode Island. 
The passage of the Bill in Massachusetts is hailed by 
the proponents of the Rhode Island Bill as a great 
victory and as establishing a precedent that should be 
followed here. 
"Of course the Bill passed, and the reason was that 
the Massachusetts public did not understand its real 
nature and its consequences. Had they understood, the 
Bill never would have been enacted. 
"The Bulletin articles commend the clever way in 
which the matter was handled by the proponents. 
Credit for the success is attributed in large measure 
to the 'quiet gradualist approach.' By 'quiet' is meant, 
I suppose, that as little publicity as possible was given 
to the matter. By 'gradualist approach' is meant the 
acceptance of a less drastic Bill than desired as a be-
ginning with the expectation of more later. As I have 
pointed out in earlier articles, this is the usual course 
of legislation of this sort,-a small beginning with 
further expansion from time to time until the ultimate 
objective is fully achieved. Such legislation must be 
stopped at the beginning. It must not be accepted in 
any form, however harmless it may appear. 
"All that is required to prevent the enactment of 
such legislation is for the people to understand its 
nature and effect. What has happened in Massachu-
setts and earlier in Colorado could not, I am con-
vinced, happen here, for the reason that the public of 
this State are aware of the evil nature and conse-
quences of the proposed legislation and are over-
whelmingly opposed to its passage in any form. 
"Incidentally, it should he noted that similar 
legislation failed to pass in New York this year. 
* * * * 
"INTEGRATION IN HOUSING. 
"The proponents' continued insistence on forced in-
tegration in housing displays a callous disregard for 
individual freedom. To force people to live together 
against their wishes is a gross violation of a basic 
right without which a person cannot be said to be 
free. 
"LOSS OF FREEDOM. 
"For some years we have seen the rights of t-he in-
dividual in this country being steadily whittled away 
and the powers of government increased. And now 
we have this major assault on the right of private 
property. Unless this trend is promptly checked, the 
inevitable outcome will be the abolition of the right 
of private property, loss of the people's liberty and 
the establishment of a fully socialized state with its 
autocratic government. 
"What an end this would be to the greatest experi-
ment in individual liberty ever tried by man! 
"Seven and a half centuries ago, the Barons at 
Runnymede wrung from King John the Magna Carta, 
regarded as the beginning of individual liberty among 
the English-speaking people. During the centuries fol-
lowing, a continual struggle was waged to free the in-
dividual from the domination of the state and make 
the people, not the government, the master. 
"Our Declaration of Independence was a demand 
for less governmental interference in the lives of the 
citizens, and the Revolutionary War was fought for 
the purpose of enforcing this demand. 
"But now in the last several decades we have wit-
nessed the amazing and distressing spectacle of a trend 
back toward autocratic government advocated and pro-
moted by persons who call themselves 'Liberals' and 
who denounce their opponents as 'Reactionaries.' Had 
anyone prior to this recent period suggested that King 
John was a 'Liberal' and that the Barons at Runny-
mede and those who have since carried on the struggle 
to limit the power of the state were 'Reactionaries,' he 
would have been regarded as a fit subj ect for an in-
sane asylum. How easily are the people fooled by 
mere titles! 
"Socialism has never worked. It will ruin any 
nation that adopts it. 
"Freedom, the antithesis of socialism, has been well 
defined as 'the right of the individual to work out his 
destiny, with whatever capacities he possesses, without 
interference from government beyond that necessary 
to prevent him from interfering with the freedom of 
others.' (The Freeman, September, 1954.) 
" 'Americans will not vote themselves out of free-
dom with their eyes open. But with their eyes half 
open they can be fooled and bit by bit the right of 
private ownership can be pulled gently away from 
them.' (Dr. George S. Benson, President of Harding 
College.) 
"THIS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN 
HERE." 
6. Advertisement dated May 7, 1959, and pub-
lished May 10. 
"NATURE OF OPPOSITION. 
"There appears to be a misunderstanding on the 
part of some of our citizens as to the nature of the 
opposition to the so-called 'Fair Housing Bill.' It is not 
in any sense a matter of emotion that will disappear 
with the passage of time. 
"The opposition is based upon a firm conviction 
that the real issue is the preservation of individual 
liberty. This was the issue that prompted the Declara-
tion of Independence. It was the cause for which the 
Revolutionary War was fought. 
"That people should be indignant at an assault upon 
their freedom should cause no surpri se. A burglar who 
tries to break into a house will be resisted by any 
redblooded owner with all the power at his command. 
Further attempts will be met with like re~istanre. It 
is not a matter of emotion. but a ma tter of 8elf 
defense. 
"MISLEADING TITLE OF HOUSING BILL. 
" In the e days when there are so many important 
and complicated issue5 hefore the country, it is un-
derstandable that persons, mi8led by the appealing 
title of a proposal, such as 'Fair Housing,' should en-
dorse it without a full examination of its terms. It is 
to be hoped, however, that all such persons, when they 
have become fully aware of the facts, will withdraw 
their endorsement. as many have already done. 
"PROPEHTY RIGHTS VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS. 
"The proponents of the Housing Bill still continue 
to declare that 'human rights' are 'more sacred than 
property rights,' despite the absurdity of the distinc-
tion. Property itself has neither rights nor value, save 
only as human interests are involved. There are no 
rights but human rights, and what are spoken of as 
property rights are only the human rights of individ· 
uals to property. 
'The ownership of property is the right for which, 
above all others, the common man has stnwgled in 
his slow ascent from serfdom. " 
* * * * 
'A man without property rights- without the right 
to the product of his own labor-is not a free man. 
He can exist only through the generosity or forbear-
ance of others.'" (Essay by Paul L. Poirot. of the 
Foundation for Economic Education.) 
"PERMA ENT ORGANIZATIO 1 • 
of.· -~· ·:1- ~·-
"Many have expressed a desire to form a permanent 
organization to safeguard individual liberty and to 
oppose ~he pass~ge of legislation designed to destroy 
or restnct that hberty. The Housing Bill in its present 
or any other form is a measure of this character. 
"Such an organization should be formed. It would , 
I am confident, attract the support of thousands of our 
citizens who would on all occasions and without re-
gard to political affiliations make the preservation of 
individual liberty paramount to all other issues. 
"It is my intention to submit for consideration a 
plan for such an organization." 
D URING the legislative session a petition op-posing passage of the so-called "Fair Hous-
ing Bill" in any form whatsoever was circulated, 
and coupons were attached to newspaper adver-
tisements expressing the individual's opposition to 
the Bill and his desire to join in the petition against 
it. By means of the petitions and coupons over 
5400 signatures were secured. Mimeographed 
copies of the petition with the signatures obtained 
from time to time were sent to the Governor of the 
State, to the members of the General Assembly, 
and to certain other individuals. In all, seven 
batches of signatures were mailed to this list. 
Also, an excellent pamphlet containing a list of 
"Questions and Answers on the so-called 'Fail 
Housing Bill'" was prepared for The Rhode 
I land State Association of Real Estate Boards 
and The Home Builders Association of Rhode Is-
land by John V. Kean, a law partner of mine. 
This was published as an advertisement during 
March, and was also widely distributed. 
On May 26, 1959, the General Assembly ended 
it ession without the Bill being reported out of 
either the Senate or House committee to which it 
had been referred. 
The proponents, however, have publicly stated 
that they "are more determined than ever" to push 
for its passage next year. 
During the legislative Session the proponents 
were given two hearings before the House Judi-
ciary Committee. 
The opponents were given a hearing before that 
Committee on February 20. It was an evening 
hearing, held in the House Chamber, and was at-
tended by more than 500 persons, the largest num-
ber ever to attend a legislative committee hearing 
in the State of Rhode Island. Twenty persons poke 
against the measure. 
On February 10, the Pawtucket Real Estate 
Board voted 26-2 to oppose the Bill. Frank A. 
Martin, Jr., the President, and Charles H. Lawton, 
Jr., a prominent member, with a number of other 
associates, became greatly interested, and with 
John V. Kean played a prominent part in defeating 
the legislation. One of the highlights of the cam-
paign was a mass meeting at the Tolman High 
School in Pawtucket on the evening of March 25, 
arranged by them, which was attended by about 
500 persons. 
Throughout the controversy very effective work 
against the Bill was done by Edwin T. Scallon of 
Providence. 
T HE proponents of this legislation are well or-ganized, apparently well financed, and de-
termined to secure the enactment of this legislation 
throughout the country. 
An organization called "National Committee 
Against Discrimination in Housing," located at 35 
We:: t 32nd Street, New York City, appears to be 
taking a leading part in the movement. 
The following is quoted from a letter sent out 
by that organization under date of May 26, 1959, 
signed by "Eleanor Roosevelt" and "Jackie Rob-
inson": 
''Dear Friend: 
" Have you heard the good news? Colorado, Massa-
chusetts, Oregon, and Connecticut have just joined New 
York City and Pittsburgh in passing state laws barring 
discrimination in private housing. Ten years ago even 
the most starry-eyed would not have predicted this. 
"Today communities across the nation are stirring, 
neighbors are organizing, articles are appearing in 
national magazines. There is a coast-to-coast move-
ment to break down the barriers. 
"The National Committee Against Discrimination 
in Housing has for ten years played a key roll in alert-
ing, educating, informing, and stimulating communi-
ties over the nation to combat residential segregation. 
* * * * 
"We believe the NCDH program is basic to the 
whole Civil Rights Challenge." 
On the reverse side of this letter appears the 
following list of the Committee's "Member Organi-
zations": 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO; American Civil Liberties Union; American 
Council on Human Rights; American Ethical Union; 
American Friends Service Committee; American Jew-
ish Committee; American Jewish Congress; Ameri-
can Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO; American Veterans 
Committee; Americans for Democratic Action; Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; Congregational 
Christian Churches, Council of Social Action and 
Race Relations Department, Board of Home Missions; 
Cooperative League of the USA; Friendship House; 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-
CIO; International Union of Electrical, Radio and 
Machine Workers, AFL-CI 0; Jewish Labor Commit-
tee; League for Industrial Democracy; The Methodist 
Church, Woman's Division of Christian Service; Mi-
gration Division, Puerto Rican Department of Labor; 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People; National Association of Intergroup Relations 
Officials; National Council of Negro Women; Na-
tional Council of Churches of Christ, Race Relations 
Department; National Urban League; Presbyterian 
Church, USA, Department of Social Education and 
Action; United Auto Workers of America, AFL-CIO; 
United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO. 
This legislation is also supported by the Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, as appears from the Spring 
1958 Edition of its publication, the Lawyers Guild 
Review, "Special Issue on Integration in Hous-
- " mg. 
A N organization called the "Committee for In· 
~ dividual Liberty" has just been formed in 
Rhode Island, having as its initial objective "to 
prevent the passage of any measure prohibiting 
discrimination because of race, color, religion, or 
national origin in the sale or renting of housing 
accommodations or land, or in making loans with 
respect to such property." 
The issue is one of the most important before 
the country today. It involves no less than the pres-
ervation of individual liberty. 
This legislation can he defeated if a sufficient 
effort to inform and arouse the people is promptly 
made. Otherwise, its passage is inevitable. 
Certainly there must he enough people in the 
various States to provide the leadership and or-
ganization necessary to check this movement. 
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SO-CALLED 
"FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION" 
Letter to the Editor of the Providence Journal 
August 17, 1959 
Dear Sir: 
My attention has been called to an ar-
ticle appearing in the Sunday Journal for 
yesterday, August 16, at page N-24, bear-
ing the title "R.I. Fair Housing Defeat 
Cited as Model." 
Your article deals with an article written 
by me appearing in the August 1st issue 
of the Economic Council Letter, which is 
published by the National Economic Coun-
cil, located in New York City. In my ar-
ticle I attempt to tell the story of the so-
called Fair Housing Bill in Rhode Island. 
The purpose of the article was to acquaint 
the people of other states with the nature 
of the apparently country-wide movement 
to secure the passage of such legislation by 
the various state legislatures,-a purpose 
which you evidently consider an unworthy 
one. 
While your article appears as a news 
item, it shoUld have been published as an 
editorial, for it is grossly and maliciously 
slanted against my article and the cause 
for which !.speak. 
Let me cite a few examples: 
National Economic Council 
"controversial" and "anti-Semitic" 
Your arti"cle states: 
"The council letter is published by the con-
troversial National Economic Council, of which 
Mr. Dresser (s a director and Merwin K. Hart 
is president. The National Economic Council 
has been accused of anti-Semitism and other 
defamatory activity by a congressional inves-
tigating committee." 
By this I assume you wish your readers 
to understand that Mr. Hart and the Di-
rectors of the National Economic Council, 
of which I am one, are "controversial" 
characters and that we are guilty of "anti-
Semitism." Among the controversial and 
much-to-be-despised characters are Lt. Gen. 
P. A. del Valle, U.S.M.C., retired, who had 
a distinguished combat record as a com• 
mander of Marines in World War n, and 
Vice Adm. C. S. Freeman, U.S.N., retired, 
who likewise had a distinguished record in 
World War II. Both of them are Vice-
Presidents and Directors, and their names 
appear in the Economic Council Letter 
which you are criticizing. I might also add 
the name of- MajeP-GenePal ChaPlea--..:'~. Wil 
loughby, U.S.A., retired, a Director of the 
Council, who played such a prominent part 
in the Pacific war. 
"Controversial" is a term frequently used 
by those who resort to the low and con-
temptible practice of "smearing"; and the 
same is true of "anti-Semitism." I assume 
you mean by the latter term "anti-Jewish", 
-or do you also include the Arabs and 
other Semitic races? 
Let me say right here and now that 
neither Mr. Hart nor I am anti-Jewish. The 
same, I am confident, is true of the other 
officers and directors. We are pro-Ameri-
can, regardless of race, creed or color, and 
are opposed to those who are against true 
Americanism. 
Mr. Hart, a graduate of Harvard College, 
is an intelligent, able man, of unimpeach-
able integrity, and is one of the most patri-
otic persons I know. It is regrettable that 
he has to spend so much of his time trying 
to counteract the harm that such news-
papers as yours are doing. 
But why, after all, are you concerned 
with the character of Mr. Hart and the 
other officers and directors of the National 
Economic Council? Grant that we are all 
scoundrels, what has that got to do with 
so-called "Fair Housing Legislation?" 
Why not stick for a moment to the issue 
of whether so-called "Fair Housing Legis-
lation" is good legislation, and stop trying 
to mislead your readers by irrelevant 
smears? 
Dresser Born in Savannah. Georgia 
You state that I was born in Savannah, 
Georgia. Just what has that to do with the 
question at issue? Perhaps you seek to 
convey the impression that having been 
born in the South I am anti-Negro. If such 
is your purpose, it is a malicious, con-
temptible falsehood. 
Not that it is of any relevance, but to 
keep the record straight, my parents came 
from Massachusetts, I left Georgia when 
I was four years old, and I have lived in 
New England ever since. 
Charges of Communism 
Your comments about my charges of 
Communism and the National Lawyers 
Guild are misleading, and apparently in-
tended to be such. The language which you 
quote about the Guild was not my lan-
guage, but that of the Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee of the House of Jtep-
resentatives. 
If you had any intention of presenting 
the matter fairly you would have quoted 
my letter withdrawing my accusations 
against the Guild, which contained the full 
text of the letter of the United States De-
partment of Justice to the Lawyers Guild 
advising the latter of the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision to discontinue the proceed-
ing to designate the Guild as subversive. 
Backers of Fair Housing Legislation 
If you consider the character and repu-
tation of the National Economic Council 
and its officers and directors of such great 
importance and you desire to be fair and 
impartial, why don't you tell us something 
about the organizations that are backing 
the "Fair Housing Legislation" on a na-
tional level and whether you consider an)"' 
of them "controversial?" They are listea 
in the Economic Council Letter of which 
you are so critical. 
Let me quote from the Council Letter 
the following paragraphs: 
"The pro@nenfs of this legislation ga welJ 
organized, apparently well financed, and d~ 
termined to secure the enactment of this legis-
lation throughout the country. 
"An organization called 'National Commit-
fee Against Discrimination in Housing,' located 
at 35 West 32nd Street, New York City, ap-
pears to be faking a leading part in the 
movement. 
"The following is quoted from a letter sent 
out by that organization under date of May 
26, 1959, signee/ by 'Eleanor Roosevelt' and 
'Jackie Robinson': · 
"'Dear Friend: 
" 'Have you heard the good news? Colo-
rado, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Connecticut 
have just joined New York City and Pittsburgh 
in passing state laws barring discrimination in 
private housing. Ten years ago even the most 
starry-eyed would not have predicted this. 
" 'Today communities across the nation are 
stirring, neighbors are organizing, articles are 
appearing in national magazines. There is a 
coast-to-coast movement to break down the 
barriers. 
" 'The National Committee Against Discrim-
ination in Housing has for ten years played 
a key roll in alerting, educating, informing, 
and stimulating communities over the nation 
to combat residential segregation. 
* * * * 
"'We believe the NCDH program is basic 
t---"....._.'n.-~.wJ.o/.e.. Civ.il~lm-C~~ 1--
"0n the reverse side of this letter appears 
the following list of the Committee's 'Member 
Organizations': 
"'Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL-C/0; American Civil Liberties Union; 
American Council on Human Rights; American 
Ethical Union; American Friends Service Com-
mittee; American Jewish Committee; American 
Jewish Congress; American Newspaper Guild, 
AFL-C/0; American Veterans Committee; 
Americans for Democratic Action; Anti-Defa-
mation League of B'nai B'rifh; Congregational 
Christian Churches, Council of Social Action 
and Race Relations Department, Board of 
Home Missions; Cooperative League of the 
USA; Friendship House; International Ladies' 
Garment Workers' Union, AFL-C/0; Interna-
tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers, AFL-C/0; Jewish Labor Committee; 
League for Industrial Democracy; The Method-
ist Church, Woman's Division of Christian 
Service; Migration Division, Puerto Rican De-
partment of Labor; National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People; Na-
tional Association of Intergroup Relations 
OHicials; National Council of Negro Women; 
National Council of Churches of Christ, Race 
Relations Department; National Urban 
League; Presbyterian Church, USA, Depart-
ment of Social Education and Action; United 
Auto Workers of America, AFL-C/0; United 
Steel Workers of America, AFL-C/0.' 
"This legislation is also supported by the 
National Lawyers Guild, as appears from the 
Spring 1958 Edition of its publication, the 
Lawyers Guild Review, 'Special Issue on Inte-
gration in Housing.' " 
Conclusion 
In closing may I quote from an editorial 
published in the Sunday Journal for Janu-
uary 18, 1959, under the title "The Fair 
Housing Law Would Benefit R.I.": 
"Precisely because it is unique in its 
scope, the proposed bill is certain to pro.-
voke controversy. This is as it should be, 
because no new departure in public policy 
ought to be undertaken without thorough-
going democratic debate. We have no 
doubt that all of the reputable citizens 
who endorse the plan have done so with 
good will and in good faith. By the same 
token, they should be prepared to accept 
honorable and open opposition to the bill 
in the spirit in which it is offered. To op-
pose the bill in good faith will no more 
mark a man as a bigot than lip-service to 
integration converts a hypocrite into an 
honest man." 
Apparently you regard as outmoded the 
maxim that one should practice what he 
preaches. 
Very trUly yours, 
ROBERT B. DRESS;ER 
